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The present political climate in which the ideals. of entrepreneurship and
self-help are strongly encouraged has drawn attention to those ethnic
minorities noted for their entrepreneurial activity. Since the Chinese
appear to be an exemplary case in point, this thesis focusses upon the
historical material conditions which have led to the formation of a
Chinese 'business' community in Britain, both past and present. As such,
it rejects the theories of cultural determinism which characterise most
studies of the Chinese. For rather than representing the endurance of
cultural norms, the existence of the contemporary Chinese 'niche' of
ethnically exclusive firms in the catering industry is due to the
conjunction of a number of historical processes. The first is the
imperialist expansion into China of Britain's capitalist empire during the
nineteenth century which established a relationship of dependency upon the
interests of British capital by colonial Chinese labour. The second is the
post war development of the catering industry and its demand for cheap
labour as administered by the British state together with the
contemporaneous development of the agricultural economy of colonial Hong
Kong. Far from representing a source of material benefit to all, the
ethnic Chinese 'niche' in catering is highly exploitative and merely
underlines the racial oppression of Chinese in Britain. Attempts to
promote business interests within the ethnic community therefore serve
merely to entrench the structures of oppression.
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INTRODUCTION
In the present climate of general industrial decline in the major
productive centres of the Western world, local ethnic communities with a
reputation for entrepreneurship have been brought increasingly under the
focus of political strategies aimed at economic revival, This is
underpinned by beliefs in the proclivities for 'self-help' attributed to
some ethnic minorities and not others. One group which has fallen target
to this 'culturalist' labelling is the Chinese, who throughout the world
have been noted for an apparent orientation towards business ownership.
Such ideas were encapsulated in the words of British sociologist Peter
Hall (1981 p.122):
"in the period when inner city innovation did flourish, it did so to a
remarkable degree with the aid of newly-arrived groups of people who
brought with them a stong entrepreneurial tradition. The Hugots in
London in the seventeenth century, the Jews at the end of the nineteenth,
the Indians in our day, all provide examples. The same might happen
again, if we attracted small businessmen, with capital and expertise, to
settle and establish small workshops and trading centres. Thus we might
being to emulate the drive and enthusiasm of emerging centres like
Singapore or Hongkong."
On the American experience, Rose (1985 pp.182-183) expounded in greater
detail upon the cultural virtues of the Chinese at which Hall had merely
hinted:
"The images of those who used to be called "Orientals" have changed
dramatically... The pariahs have become paragons, lauded for their
ingenuity and industry and for embodying the truest fulfillment of the
"American Dream". Ronald Reagan has called them "Our exemplars of hope
and inspiration... The characteristics are familiar: a deep sense of ethnic
identification and group loyalty; a high level of filial respect; a heavy
emphasis on proper demeanor and on the seriousness of life; a firm belief
in the importance of education; a tendency toward extrinsic assimilation;
and an overriding attitude that one must advance as far as possible not
just for oneself, but so that parents can enjoy the Chinese ... equivalent
of what in Yiddish is known as nacbas fun die Kinder, "pleasure from the
[accomplishments of] children"."
By studying the case of the Chinese in Britain, this thesis seeks not only
to explode some of the popular myths and stereotypes which inform
attitudes to Chinese communities but also to expose the explanatory
inadequacy and reactionary politics of culturalist arguments. Unlike the
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vast majority of work on Chinese communities, therefore, this study goes
far beyond an etlinography of everyday life for Britain's Chinese;
something which Robert Miles (1982 p.67) might have termed "a simple
cataloguing of cultural difference (a dictionary of the 'exotic')", Instead,
the method of analysis presented by this study is the historical
materialism of political economy, a methodology that renders qualitatively
different conclusions from those of the culturalists.
Chapter 1 defines the parameters of the political economy approach,
establishing a case developed from a critique of competing analyses used
to study Chinese communities. The following chapter then proceeds to
explore the historical material conditions which structured the emergence
of Chinese 'business' communities under the economic and political umbrella
of Western colonial expansion. Within this framework, special attention is
given to the development of the entrepreneurial basis of the early Chinese
community in Britain, Chapter 3 goes on to examine the foundations of the
contemporary small business concentration of Chinese in Britain, reviewing
in detail the factors which have shaped the profile of the Chinese
catering 'niche'. The discussion includes a historical consideration of the
catering industry and the role that migrant workers have played within it
as well as the particular circumstances which led to the post war Chinese
migrants to enter into a specifically ethnic sector of catering. The focus
then turns to their personal experiences of this process. Chapter 4
traces the subsequent development of the catering industry in terms of the
American-led 'fast food' expansion of the 1970s and its impact upon the
Chinese community, both objectively and subjectively. Here and in Chapter
3, care is taken to present people's experiences as accurately and as
sensitively as possible by reproducing tape-recorded verbal accounts
solicited from Chinese people themselves, The final chapter returns again
to the original themes of the thesis, drawing together the underlying
arguments in a conclusive rejection of the ideology of culturalisni, ethnic
small business generation and economic revival. Finally, the discussion is
set within the practical context of the contemporary political intiatives
to encourage ethnic entrepreneurship.
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RESEARCH XETHODS & DATA COLLECTION
The research for this study was conducted through a variety of means.
These were as follows,
1) A wide ranging literature survey of books, articles, reports and
dissertations pertaining to the subject of the thesis: this was achieved
through pursuing references taken from book and journal bibliographies,
computerised library searches (University of Aston in Birmingham, London
Research Centre), daily reviews of press articles and a trawl of library
material by subject at the Universities of Aston, Birmingham, Warwick and
London (Senate House & London School of Economics), Birmingham City
Library, the Office of Population, Census & Statistics, the Runnymede Trust,
the Institute of Race Relations, the Centre for Research on Ethnic
Relations and the Centre for Urban and Regional Studies,
2) Consultation with statutory and non-statutory bodies with an
overlapping interest in the areas of concern (listed at - the end of the
thesis): an important achievement arising from this exercise was the
completion of a tendered research project on the local Chinese and
Vietnamese communities in Birmingham with regard to local authority
service provision for Birmingham City Council Race Relations Unit (Baxter
1986),
3) Active participation in Chinese community groups: including part-time
community advice work, organisational work on management committees,
defence campaigns and a strike support group (Chinese Community Centre,
Birmingham; Chinese Information & Advice Centre, London),
4) Semi-structured, tape-recorded and transcribed interviews solicited
through community based activities: these numbered fifty seven in total
but varied greatly in terms of length and quality.
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN RESEARCH & DATA COLLECTION
A political economy methodology, in particular, necessarily requires as
many statistical data and as much factual evidence as possible to
substantiate an argument. The major problem for this study was an acute
lack of reliable, corroborative information of any such nature even in the
most basic of areas, such as the size and distribution of the Chinese
community in Britain. The best existing measure for calculating this is
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the 1981 Census (supplemented by the Labour Force Survey). However, as is
commonly recognised, the 1981 Census <Table 4) recorded only country of
birth rather than ethnic origin and In this sense probably grossly under-
enumerated the Chinese community in Britain. It was not possible to
identity Chinese people purely on the basis of name (for example, from the
Electoral Regiter) because of the similarities between certain Chinese and
English surnames names ("Lee" for instance), non-Chinese with Chinese
surnames (particularly amongst the Afro-Caribbean community) and Chinese
people who have taken non-Chinese surnames (for instance, through
marriage). This was complicated further by the fact of many Chinese
adopting English forenames ±or convenience, as is commonly the custom in
urban Hong Kong.
On the contemporary history of Chinese migrants both in Hong Kong and
Britain, again there is hardly any reliable documented information. The
scale of the ethnic Chinese catering industry was measured by the Home
Affairs Committee (1984-5) entirely upon the basis of "community
estimates". A systematic attempt at sampling a representative cross
section of Birmingham's Chinese community for interview by questionnaire
based on files held at the local Chinese Community Centre was thus finally
abandoned when adequate demographic and other necessary information
proved impossible to obtain. The interview sample therefore was based
upon an approximation of the demography of the Chinese community in
Birmingham with regard to social class, gender, occupation, age group and
generation. However, It was felt that neither the quality nor accuracy of
the data suffered in respect of this.	 Selected excerpts from these
intereviews are reproduced in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis.
My thanks is extended to E.Ellis Cashinore, George Paton and Annie
Phizacklea, who (consecutively) advised upon and supervised the content
and direction of this thesis.
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CIL&PTER
APPROACHING CHINESE COIOWNITIES IN BUSINESS
INTRODUCTIQI
This chapter seeks to define the methodological parameters of the thesis.
As such, it builds upon a review of the relevant literature, the bulk of
which is cast within a theoretical mould that assumes culture to be the
most significant determinant of entrepreneurship. This 'culturalist'
perspective characterises most studies of Chinese communities throughout
the world, as well those that focus on non-Chinese minorities renowned for
entrepreneurial activity. The following discussion thus attempts to chart
the culturalist argument in its various manifestations, presenting a case
throughout for a more rigorous and sophisticated analysis of Chinese and
other apparently 'business-oriented' communities. Such an analysis, it is
argued, is offered by the historical material method of 1(arxist political
economy, which has the capacity to portray and explain more accurately the
totality of Chinese people's experiences in Britain.
A case is made by first addressing the most simplistic culturalist studies
which culminate in the notion of the 'middleman minority'. The conceptual
frameworks and theoretical propositions which underpin them are then
abstracted for critical discussion. From this is derived a sharper
analytical approach to the biological implications that are lodged tacitly
in the culturalist 'middleman' argument and then to the more developed
theories of the 'ethnic enclave'. Having exhausted the culturalist
literature, the chapter proceeds to consider another body of 'ethnic
business' studies which align themselves to the Chicago 'urban ecology'
school. Vhilst these provide valuable observations that contradict the
conclusions of the culturalists, they nevertheless fall short of offering
the level of explanation afforded by political economy. In conclusion, the
implications of this critical review for the structure and direction of the
thesis are explicitly summarised. This is what is taken to constitute a
discussion of methodology. It is not so much concerned with the mechanics
of research technique as with fundamental principles of analysis.
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CULTURAL DETERUNISM AND ETHNIC ENTERPRISE
'Culture', to postulate a received definition, is a repertoire of social
relations and institutions which are particular to every society. There
are sub-cultures whose boundaries to an extent cut across the dominant
culture ('working class culture', for example) but these are all necessarily
defined by the overarching culture. These social relations have an
ideological counterpart, for without the latter, the institutions would be
devoid of meaning [1]. Chinese culture, it is popularly believed, is
especially enduring, so much so that the cultural dimension has virtually
monopolised all sociological studies of Chinese communities.
Bernard ong (1979) on New York's Chinatown community represents a
classic case of the culturalist approach. Wong expressly set out to
remedy what he perceived to be an inadequacy of the sociological
literature which was the failure to take into account the specific methods
used in the mabilisation of human resources to explain Chinese economic
activity. He documented how the New York Chinese community was an
"obvious" example of the "persistence of the old values" (ibid p.i3i), in
that people's lives were regulated according to the code of gam cMng
(trusting friendship), kinship solidarity and patronage, without which
entrpreneurial success would never have blossomed. He identified three
patterns of organisation within what were typically family firms which
facilitated the best use of training and labour, provided unchallenged
leadership and hence, swift adaptabilty to changing demand. Entrenched
customs of acquiring credit through family, friends and informal credit
clubs (known as wul or hui) safeguarded financing. Lastly, the resolution
of conflict through channels established according to community norms
ensured the smooth overall running of the ethnic economy. Thus, in
conclusion, Wong upheld that "Economic success and maintenance of the
ethnic businesses have a great deal to do with their successful
manipulation of kinship, friendship, patron-client and broker-client
networks" (ibid p.lTh).
In a study of Chinese businesses in Toronto, Chan and Cheung (1982)
emphasised the importance of "individual" advantages as well as cultural
institutions for the maintenance of the ethnic economy. 	 "Personal
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resources such as education and English language facility tend to
influence the type and nature of business one engages in" (ibj.d p.12).
Nonetheless, the authors concluded that
"The Chinese population provides a large pool of customers and potential
employees for these businesses... Other collective resources such as
partnership arrangements and family or kinship assistance also play some
role in the maintenance and growth of ethnic businesses." (ibid p.13)
Pitting Black entrepreneurs against those from Chinese and other American
Asian [2] groups, Light <1972) drew conclusions similar to those of Wong
(1979) on their relative achievements. Like Wong, Light also identified
the Jui as the mainstay of Chinese prosperity. The 1ui, moreover 1 was
deemed by Light to be a viable institution only by virtue of the cohesive
cultural bonds which existed between members: "the ability of the )1u1
routinely to provide credit without requiring collateral depended, in the
last analysis, on the strong, informal, and moralistic social relations of
lenders and borrowers" <Light 1972 op cit p.189). The financial advantage
rendered to Chinese entrepreneurs by the bul was said to account for their
greater success in comparison to Black businesses. The Ju1 circumvented
the difficulties presented by trying to acquire sufficiently sophisticated
expertise necessary for financial dealing in the mainstream economy, a
problem that supposedly "dogged ... Negro efforts in formal banking" (ibid
p.51). Continued business prosperity amongst the Chinese, according to
Light, was contingent upon "mutual aid" and "immigrant brotherhood" for
labour, custom and credit. In contrast, Blacks were "Deprived ... of any
valued ethnic identity" (ibid p.189) and thus were condemned to "rampant
individualism" which was not conducive to entrepreneurial success.
In a similar comparison of the successes of Black and Chinese Americans
in the vice industry, Budros (1983) attributed the accomplishments of the
Chinese to their specific forms of cultural organisation. He argued that
Chinese syndication was achieved
"because the Chinese immigrants utilized a traditional cultural form,
fighting 'tongs' (or 'secret organizations'), as a basis for the development
of their organized vice networks ...: overseas tong agents, for instance,
recruited prostitutes in South China; tong importers arranged for the
Chinese girls to be transported to America and then distributed to tong
brothels; and finally, the tongs protected their investments by paying-off
the police and employing the Chinese gangsters (or 'high-binders') to
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ensure the safety of their women ... (ibid p.442) Furthermore, it seems
that only cultural variables have the potential to emerge as the 'sole'
cause of vice syndication. (ibid p.443)"
Likewise, Charles Choy Vong (1977) on Black and Chinese grocery stores in
Los Angeles concluded that "the ethnic groups' divergent business
practices" (ibid p.460) accounted for their differential success rates. His
questionnaire survey revealed that cutomers felt Chinese store owners
possessed greater business acumen, invested more time and money in their
stores and were culturally more cohesive (ibid p.459) than Black grocers,
which explained their greater profits.
On the British as well as the American experience, Storey (1982) cited the
"lack of a tradition of enterprise amongst Iegroes" (p.92) as a reason for
their lower rates of entrepreneurship. 11oreover, with reference to a study
in the Seychelles by Benedict (1979), Storey (1982 op cit p.92) related
how "In short, the Indian and Chinese family structures oriented to
business development. The opposite is true for the Creoles", Benedict
(1979 op cit p.323) contended that the patriarchal family relations shared
by Indians and Chinese predisposed them to greater business success than
the typically "conjugal family with a neolocal nuclear family ideology" of
the local Creoles,
Another study by Light (1980) proposed that not only the Chinese but also
the Japanese and Koreans in America displayed similar cultural traits,
which made for a specific form of "ethnic business style" that was a
recipe for success. Like the Chinese, Koreans in Los Angeles also operated
rotating credit associations (or kye), nepotistic trade guilds, family
firms, ethnic homogeneity of business sales and maintained immigrant
motivations and values. It was this "ethnic solidarity and culture" (ibid
p54) that was deemed by Light to be the root cause of Korean business
success and not the "personal wealth and strong educational background"
(ibid) which they brought with them to America.
A recurring implication thrown up by the various culturalist ana'yses is
the assumption that the traditional emphasis upon bonds of kinship within
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Chinese culture entails a common orientation towards familistic economic
and social activity amongst overseas Chinese communities, Thus follows
the preference for self-employment and an economic strategy which
niobilises resources from within the family and extended kin structures as
far as possible so that the benefits are confined within these boundaries.
Further resources are tapped from within the rest of the ethnic community
according to received norms based upon amity and trust which are
consistent with the introspective principle of ±amilisni. These ideas were
neatly summarised by Fitzgerald (1972 p.75):
"The ties which in the past have bound the Overseas Chinese to China have
been ones of kinship, culture, patriotism and the sojourner mentality,
expressed in the term for Overseas Chinese, hua-ch'iao, and it is on these
ties that the close commercial and political links have been founded."
This theme is cystallised in the concept of 'middleman minorities'. The
term can be traced to a Weberian characterisation of marginalised groups
who performed essentially alien functions (usually trade and commerce) in
predominantly agrarian societies, however in recent years it has been
applied to ethnic groups in advanced industrial society, including the
Chinese both in Britain (eg. Ward 1984) and throughout the world (eg.
Bonacich 1973, Fallers 1967, Hamilton 1978, Shibutani & Kwan 1965).
)(iddleman minorities are otherwise known in the literature as "pariah
capitalists" (Hamilton 1978, Jiang 1968), "migrant intermediaries"
(Schermerhorii 1968), "marginal trading peoples" (Stryker 1959) and
"stranger-traders" (Fallers 1967).
IDDLB1'AN XINORITIES
The basic components of the 'middleman minority' model have been developed
aver time by a number of authors. Weber (1968 p.493), for instance,
developed the notion of 'pariah' peoples, "a distinctive hereditary social
group" who were noted for their "political and social disprivilege and a
far-reaching distinctiveness in economic functioning." Their social
distinctiveness was supposedly commensurate with the degree of
"disprivilege" experienced by the group. Similarly, the trading 'stranger'
as described by Siinmel (in Wolff 1950 p.403) was a "supernumerary •.. who
intrudes ... into a group in which the economic positions are actually
16
occupied". Since 'strangers' were not integrated within the mainstream
society, they were ideally placed as "objective" and therefore successful
traders. However, their social ambivalence rendered 'strangers'
particularly susceptible to victimisation as scapegoats during periods of
political turmoil. Another contribution of the early sociologists was that
of the 'marginal man' developed by Park (1928). Like the 'stranger', the
'marginal man' was associated with the expansion of trade and commerce
and his presence heralded progressive social change. As "one who lives in
two worlds, in both of which he is more or less of a stranger" (ibid
p.893), 'marginal man' as a rule was only a transitory "personality type"
on the road to assimilation into the surrounding society [3]. Notably,
ieber, Simmel and Park cited the European Jews as model examples.
Xany other sociologists have contributed to the 'middleman minority'
concept. Rinder (1956), for example, proposed that a 'status gap' between
rulers and "social inferiors" in rigidly stratified societies was a
necessary pre-condition for the emergence of 'middleinn'. Blalock (1967),
Fallers (1967), Sjoberg (1960) and Jiang (1968) have discussed in further
detail the role o± 'middleman' traders in peasant societies, whilst Stryker
(1959) and Wertheim (1964) emphasised that the position of 'middleman
minorities' was contingent upon the specific balance of political forces in
every particular social formation.
The pertinence of the 'middleman minority' model to culturalist
perspectives on contemporary ethnic communities in business was
established in a paper by Bonacich (1973). Up until that time, the
expanding body of literature on the 'middleman' phenomenon had focussed
mainly on agrarian, but also to some extent, colonial societies. However,
throughout the literature ran the suggestion that 'middleman minorities'
were ideal types to be found at any historical juncture given a certain set
of social conditions. 	 Bonacich articulated this suggestion, proposing
decidedly that "it is clear these groups persist beyond the status gap
One finds them in post-colonial societies, after the elites have gone
And one finds them in modern indrial societies,,." (ibid p.584).
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The underlying reason for the development and maintenance of 'middleman
minorities', Bonacich argued, could be found in a 'sojourning' attitude to
migration of which the ultimate objective which was one day to return to
their country of origin. 'Sojourning', it was argued, fostered a "Future
time orientation" (or deferred gratification), a drive "to make money, not
spend it" (ibid p.585). For this reason, 'sojourning' groups were drawn
towards easily liquidable lines of business, (often rising to dominate
certain trades) and thriftiness. They displayed internal social insularity
which set them apart sharply from the surrounding society and in this
sense, the hostility shown towards them was a result of their economic
role (ie. clashes of interest with clients, with native businesses and with
organised labour), rather than its cause, The apparent "alienness" of
'middleman minorities' and their tendency towards self-employment in what
were seen to be peripheral trades, Bonacich construed as being "closely
akin to preindustrial capitalism" (ibid p.588).
Bonacich's paper drew heavily upon the work of Siu (1952/3) in which
'sojourners' were distinguished from previously defined 'pariahs' and
marginalised groups by a purposeful decision to "cling" to their original
culture. Siu maintained that 'sojourners' were quintessentially
unassimilable because the economic and social roles they assumed in the
country of migration were simply part of a longer-term scheme, a means to
an end (ibid p.35). 'Sojourners' thus lived in "symbiotic segregation" from
the rest of society, deliberately limiting their spheres of activity and
interest within It to their economic role alone, at the same time remaining
immersed in their own ethnic cultural persuits in order not to sever ties
with "the homeland". In the course of time, 'sojourners' became distinct
"racial colonies", still ideologically oriented to returning home, yet with
an increasing material stake in their country of migration. \ithin the
British sociological literature, 'sojourning' has been said also to
characterise the Asian - particularly the Pakistani - experience (see for
example, Brooks & Singh 1978/80, Anwar 1979).
The voluntarism and 'sojourner' attitudes which, according to Bonacich,
moulded the experience of migration for 'middleman minorities' were
features which distinguished her formula from previous ones. Applied to
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the Chinese throughout America and South East Asia, the culturalist
understanding of 'middlemen' stood in contrast to a variety of other
studies of Far Eastern Chinese communities (eg. Coughlin 1955 on the
Chinese in Bangkok, Eitzen 1971 on the Chinese in the Philippines, Esman
1979 on the Chinese in South East Asia as a whole). Bonacich also
generalised her anaylsis to cover Asian Americans in general, in the belief
that "almost all" groups that have become 'middlemen' "derive from Asia and
the Near East" (1973 op cit p.588). Like Siu, she suggested that certain
'sojourning' groups
"become middlemen wherever they go.	 Chinese, Indians, Jews, in every
country show a similar occupational concentration (thus, a status gap in
the receiving country cannot explain the pattern), This regularity
suggests that culture of origin is an important contributory factor."
(ibid)
Bonacich's culturalist interpretation of the 'middleman minority'
phenomenon in advanced capitalist societies is important in that it
crystallised many of the analytical assumptions contained within the
contemporary studies reviewed above of Chinese (and other ethnic)
communities in business. Clearly stated was a particular conception of
culture and a specific view of the properties believed to be inherent in
Chinese and other Asian cultures. The general perspective on the Chinese
was derivative of the anthropological literature on traditional Chinese
society, as exemplified by the work of Freedman (1958 and 1966), Hsu
(1971) and Baker (1979), to name but a few. These authors illustrated at
length the centrality of the family for the maintenance of a society
characterised by feudal subsistance agriculture [4). Baker (ibid pp.26-2?),
for example, recounted how
"the Chinese saw the family as the basic unit of society ... In a way the
individual was the family, just as he was his own ancestors and his own
descendants, He received his descent and his body from his parents and
he held them in trust for his sons -
Bonacich (1973 op cit) and the other culturalists, however, clearly
departed from the anthropological studies in as far as they implicitly
contended that the ideological and institutional relations which were
integral to traditional Chinese society were said to continue to structure
the lives of Chinese people in emigration once divorced from their
material context.
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The culturally deterministic vision described above reflects a
fundamentally static conception of culture. It makes no concession to the
ideological and institutional components of cultures being socially
created, sustained and changed through time 1 although this is necessarily
the process by which cultures become distinguished from each other (and
implicitly, the process by which ethnic cultures become distinguished from
those in their societies of origin).
At the root of the culturalist analysis is a specific articulation of the
relationship between ideology and the material world. Ideology refers to
the matrix of ideas with which a person perceives things and events
rather than to discrete political doctrines, although this is not to deny
that the latter do not permeate one's ideology. What is proposed by the
culturalists is essentially an ideological determinism in the sense that
over-riding importance is ascribed to the ideological 'baggage' that
migrants transport with them in determining their position in the society
to which they migrate. That is to say, ideological relations are
understood by the culturalists to operate independently from their
material basis - the economic, political and juridical structures which
constitute the physical skeleton of ideology - for these cannot be
transported with the migrant. (This would not be the case in
imperialistic migration, since this entails the imposition of new material
and hence, ideological relations. However, as the subject does not fall
within the context of the immediate discussion, it will not be addressed
here.) Kitano (1974), on Japanese Americans in Hawaii and California as
an ideal 'middleman minority', asserted that "What that group brings to the
interaction initially determines where its members fit into society and
how they adjust" (ibid p.5O4). He continued,
"The less-than-equal perspective brought over from Japan appears to have
survived in modified form in spite of the change in generations. (ibid
p.l4) .. .Most "knew their place in society," and although there was high
motivation to achieve some degree of upward mobility (especially
financially), there was also a limit to their expectations; becoming
members of a ruling class or more powerful elite was not a part of their
dreams." (ibid p.517)
Probably the best critique of the ideological determinism which
characterises the culturalist studies is to be found in Bonacich's own
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later work with }odell on Japanese Americans. The theoretical foundation
of their book, The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity (1980),. was an
elaborated version of Bonacich's 1973 (op cit) 'middleman minority' model
but the weight of their empirical evidence led them beyond the limits of
this framework. '}liddleman minorities' were introduced as ideal typical
communities (1980 op cit p.22), characterised by a high level of cultural
organisation which distinguished them from the surrounding community as
"birds of passage". They were economically specialised in petty trading
and finance on a 'family business' scale and were political "buffers" or
"go-betweens" between "elites and masses". Ethnic solidarity, small
business concentration and societal hostility were portrayed as mutually
interacting forces which served to perpetuate 'middleman' communities.
'Middlemen' were said also to have been a feature of both modern
capitalist and pre-capitalist societies, although certain social conditions
were identified as being especially conducive to their emergence. The
culturalist argument was clearly stated at several points within the
opening chapters:
"Indeed, some groups, notably Jews, Chinese and Indians, are regarded as
middleman minorities no matter where they reside" (ibid p.14).
"There is ample evidence to suggest that only some groups, and not others,
come to concentrate in middleman-type economic activities, regardless of
context. An adequate theory, therefore, cannot ignore internal factors."
(ibid p.31)
Following a lengthy introduction of their "middleman-minority perspective",
Bonacich and 1{odell concluded nevertheless, that "the concept of middleman
minorities is no substitute for tracing the historical development of a
particular community in a particular context" (ibid p.24), so this they
proceeded to do in their extensive survey of the Japanese community in
America. The first generation of Japanese migrants, or Issel, Bonacich and
Xodell found,
"were driven into these very kinds of small businesses. 	 Their
opportunities for employment were severely restricted. Japanese
immigrants were denied citizenship rights and therefore could not lodge
complaints against discrimination. New immigrants were forced to take
jobs wherever they could get them, and the fact that fellow ethnics
offered them an opportunity to establish themselves was bound to produce
loyalty." (ibid pp.251-22)
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The Nisel, or the second generation Japanese, were found "to be fully
enmeshed in the middleman-minority position of their parents" (ibLd p.254)
before the wartime internment of Japanese in America. Indeed, "regardless
of their desires, ... They had to continue in small business" (ibid p.255).
However,
"The postwar period ... provided a whole new social context for the
Japanese minority. No longer were they excluded from participation in the
surrounding economy as employees, while opportunities for ethnic small
business concomitantly shrank,.. The Nisel in the mid-1960s could hardly
be considered a full-fledged middleman minority." (ibid)
The decline of the ethnic Japanese economy, together with the decline in
ethnic Japanese institutions, was found to be accelerating. The Sansel, or
third generation Japanese, showed "a marked continuation of this trend"
(ibid p.258)
Thus Bonacich's and Modell's longitudinal study of the historical
experiences of America's Japanese led them to draw the following
conclusions:
"Engaging in small business tended to be related to relatively high levels
of attachment to the family, high rates of informal social attachments in
the ethnic community, high levels of participation in Japanese American
organizations, and high rates of affiliation with Buddhism." <ibid p.256)
"Retention of the small-business mode has tended to reinforce ethnic
solidarity; leaving small business has been associated with the weakening
of ethnic bonds. This is perhaps our most significant finding, and one we
would like to stress... ethnicity is not an eternal verity but a variable
that is responsive to societal conditions, and that one very important
condition is the economic position of the group in question. Ethnic
affiliation is a resource that may be called upon to support certain
economic interests. When those economic interests are no longer present,
ethnicity is likely to subside in importance. Our study has demonstrated
this, at least to a certain extent, with the Nisei. Those who moved into
the corporate economy had less material reason for retaining closed ethnic
ties than did those who ran small businesses, and they behaved
accordingly." (ibid p.257)
"without the retention of common and distinctive class interests, it will
be increasingly difficult to keep members from defecting and disappearing
into the mainstream,.." (ibid p.258)
"To comprehend ethnicity fully and to gain a sense of its future, we must
examine it as a dialectically changing product of concrete historical
structures and processes." (ibid p.259)
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The findings of Bonacich and Modell seemed to refute the "ample evidence"
they cited at the outset of their study which suggested ethnic grQups like
the Chinese, Jews and Indians emerged as 'middlemen' "no matter where they
reside" and "regardless of context". The overwhelming evidence of their
own study squeezed them into a tacit rejection of' the methodological
assumptions of their original culturalist 'middleman minority' perspective
and onto new theoretical terrain. For once their impressionistic idealism
was confronted with actual historical data, it crumbled. Thus, it appears
that abstract culturalism (crystallised in the concept of 'middleman
minorities') fails to account for the empirically proven reality of the
situations it is intended to explain, even when tested by arch advocates
of the culturalist argument. It is assumed, therefore, that such
contentions by the authors as "Our central thesis is that ethnic groups
often act as economic-interest groups, and when they cease to do so, they
tend to dissolve" (ibid p.3) must have been imputed retrospectively, since
they were posed against the thrust of the culturalist presentation which
dominated the beginning of the book. In sum, Bonacich's and Modell's
serious attempt to substantiate an essentially ideologically deterministic
approach with detailed historical evidence floundered in a confused and
confusing discussion.
Not wishing to suffer from the same pitfalls as Bonacich and Modell, this
study intends to reject the cultural determinism of the ethnographies
outlined above as a methodological principle for the present study. This
is due to the inadequacy of their analysis which does not extend an
explanatory framework beyond the narrow confines of that which is
superficially most apparent. Because such an approach projects an
interpretation of the present position of ethnic communities in terms of
their perceived outward forms which derive meaning and significance from
the societies left behind, it cannot fully comprehend any independent
ideological and social transformations in the ethnic community itself as a
result of its specific situation. This criticism does not deny that ethnic
cultures are important in informing the daily experiences of migrants:
what is disputed is the principle that ethnic cultures, or to be more
specific, ethnic ideologies in themselves are the sole or major
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determinants of people's material position in the society to which they
migrate.
UNDERSTANDING ETHNIC ENTERPRISE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEAS AND
REALITY
The self-contradictory work of Bonacich and Modell does more than expose
the failure of a simplistic, uni-directional apprehension of the
relationship between ethnicity and society to explain adequately the
reality of experience. It also points to the necessity for an explanatory
theory which incorporates an understanding of the broad structural
determinants of ethnic mobilisation. This is provided, it is argued, by
the analytical method of historical materialis.m developed by Marx. In
contrast with the idealism of the culturalists, the conceptual relationship
between Ideas and the material world that is implied by a Marxist
methodology is not one in which the realm of ideas moulds real life
experience nor even a crude inversion of this [5]. Rather, it is a
relationship in which ideology, or people's consciousness, is the
contemplative reflection of the struggle between essentially antagonistic
classes of people within society.
Every society (with the exception of primitive communal and future
communist social formations), Marx argued, was characterised fundamentally
by two polarised classes - producers and non-producers. The relationship
between the two was defined and structured by the principle upon which
goods and services were made and distributed within society - the mode of
prod uction. This economic base structure delineated both the form of
classes and the relationship between them (ie. the social relations of
production). These social relations, encompassing legal, political,
ideological and cultural systems, Marx analogously termed the
superstructure of a society, to emphasise that such systems did not act
autonomously but in relation to and also upon the base. However, it was
the base Cie. the essential mode of production), which supplied the logic
by which the superstructure (ie, its social relations) must be understood
and explained. On the basis of this fundamental abstraction, an analysis
of the concrete world could be developed.
24
"In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations
that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of
production which correspond to a definite stage of development bf their
material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production
constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on
which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond
definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of
material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life-process
in general." (]karx & Engels 1973 p.503)
The analytical centrality of the mode of production rests upon 11arx's
materialist conception of historical progression. He argued that
production was necessarily a social activity by which people modified the
natural environment to meet their needs. As such, it entailed a
Iundamental structure of relations between people wbich governed the
access to the means of production (ie. the materials needed for
production) and the use of the product. The social relations engendered
by the mode of production threw up mechanisms by which that mode was
reproduced and developed. However, they also generated the forces which
would lead to the exhaustion and demise of that mode and its replacement
with another. These social relations did not develop by conscious design
but by historical evolution. Different stages of development were
characterised by a correspondingly different structure of social relations
and thus a separate process of analysis was neccessary for each.
Marx abstracted a number of modes (and social relations) of production
through which society had already passed. In Europe these were the
ancient mode, defined by the dichotomy between slaves and slave owners;
the feudal mode, characterised by localised agrarian production by a class
of unfree peasants or serfs who controlled their own subsistence plots but
who were physically coerced to support a landlord class; and most
importantly, the contemporary capitalist mode. The latter involves the
generalised production of commodities for monetary exchange. People who
form the producing, or working class own nothing except their labour
power, which they must sell for a wage in order to purchase their means of
sustenance. Ownership and control of the productive forces are
concentrated in the hands of the minority capitalist class, or the
bourgeoisie, The central dynamic of capitalism is the accumulation of
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capital (in simplified terms, profit). This is achieved by the bourgeois
class reaping a surplus from the commodities produced by the working
class in terms of their exchange value. The bulk of this surplus is then
reinvested in the production process. Capital accumulation is thus by
nature, a predatory and exploitative principle, according to which the
objective interests of the bourgeoisie and the working class are
diametrically opposed. Whilst the former must strive to enhance profits,
the latter are forced consistently to thwart such attempts, their ultimate
interests lying in the overthrow of the capitalist system by wresting
control of the means of production.
Classes, then, are fundamentally economic relations. They cannot be
analysed meaningfully in isolation from each other and the relationship
between them is the essential defining characteristic of the society in
which they exist.
"Classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the
places they occupy within a historically determined system of social
production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in law)
to the means of production, by their role in the social organisation of
labour, and, consequently, by the dimensions of social wealth of which they
dispose and the mode of acquiring it. Classes are groups of people one of
which can appropriate the labour of another owing to the different places
they occupy in a definite system of social economy." (Lenin cited in
Callinicos 1987 p.96>
The inevitable expression of the inherent antagonism between opposing
economic classes (le. class struggle) Marx saw as the dialectical basis of
all historical change and progression. This was wholly distinguished from
the philosopher Hegel's dialectical view of history, firstly in that Marx's
analysis was materialist (ie. the impetus of historical development is
rooted in the material world) and not idealist (ie. the impetus of
historical development is rooted in ideas) like that of the cultural
determinists, and secondly, in that he argued how class conflict was not
mechanically resolvable in terms of an absolute: "It is not the
consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary,
their social being that determines their consciousness." (Marx & Engels
1973 p.504)
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Class struggle, and therefore the conditions of historical development,
were defined by the historically specific relations of production in which
they were rooted. These relations of production, in turn, were tied to a
definite stage in the development of the productive forces (ie. the
material organisation of production in terms of tools, level of technology,
etc),
"Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please;
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under
circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past."
(Marx & Engels 1975 pp.103-104)
Within the Marxist framework, a person's consciousness, or ideology, at any
one time is both reflective of and reflexive upon the present state of the
specific historical process and the balance of forces within the struggle.
It follows, therefore, that "the class which is the prevailing ateria1
force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force" (Marx &
Engels 1975 in Callinicos 1987 op cit p.99). Ideas in themselves cannot
determine their material context nor a person's position within it.
1either can a person's ideology remain static, for it is an integral part
of the historical process of class struggle within certain prevailing
relations of production and it is within this context that ideology must
be understood.
To apply these methodological tenets to a study of an ethnic community
means that the ideological and social relations between people within that
community which derive from their society of origin - the basis of their
ethnicity - cannot aetennine their material position in their society of
migration (although they will inform people's perceptions of and responses
to it). Moreover, those relations develop and transform in accordance
with the prevailing balance of productive forces in their new material
context and it is this context which sets the framework within which such
relations must be analysed. (Thus it is possible for people who form an
ethnic community to show little cultural resemblance to the culture of
their society of origin whilst at the same time being markedly different
from others around them in their society of migration.) To establish the
nature of the material context provides only the pqranieters of its study.
A proper understanding of that society or of particular groups of people
within it must grasp the content of those relations - the specific way in
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which economic, political and ideological forces interact with each other.
Therefore, an understanding of the position of Chinese people in Britain
would entail an examination of the economic, political and ideological
evolution of their role within the overall relations of production.
This was specifically the methodology adopted by Leon (1970) in his
analysis of Jews, a group like the Chinese who were popularly associated
with trade, entrepreneurship and 'middleman minority' forms of economic
activity. Leon rejected the conventional approaches which started from
the perspective of religion or nationality, taking his guide from Marx: "We
will not look for the secret of the Jew in his religion, but we will look
for the secret of the religion in the real Jew" (Marx 1926 cited in Leon
1970 p.66). The material facts of history were central to Leon's study:
"The plight of the Jews in the twentieth century is intimately bound up
with their historical past. Every social formation represents a stage in
the social process. Being is only a moment in the process of becoming,
In order to undertake an analysis of the Jewish question it its present
phase of development, it is indispensable to know its historical roots."
(Leon 1970 op cit)
Leon documented how although originally occupationally diverse, the Jews
had become entrenched into commerce and usqry during the period of the
Roman Empire and Medieval Europe, not through an accident of fate but due
to the specific conditions in Palestine which forced a mass emigration -
the Jewish diaspora. As such, "the Jews constitute historically a social
group with a specific economic function. They are a class, or more
precisely, a people-class " (ibid p.73) which rose to dominate a pivotal
role in feudal society. "It is ... the transformation of the Jewish nation
into a class which is at the bottom of the "preservation of' Judaism"."
(ibid p.123)
The steady encroachment of capitalism throughout Europe following the
industrial revolution gave rise to mounting persecution of Jews as the
economic bastions of the old feudal system. As a result, Jews retreated
as a "people-class" to the last outposts of feudalism in the most backward
areas of Eastern Europe.	 In this sense, the accentuated attachment of
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Jews to Judaism was the expression of the Jewish "people-class" interests
under attack:
"It is not the loyalty of the Jews to their faith which explains their
preservation as a distinct social group; on the contrary, it is their
preservation as a distinct social group which explains their attachment to
their faith." (ibid p.73)
The spread of capitalism, hastened by the discovery of America and the
development of the mercantile economy, was eventually to undermine
completely the basis of the Jews as a "people-class". In the 'New World',
Jewish traders became known as 'new Christians', since their economic
character was indistinguishable from that of the 'old Christians'. "The
same was true of the Jewish plantation owner. And this is also the reason
why juridical, religious and political distinctions rapidly disappeared.'4
(ibid p.176)
From the systematic destruction of the Jewish "people-class" under
capitalism emerged a dialectic which explains the contemporary salient
forms of Jewish ethnicity in the absence of a substantial material basis.
"On the one hand, capitalism favoured the economic assimilation of Judaism
and consequently its cultural assimilation; on the other hand, by uprooting
the Jewish masses, concentrating them in cities, provoking the rise of
anti-Semitism, it stimulated the development of Jewish nationalism... At
the same time that the bases for a new Jewish nationality were being
elaborated, all the conditions were likewise being created for its
disappearance. " (ibid pp.221-222)
The role of the Jews as portrayed by the culturalists and proponents of
'middleman minority theory' was rooted wholly in the feudal class system.
As Leon stated, "The Jews lived within the pores of feudal society. When
the feudal structure started to crumble, it began expelling elements which
were, at one and the same time, foreign to it and indispensable to it."
(ibid p.225) The 'people-class' was "strangled between the jaws of two
systems; feudalism and capitalism, each feeding the rottenness of the
other" (ibid p.87). To regard the role of the Jews as a 'people-class'
under feudalism as somehow intrinsic to Jews themselves or even to
capitalism is profoundly misleading, according to Leon's historical
analysis. "The Jews certainly contributed to the development of the
exchange economy in Europe but their specific economic role ends precisely
where modern capitalism starts" (ibid p.182). The relationship of userers
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in feudal society to the relations of production was entirely different
from that of bankers in capitalist society:
"Whereas credit is essentially consumer credit In the feudal era, It
becomes credit of production and of circulation in the era of commerical
and industrial development... Ignoring this fundamental distinction leads
almost all historians into error." (ibid pp.143-144)
The conclusions drawn from Leon's Marxist analysis of Jews were
completely different from those of the culturalists and 'middleman
minority' theorists. Most significantly, his study illustrated in detail
how ethnic economic concentration was in no way attributable to a group's
particular cultural traits and that such a phenomenon could not be
characterised as an 'ideal type' which emerged under any mode of
production given a similar set of circumstances. To attempt to do so was
to draw false analogies.
BIOLOGICAL DETERXI!US}'i AD ETHIUC ENTPRISE
Implicitly rejected by a historical materialist analytical methodology such
as Leon's is an explanation of distinctive ethnic economic activity in
terms of biologically fixed drives and propensities. The latter is a line
of reasoning which cannot be dismissed lightly since it finds resonance
with many culturalist accounts (although it is by no means an automatic
extension of culturalist interpretations). Bonacich (1973 op cit p.586),
for instance, stated how "The "primordial tie" of blood provides a basis
for trust" but in her later work with Modell (1980 op cit) the suggestion
of biological determination was clearly dispelled. Other studies of
Chinese communities have displayed greater ambivalence on the subject.
Clammer (1982) on the Chinese in Singapore, for instance, dismissed
"ecoriomistic" explanations of their role as "invalid". Instead, he believed
the answer to lie in the "high degree of spontaneous ethnic consciousness
felt by Singaporean Chinese, and indeed, Chinese everywhere" (ibid p.128),
which was said to be "irreducible - a primordial characteristic or
essence" (ibid p.129). Similar conclusions can be drawn from all such
unsubstantiated and impressionistic generalisations about Chinese culture.
To take another example, Francis Hsu (1958 pp.67-68), a Chinese
anthropologist, remarked that
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"Nepotism is an old Chinese virtue. There's nothing wrong with it really...
"I believe it (le, Chinese culture) to be remarkably cohesive, much more so,
for example, than is the Hindu culture. The cohesion of Chinese culture
permeates personal relationships between the generations and also works
horizontally within the generations. The strength of the Chinese
background tends to discourage the adoption of non-Chinese ways. I would
say that the Chinese are less readily assimilated than are the Hindus and
attribute this to the difference in the cohesiveness of their respective
cultures."
The "primordial" bonds of ethnicity is a theme which in recent years has
been articulated in sociobiological theory. Essentially, sociobiology is an
analysis of human society in terms of the relationship of heredity with
environment and based upon Darwin's natural evolutionary principle of
'survival of the fittest.' According to the sociobiologists, social
organisation is structured around the perpetuation of the fittest human
genes. Racism thus stems from an innate drive to ensure the safe
reproduction of a person's genes by favouring blood relatives over non-
blood relatives (van den Berghe 1981 p.29). In this sense, phenotypical
resemblance and cultural similarity are taken instinctively as indicators
of genealogical relatedness and are acted upon in the ne potistic urge to
form allegiances with kin. Hence the formation of phenotypically and
culturally distinct cohesive groups, or "ethnies", to use a sociobiological
term [6].
The sociobiological perspective embraces wholesale and unquestioningly
ideal typical concepts such as 'middleman minorities'. Van den Berghe saw
such social phenomena as particular group responses to situations in which
"ethnies" were forced to merge and compete over scarce resources.
'1'iddleman minorities' thus were not solely products of pre-industrial,
agrarian societies but could be found presently engaged in "the import-
export trade, retail and wholesale shopkeeping, ... buying and reselling of
cash crops, ... restaurants, laundries and the provision of transport
facilities" as well as in "clerical, administrative and technical"
occupations (ibid ph2). Drawing upon the example of the Chinese in
South East Asia, van den Berghe described classical 'middleman minorities'
as nepotistic, frugal, thrifty and industrious (ibid p.i5) and usually
engaged in a "familistic mode of production" (ibid p.143).
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Precisely because van den Berghe was so specific in his widely cast
characterisation of contemporary 'middleman minorities', the serious flaws
in his argument were clearly exposed. As one who claimed his theory was
"fully congruent with Marxist class analysis" (ibid p.61; see also ibid p.x
of the Introduction & p.241), van den Bergbe then proceeded with an
economic definition of 'middlemen' not In terms of their relationship to
the means of production (ie. class) but as they were concentrated
vertically within distinguishable industries, (hardly a method which could
be called "Marxist class analysis"). Moreover, it is difficult to see how
a "faniilistic mode of production" (ibid p.143) could possibly apply to
"clerical, administrative and technical occupations" or even "import-export"
and "the provision of transport facilities", since these descriptions
almost certainly imply a level of economic organisation which surpasses
the scale of the small family firm.
Whatever commonality there could have existed between the sundry
'middleman' trades listed by van den Berghe, it was certainly not of an
economic nature. Neither was it conceivably in terms of low 'exit' (or
even 'entry') barriers for speedy 'liquidity', to use 'middleman minority'
jargon. Moreover, the enormous diversity of economic roles which were
said to distinguish 'middleman minorities' from others around them were so
diffuse as to render virtually meaningless van den Berghe's definitions.
"Any ethnically distinct group that specializes in the selling of goods or
skills" (van den Berghe 1981 op cit p.138), hardly constitutes an
analytical starting point, let alone betraying a biological inclination
towards nepotistic familism, of which the ultimate objective is the
preservation of specific human genes. Van den Berghe's model, and indeed,
the whole culturalist and 'middleman minority' syndrome, appears to be
founded more upon crude stereotypes and impressionistic observations than
accurate and contextualised evidence,
Indeed, absent from van den Berghe's "Marxist class analysis" of
'middleman minorities' appeared to be any consideration whatsoever of
Marxist conceptions of economic class in terms of ownership and control
of capital. Otherwise, his attention would have been drawn immediately to
the point that far from providing a shared economic interest conducive to
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ethnic solidarity, the fundamentally antagonistic economic relations within
the ethnic community concentrated within an industry would have provided
a material basis for intra-ethnic division and conflict, This general
failure to accommodate any notions of class when defining economic
interest groups in advanced capitalist societies, however, is not specific
to van den Berghe. It is inherent to any attempt to construct an ideal
typical economic group from a disparate set of social characteristics.
Bonacich and Modell (1980 op cit p.14), for instance, fell into the same
trap by including "pro±essional and bureaucratic government positions" in
their range of 'middleman minority' occupations.
Since van den Berghe's vivid illustration of sociobiological theory for
explaining ethnic 'business' communities seems to have contradicted the
material realities which it attempted to illuminate, it would seem
reasonable to regard such theory as contentious. Sociobiology takes no
account of the self-conscious labour of humans which distinguishes them
from all other animals and transforms nature, a fundamental tenet of
Xarxist analysis. If it did, it could not continue to adhere to the
simplistic and profoundly conservative biological reductionism through
which all human behaviour is interpreted. Needless to say, the
sociobiologist assumptions about human nature and behaviour, many of which
are latently implied in many of the culturalist studies discussed above,
are an anathema to Marx's historical materialist method. From the
insights afforded by the work of Leon (1970 op cit) and Bonacich and
Modell (1980 op cit) alone, van den Bergbe's application of sociobiological
theory to an explanation of 'middleman minorities' appears not only
internally inconsistent but also unable to incorporate any sustained
historical substantiation. Thus, an analytical procedure which does
attempt to address reality must follow as Leon (1970 op cit pd4O)
described: "It is not by the "innate" capacities or the ideology of a
social group that we must explain its economic position. On the contrary,
it is its economic position which explains its capacities and its
ideology."
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ETHNIC ENCLAVES
A similar, more updated version of the 'middleman minority' perspective is
a body of literature which centres around the concept of 'ethnic enclaves'.
'Ethnic enclave' studies, however, differ from the ahistorical cultural and
biological analyses, in that their analytical terms of reference are
expressly rooted in the contemporary social relations of production in
which the studies are set and, therefore, they do not set out ostensibly to
assert sweeping historical generalisations from perceived quintessential
'models'.
The starting point of ethnic enclave analysis was taken from 'dual labour
market theory', which sought to assess the differing Implications for
employment conditions for American workers by isolating the central
features of' America's advanced capitalist economy. Developed in relation
to theories of the American 'dual economy' (Averitt 1968) [7], 'dual labour
market theory' proposed basically that workers were divided between a
priliiar'y labour market, where wages and conditions were relatively good,
and a secondary labour market, where the opposite applied. Within the
former, employment security, promotion prospects, "equity, and due process
in the administration of work rules" (Doeringer and Piore 1978 p.l65)
combined to form what Doeringer and Piore termed an "internal labour
market" a set of privileges conferred upon workers to minimalise
industrial disruption (see also Edwards et al 1975). In contrast, "high
labor turnover, little chance of advancement, and often arbitrary and
capricious supervision" (Doeringer and Piore 1978 op cit p.165) as well as
undesirable work tasks, bad pay and conditions were rife in smaller,
secondary labour market firms. Primary labour markets generally
structured firms which operated with a high degree of fixed capital and
employed a relatively highly skilled and unionised workforce. The obverse
was the case for secondary labour markets. Primary jobs characterised the
'centre' economy; secondary jobs were concentrated in the economic
'periphery' (see also Averitt 1968 op cit). Racism and sexism practiced
by the state, employers and labour unions alike, it was said, served to
channel ethnic migrants and women disproportionately into secondary jobs,
effectively preserving primary jobs for non-minority white men.
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'Ethnic enclave' theory found that contrary to the conventional 'dual
labour market' analysis, not all ethnic workers were simply cheap,
subordinate labour for non-minority employers. 'Dual labour market'
theory, it was proposed, had neglected the phenomenon of clusters of
ethnically owned and staffed firms, Despite their resemblance to other
secondary firms on an individual level, the economic integration within
the clusters (in the degree to which competition and control over supplies
was regulated between them) entailed an aggregate organisational
resemblance to primary labour market firms in the centre economy. "The
enclave is different from the periphery in that the latter is much more
"atomized" - that is, less interconnected with other firs in the periphery
-' than the ethnic enclave." (Wilson and Martin 1982 p.138) This
distinction, argued Wilson and Martin, explained the relative success of
'enclave' firms compared to others in the secondary sector.
The high level of integration within clusters of 'enclave' firms depended
upon tight control within individual firms. This was achieved through
informal channels based upon the shared ethnicity of owners, managers and
staff alike which was lacking in conventional secondary labour market
firms. Recruitment through informal networks, for instance, permitted
"cheap information about the quality of future workers" (Model 1986 p.66).
More importantly, "By hiring through the ethnic networks, immigrant
employers engage their workers in a sponsor/client relationship whose
claims extend far beyond the cash nexus" <Waldinger 1984 p.225).
Paternalistic relations between employer and employee were said to cement
workers' attachment to their employers, despite the inherent economic
antagonism and generally low wages, thus lessening the appeal of unions
(Model 1986 op cit p.66). Where shop sizes were small, formal labour
market relations might be "entirely superseded by family relations" and
where it was necessary to "reach beyond the family circle", jobs were
filled by "fellow townsmen, or at the very least, common nationals"
(Waldinger 1984 op cit p.218). Furthermore, since racism was not an issue
within the 'enclave', employers took full advantage of workers' "past
investments in education and job training" (Fortes 1981 p.291). The
relative integration and stability of 'enclave' firms built on ethnic
resources, it was said, provided the basis f or a secure "export platform"
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from which the firms could broaden their markets (Waldinger 1984 op cit
p.224). Workers supposedly benefitted by being able to maximise their
"past human capital investments" (Wilson and Fortes 1980 p.295) in the
absence of racist or linguistic barriers and also to enjoy the protection
of community based "norms and sanctions" (Waldinger 1984 op cit p.219)
which safeguarded wage levels and checked rapacious management.
The 'ethnic enclave' analysis has been applied in America specifically to
Cubans in Miami (Wilson and Fortes 1980 op cit; Wilson and Martin 1982 op
cit) and Chinese in the New York garment industry (Waldinger 1983), and
in Britain to Bangladeshis in the restaurant industry (Baker 1981/2) and
Pakistanis in the Manchester clothing trade (Werbner 1985). Whilst Baker
documented how Bengali entrepreneurs adapted their available ethnic
resources to suit their economic requirements, Werbner stressed how
consolidation of the 'enclave' depended as much upon the necessity for
regulation of internal economic competition as upon mutual support and
trust.
The New York garment industry, according to Waldinger (1983 op cit), was
in the process of being transformed from a principal centre of clothing
manufacture into a "spot" market, specialising in the production of novelty
fashions and uncalculated over-demand for more standardised items (the
bulk of these being supplied from the Far East>. Acceleration of this
industrial reorganisation had witnessed the proliferation of ethnic
garment manufacturers, of which Chinese firms had figured significantly.
This was in part a result of the exodus of larger, primary clothing firms
from the city centre during the 1970s, which had lowered the cost barriers
to entry for more lowly capitalised firms with a flexible workforce,
Amongst the Chinese firms, a "repertoire of cultural symbols" between
workers and employers was said to reduce the "social distance" derived
from differential relations of production, establishing a feeling of mutual
"egalitarianism". This normative climate mitigated against industrial
conflict and thus facilitated the smooth absorption of the effects of
erratic demand. Paternalistic employer/employee relations were bolstered
by the giving of ung bow (small, red envelopes containing money and
symboilsing the bestowment of good luck) amongst other gifts as
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compensation for long hours of hard work. Thus, Waldinger was led to the
conclusion that it was the "interaction" between specific economic change
and the mobilisation of informal, ethnic resources that afforded 'enclave'
firms an advantage not open to larger scale, more traditional primary
employers. Waldinger's emphasis on the economistic elements of 'ethnic
enclaves' represented what has been termed the "interactive" approach,
which also has been used to interpret the position of Asians in Britain
(Ward 1984; Mars & Ward 1984).
Waldinger's study, like those of the other 'enclave' theorists, illuminated
vividly the organisational mechanics of economically concentrated ethnic
communities. However, like the 'middleman minority' theorists, they failed
to come to terms with the essential logic of capitalist production - the
accumulation of capital by the capitalist class through the expropriation
of surplus values produced by the working class - a principle which
applies regardless of cultural similarity. By confounding this central
antagonism with the cultural boundaries of the ethnic group, the 'enclave'
studies associated the interests of the ethnic group as a whole with the
specific interests of ethnic capital alone. The benefits believed to
accrue to ethnic labour within the 'enclave' were obscure. Upward mobility
due to the absence of internal racism, by definition, was achievable only
for the minority in relation to the majority. Moreover, no attempt was
made to relate upward mobility within the 'enclave' to the wider society of
which the 'enclave' was an integral part. This was because of the
fundamental error in 'ethnic enclave' theory, by which the 'ethnic enclave'
is analysed as an economically autonomous entity existing within
capitalist class relations, although these were precisely the relations by
which the 'enclave' was defined and structured.
This is not to say that potential economic conflict within ethnic firms
could not be subverted or obscured by constant recourse to a shared
cultural heritage, but that the interpretation of such strategies requires
an analysis which is contextualised within the general capitalist relations
of production from which they derive significance, if it is not to lapse
into simplistic culturalism. As it remains, the shortcomings of 'ethnic
enclave' theory outlined above render it incapable of integrating such
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empirical anomalies as intra-community struggles into the static model.
Evidence of growing industrial militancy within the New York Chinese
restaurant 'enclave' and employers' Increasingly oppressive and underhand
attempts to thwart It (Neustadt 19BO) for instance, cannot be readily
explained through Waldinger's framework according to which the cultural
repertoire of "norms and sanctions" safeguard pay and working conditions.
A variation of the 'ethnic enclave' model Is to be found in a study by
Loewen (1971) on Chinese grocery stores In the Mississippi Delta. Whilst
Loeweri's approach yielded more to the conventional culturalist analysis
than to 'dual labour market theory', his historically specific exposition of
the social structure of the Mississippi Delta and the position of the
Chinese grocery niche within it strongly resembled the 'ethnic enclave'
pattern of findings. The specific conditions of local racial segregation,
Loewen argued, afforded the Chinese an opportunity to capitalise upon their
ethnic resources and thus to rise in social status to the extent that they
are now associated more with the position of whites than with Blacks.
Unlike the 'enclave' theorists, Loewen's analysis focussed upon the more
pathological aspects of the situation, Rigid Black/white segregation,
Loewen asserted, was principally "an etiquette system, a system of norms,
expected behaviours, and definitions" (ibid p.4) demarcated by white upper
class ideology (ibid pp.40-45 & p.iSB). As such, "native whites have left
a vacuum in the field" (ibid p.49) which was filled by the Chinese who
were viewed as racial "intermediates", remaining somehow "alien" and
politically oblivious to the nuances of segregation (ibid p.47 and p.155).
An established tradition of independent economic activity owing to a
cultural orientation towards familism and sojourning amongst the Chinese
but not the Blacks (ibid pp.30-50) entailed the mobilisation of necessary
resources for business operation from within the ethnic, if not the family
group. As long as whites refused to service Blacks by opening small
shops in competition with the Chinese and as long as Blacks lacked the
resources to service themselves, the Chinese grocery shop enclave
flourished.	 Eventually, the Chinese achieved relative parity with local
whites but at the same time becoming occupationally drawn to the northern
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and western cities of America (ibid p.180). Hence the contemporary demise
of the Delta Chinese grocery store niche.
Vhereas the Delta Chinese appeared to have been predominantly self-
employed within retail trading whilst the ethnic 'clusters' in the urban
manufacturing industries were not, Loewen did not treat this phenomenon
with the importance It deserved. The apparent reason for this shortcoming
was that, like the 'ethnic enclave' studies, Loewen appeared to display an
inadequate conception of the relationship between ethnicity arid economic
forces. By discussing racial segregation exclusively within ideological
and social dimensions, Loewen neglected the central importance of its
underlying economic determinants and thus failed to explain, for instance,
the situation of the Chinese grocers in relation to the local Italians,
Lebanese and Jews who also dominated petty trading in the Delta (ibid
p.49). Such a comparison would have invoked an economic analysis which
was not present in Loewen's study. Only in passing did he refer to the
mechanisation of agricultural harvesting which led to a rapid Black
depopulation of the area and a correspondingly sharp drop in clientele ± or
Chinese grocery stores as a reason for their decline (ibid p.172). Thus,
Loewen's work resembled the 'ethnic enclave' studies in that the groups
they sought to examine were identified precisely in terms of the
coincidence of their economic and ethnic characteristics under a specific
set of material relations. However, it also suffered from the same
methodological inconsistencies in that a sustained economic analysis which
took cognisance of the material basis of such a phenomenon was missing.
The Delta Blacks had inherited a bitter legacy of slavery to the white
ruling class, The Chinese, whilst having been indentured labourers, were
never slaves, yet the implications of this fundamental historical
difference f or explaining their divergent economic roles were barely
mentioned.
ECOLOGICAL BUSINESSUCCESSION AND THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
fet another perspective on ethnic businesses derives from the work of
Park, Burgess and McKenzie (1925) on the socio-spatial organisation of
urban centres. Inspired by what has been termed the 'Chicago' school of
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sociology, Park et al. interpreted the social composition of the city in
terms of the patterns of ecological concentration within it. From this,
Burgess elaborated what came to be known as the 'concentric zone theory'
of the city. Park and Burgess both appeared to regard the city as a
manufactured ecological complex within which the processes of social
adaptation, competition for living space, specialisation of function and of
life style acted to produce a coherent spatial structure which was held
together by a form of social solidarity which Park (1936) called "the
moral order". The various groups and activities within the city system
were essentially bound together by this 'moral order' and competed with
each other, both socially and spatially, within the constraints imposed by
the 'moral order'. It was within this context that Park's ideal typical
'marginal man' (see 'middleman minorities') was located. 1. ore recently,
Rex's theory of immigrant incorporation into urban areas through
transitory, or "twilight" 'housing zones' (Rex and ]{oore 1967) has made an
influential contribution to contemporary sociological thought based upon
similar lines. The Chicago scholars, like the 'ethnic enclave' theorists,
were concerned primarily with the socio-cultural rather than the economic
definition of groups.
Rooted firmly in the tradition of Park et al., the 'ecological' analysis of
ethnic businesses is one in which the residential succession of areas by
ethnic groups is followed by a corresponding entrepreneurial succession
within the locality. This framework has been applied empirically to Asian
retailers in Bradford, Baling and Leicester (McEvoy 1979; Aldrich, Cater,
Jones & McEvoy 1981 and 1983; Aldrich and McEvoy 1984; Jones and McEvoy
1985), in Wandsworth (Aldrich 1980) and in Croydon (Mullins 1979), as well
as to Blacks and Puerto Ricans in the United States (Aldrich and Reiss
1976).
The 'ecological' studies specifically rejected the differing "organising
capacities" of ethnic groups as a major determinant of business activity,
preferring instead an explanation of Asian self-employment and small scale
entrepreneurhip as an outcome of their structural subordination in the
general labour market (eg. Aldrich 1980), 1'oreover, the 'ecological'
studies avoided the stumbling blocks of the culturalist and 'enclave'
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arguments by addressing only the specific situation of the small scale
self-employed instead of trying to compress into a single explanatory
'model 1 the polarised interests of capital and labour. In this respect, the
various ecological studies of ethnic businesses were in general agreement
that Asian small business owners had merely "exchanged the status of
second-class worker for that of second-class proprietor, with the visible
gloss of self-employment simply concealing the continuing presence of
racial disadvantage" (Aldrich et al 1983 p.29). They stated that such a
phenomenon was an example of ecological "growth without development"
(Jones and McEvoy op cit), despite widely varying accounts of business
operation in different locations. The British three city study, for
Instance, found Asian entrepreneurs to be dependent upon a local,
"protected" ethnic market for continued viability, whilst in Croydon, "Only
5 per cent of businesses were mainly dependent on Asian customers, and in
only 15 per cent of cases were more than a quarter of the customers
Asian" U'Iullins 1979 op cit p.404),
Clearly, the 'ecological' perspective illuminates a different reality for
small scale ethnic entrepreneurs from that presented by the culturalists
and 'enclave' theorists. However, it lacks the capacity to explain this
reality. For instance, despite bearing crucial significance, "racial
disadvantage" (cited as the reason for the continued "second class" status
of Asians in the transition from manufacturing employment to self-
employment) remained largely unaddressed by the 'ecologists'. This is
because the theoretical basis of the 'ecological' studies is one which
seeks to interpret social phenomena within a context of the spatial
pattern of urban development and not in terms of economic and political
relations, As such, rather than offering incisive analysis, the
'ecological' approach remains on the level of description (and an erroneous
level of description at that, according to Engels in The Condition of the
English Working Class 1844 p.46-47 cited in Harvey 1979 p.133).
Therefore, like 'ethnic enclave' theory, the 'ecological' perspective is
confined to making a fragmented series of observations which throw up
'models' that cannot adequatelexplained.
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FOR AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON ETHNIC CHINESE ENTERPRISE
Through a critical discussion of competing analytical methodologies for
the study of ethnic Chinese entrepreneurship, this first chapter has
attempted to establish a case for a method based on arxist political
economy. It has been argued that those groups who might seem to fall into
the category of what have been termed 'middleman minorities' are
essentially a product of the historical material conditions of their
existence.	 Therefore, at best, elements of the 'middleman' label would
apply only to certain minorities at certain periods in history, as
illustrated by Leon's analysis of the "people class" of Jews during the
demise of feudalism in Europe. Static characterisatioris which brand
groups as 'middlemen' as a result of cultural or biological propensities,
on the other hand, do not conform to the historical realities which they
attempt to explain, as illustrated by the work of Bonacich & i'Iodell (1980
op cit) and van den Berg'ne (1981 op cit). Like the culturalists,
proponents of the 'ethnic enclave' theory suffer from the same fundamental
methodological problem, which is a failure to incorporate any notions of
class in advanced capitalist society. By concentrating upon superficial
appearance (ie, ethnic homogeneity and occupational 'clustering'), they
overlook the essential material basis for social organisation and
mobilisation within the ethnic community. The 'ecological' model of urban
business succession by immigrant groups does not necessarily lead to the
same pitfalls as the culturalist argument. However, as a perspective set
within the explanatory dimensions of "organic" spatial development, the
'ecological' approach is incapable of moving beyond the level of simple
description.
There are other studies of Chinese communities which do not fall into the
broad approaches of the studies discussed above, although these are few
and far between. Unlike the niaiority, they take into account the
historical development of economic and political relations structuring the
entrepreneurial activity of Chinese people. These studies derive almost
exclusively from America and Canada. Li (1976 pp.330 & 39) for instance,
moulded his study from the starting point that
"The importance of studying the specific historical experience of ethnic
groups (is] a precondition to unravelling the meaning of ethnic
stratification... The persistence of the ethnic businesses among the
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Chinese cannot be seen in isolation from the historical continuity of
racial inequality, nor can it be evaluated solely in terms of the ciltural
characteristics of the ethnic group. Human relations, like commodities,
are produced and reproduced in a continuous connected process. To single
out the ethnic businesses of the Chinese without reference to the economic
relationships of the past and the present is to disregard the forces of
historical development."
King and Locke (1980), to take another example, found the Chinatown
subeconomies in America to be far from a thriving source of wealth for
those who sustained them, whilst Thompson's data on Toronto refuted the
whole notion of an ethnically exclusive subeconomy in the first instance.
"Businessmen first, Chinese second" (Thompson 1979 p.312) was how one of
Thompson's informants characterised the dominant economic and political
class of Toronto's Chinatown. Their public appeals to ethnic camaraderie,
according to Thompson, were no more than attempts to obscure and repress
class conflict.
Common to the final set of studies mentioned above is an implicit
recognition of the dynamics of racism and class within the operation of
capitalist society and more specifbally within the ethnic community. This
is derived from an analytical methodology grounded in political economy,
which broadens the explanatory scope beyond that which is superficially
most apparent.
Specifically, political economy is the science of laws governing economic
production and exchange. These are far from static, being continuously
susceptible to the influences of external forces, as pointed out by Engels
(1969 pp.l77-l78):
"The conditions under which men produce and exchange vary from country to
country, and within each country again from generation to generation.
Political economy, therefore, cannot be the same for all countries and for
all historical epochs... Political economy is therefore a historical
science. It deals with material which is historical, that is constantly
changing; it must first investigate the special laws of each individual
stage in the evolution of production and exchange, and only when it has
completed this investigation will it be able to establish the few quite
general laws which hold good for production and exchange in general."
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An understanding of the entrepreneurial Chinese phenomenon in terms of the
historical material evolution of production and exchange therefore aites
the basic structure of this study. The next chapter thus embarks upon a
validation of the thoretical propositions of political economy analysis as
defined in the preceeding discussion by examining the actual historical
conditions which have contributed to the emergence of Chinese communities
renowned for entrepreneurship. Implicitly rejected by such a procedure are
the prejudicial and arbitrary assumptions of the culturalists, biologists
and urban ecologists. Instead of accepting an explanation achieved
through 'stereotyping backwards' based upon the perceived contemporary
social or cultural attributes of entrepreneurial Chinese groups, the
Chapter will focus upon the material factors which unify them historically.
Such an analysis necessarily wil bear relation to the development of the
international capitalist mode of production, for it is principally this
context which has structured entrepreneurial Chinese communities,
regardless of ethnic allegiance and geographic distribution. Indeed, the
following chapter reveals the great extent to which the development of
modern-day Chinese 'business' communities has been a direct result of the
internationalisation of capitalist relations of production.
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cIEa
THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF ENTREPREEURIAL CHWESE COX(UNITIES
INTRODUCT ION
The central mode of production characterising the epoch in which Chinese
'business' communities have emerged is capitalism. A political economy
method of analysis, as discussed in Chapter 1, thus takes these
communities to be an Inextricable part of the capitalist social formations
in which they are sustained and stresses that it is within such contexts
that they must be apprehended. In other words, no ethnic community can be
defined autonomously from the overarching social relations of production
which surround it. Indeed, this chapter argues that it has been precisely
the impact of the global expansion of capitalism into China that accounts
for the contemporary entrepreneurial profile of Chinese communities
throughout the world. Such an argument draws upon a specific conception
of the capitalist law of accumulation and its implications for the
movement of capital and labour on a global scale, discussed immediately
below. The chapter then moves on to document exactly how such a process
operated in the specific case of the Chinese, articulating and illustrating
three major points. The first is that the imposition of capitalism upon
China gravely eroded and finally destroyed the country's pre-existing
economic and social fabric. Secondly, the effects of this abrupt
transformation for millions of Chinese people were such that they were
compelled either by force or by starvation to emigrate as indentured
labour to the far flung corners of the capitalist empires. Thirdly, the
varying conditions which influenced their experiences of migration
entailed that these Chinese communities either became totally assimilated,
repatriated, or else systematically excluded and disenfranchised to the
extent that self-employment and intra-ethnic patronage became the only
resort for economic survival. It is within the context of the last
situation that the case of the Chinese in Britain is then examined in
greater detail.
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ACCUMULATION AND EXPANSION
"The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the
instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and
with them the whole relations of society... Constant revolutionising of
production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting
uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier
ones. All fixed, fast frozen relations, with their train of ancient and
removable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, antiquated before they
can ossify."
(Marx & Engels Manifesto of the Communist Party, 1975, pp.36-37)
The competitive drive within capitalism always to seek to maxiniise profits
has led to the expansion abroad of the forces of capitalist production in
the continual quest for new markets, cheaper raw materials and cheaper
labour. In the process, more and more people have become incorporated
into capitalist relations of production, usually through the coercive use
of brute force. The expansionist nature of capitalism has entailed on the
one hand the internationalisation of capitalist relations of production
(and hence the internationalisation of the labour market) whilst on the
other, the concentration and centralisation of capitalist monopolies has
become entwined increasingly with national state powers in order to secure
and further competitive interests. Consequently, rivalry between
capitalist monopolies has also assumed a political militaristic dimension.
One specific aspect of this expansion has been the acquisition of colonies
by the advanced capitalist powers and their integration into an
international capitalist economy. As Lenin (1944 p.379) wrote,
"the capitalist system cannot exist and develop without constantly
extending its sphere of domination, without colonizing new countries and
without drawing ancient, non-capitalist countries Into the whirlpool of the
world economy."
However, this was not achieved merely by the replication throughout the
world of the autarkic pattern of capitalist development in its countries of
origin. Instead, the very process by which capitalism spread from its
European centres to the colonies entailed for the latter a restricted form
of capitalist development which was oriented towards satisfying the
demands of capital at the centres. This phenomenon has been termed the
under-development of societies at the capitalist periphery. It arose from
the outset by virtue of the initial trading advantages of the more
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developed powers and continues to be expressed in the asymmetrical
relationships of exchange between centre and periphery. Whilst concern
originally was focussed upon underdevelopment in relation to the case of
Latin America, the analysis has been extended to characterise the
contemporary relationship on a global scale between all advanced major
capitalist powers and the 'Third World'. Prescriptions for action vary
widely amongst 'underdevelopment' theorists [1] but they nevertheless share
a basic underlying unity of analysis which articulates clearly the specific
processes structuring the dominance of the centre over the periphery and
thus, the conditions under which migration has occurred from peripheral
social formations as they have become integrated into a world capitalist
system.
Amin (1976) for instance, detailed how the "extraverted" development of
speclalised commodity production in peripheral societies towards export to
countries at the centre had distorted local economic growth from the very
beginning. Disproportionate foreign investment in high-productivity
sectors had had the dual effect in the periphery of undermining pre-
capitalist production by draining a part of the labour force (without
implanting an autarkic substitute) and imposing competition with more
sophisticated production techniques at the centre economies. This had
forced production at the periphery into a subordinate role with the
result that wages there had become depressed and exchange with centre
economies unequal. lJnderdevelopment, therefore, was not simply a
description of less advanced countries in comparison to the more advanced.
It referred specifically to the extreme unevenness in productivities and
income in the periphery, its unequal exchange relationship with the centre,
the orientation of production towards the needs of the centre and the
concomitant stifling of economic progress at the periphery and finally,
the dependence of the periphery upon dominant centre countries in the
development of specialised commodity production. Thus, workers at the
periphery were super-exploited by capital rooted at the centre, This
rendered them an extra vulnerable source of' labour to be directed wherever
greatest profit was to be realised. Amin noted how the migration of
cheapened workers from the periphery to industries at the centre served to
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boost profits there by undermining standard wage levels for indigenous
workers:
"In order to counteract the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to
fall at the centre itself, capital imports labour from the periphery at a
lower wage (reserving for this labour the most thanklesstasks), in order
to depress the labour market of the metropolitan countries." (ibid p.362)
MIGRATION AND CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT
Migration has occurred throughout human history. However it is
specifically the demise of pre-capitalist societies upon the rise of
capitalism that has induced migrations on an unprecedented numerical and
geographical scale. Understanding the international migration of labour as
an intrinsic part of the uneven development of capitalism is central to
understanding the case of the Chinese, as will be revealed. (There are, of
course, other migratory movements which also characterise the integrated
nature of the world system: managerial and 'brain drain' flows, for
example, can occur across continents but within a single firm.) This
framework does not deny individualistic motivations for migration in terms
of 'push and pull factors', the preoccupation of many migration studies.
It merely explains the reasons why such 'factors' emerge. Not to do so
leaves recourse only to ad hoc psychological and culturalistic analyses
that only mystify rather than clarify historical example.
Prior to the capitalist penetration of China, migration on any large scale
was uncommon, most movement having occurred for trading purposes.
However, the inherent conservatism of the Chinese regime (see discussion
on the asiatic mode of production below) restricted trading to such an
extent so as to retard the country's commercial development (Meskill 1973;
Ho 1962). Whilst some progress continued under the Yuan Dynasty (1260 -
1367), trade was again severely curtailed under the reign of the lUng
(1368 - 1644), although by this period, Chinese trade routes had become
established as far afield as Africa (Lyman 1974). An Imperial Edict
issued in 1712 prohibiting the return of overseas Chinese under penalty of
death discouraged migration still further. The following sections of this
chapter describe how such a situation was reversed with the advent of the
Western colonialists.
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jA BEFORE THE BRITISH
The history of China falls into four broad categories corresponding -to its
stages of economic and political development (Chen 1973). The first
period stretches from the earliest historical records (C, 2000 BC) to the
unification of China under the Chin dynasty (221 - 207 BC), during which
the basic patterns of agricultural life were evolved. The second period
covers the next two thousand years up to the first Opium War of 1840 and
witnessed the firm establishment of agricultural production and its
subsidiary activities. This was abruptly ended with the political
subordination of China to Western colonialists following China's defeat in
the Opium Wars. The subsequent injection into China of industrial capital,
integrating local production with the world markets of the capitalist
empires, entailed the demise of the previous local economic and social
order and the mass deportation of Chinese workers. The imperialistic
struggle for control of China's resources ending with the Second World War
hailed the dawn of the contemporary stage of China's development in which
wealth and power were wrested back into the hands of the Chinese state in
1949 under the Chinese Communist Party led by Mao. To understand the
impact of the introduction of capitalism to China and the resulting
development of a Chinese community in Britain, it is necessary to focus
upon the period of transition from the second to the third historical
period.
The traditional China which confronted the first colonial merchants from
the West was an agrarian society in which economic and social relations
centred around localised susbsistence agricultural production. Crops
accounted for the bulk of produce, these being mainly wheat and millet in
the north and rice in the south, although cotton, tobacco, potatoes, maize
and peanuts were also grown. Agriculture combined with animal husbandry
and handicraft production on a domestic scale for direct use by the
household and local community formed the foundations of a largely self-
sufficient, self-sustaining economic and social system [2]. 	 This was
perpetuated through rigid divisions of labour and political despotism.
Men generally farmed the land whilst women's tasks were rooted in the
domestic sphere, spinning and weaving cotton, making pottery, shoes and
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other textiles <Curtin 1974; Croll 1978; Slu 1982). During peak demand for
agricultural labour, such as planting and harvest, women joined men in the
fields but their contributions were never sufficiently sustained to
threaten the established patriarchal structures (ibid), 	 ProDertv
transmitted along agnatic lines meant that women were economically,
socially and politically subordinate, Subject first to their fathers, then
to their husbands and finally to their Sons, the role of women in dynastic
China could never be an independent one (Baker 1979; Freedman 1965). This
was enshrined in the lineage and clan institutions which regulated village
life and codified in Confucian epigrams. (Confucianism - the doctrine
developed from the works of an ancient Chinese philosopher - was a
dominant, state endorsed ideology in dynastic China.) Thus, if women held
any power at all, it was only in the ability to manipulate their kinsmen.
An extensive and elaborate bureaucracy administered the imperial autocracy
throughout China's vast eighteen provinces and their subdivisions. Its
prime objective was to maintain absolute political control, which was
achieved through such devices as popular indoctrination, oppressive
magistrates and governmental 'spies' operating in village and clan
organisations.	 The net result was social, economic and political
stagnation, as expressed by Hsiao (1972 Pp.8 and 9):
"Few public functionaries, from the highest ranking mandarins in Peking to
the humble magistrates of remote districts, made efforts to do things that
might bring true advantages to their sovereigns or give material benefits
to the people; most merely sought to keep out of trouble and to look out
for their personal advantage and. profit... Rural China was thus kept
virtually stagnant, intellectually and economically unable to meet the
challenge of changed circumstances; the inhabitants became helpless
against grave disasters wrought by nature or against oppressions inflicted
by local bullies and yamen underlings. The foundations of the empire,
ironically, were weakened by the very process of control."
The condition of classical Chinese society was symptomatic of the static
oriental, or asiatic (to use Marx's term) mode of production by which it
was differentiated from Western societies immediately predating capitalism
[31. Unlike the structure of feudalism in the Europe, economies formed
around the asiatic mode (China and India being the two main examples usea
by Marx to develop the concept) tended not to generate any mechanisms
that would lead to the development of productive forces and the eventui
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rise of capitalism. Therefore, contrary to popular belief, a trading or
entrepreneurial tradition was distinctly lacking in dynastic China prior
to its Integration with the world capitalist system.
"The Asiatic form necessarily holds out longest and most tenaciously.
This fact is rooted in Its very presupposition: that the individual does
not become autonomous vis-a-vls the community; that the production cycle
is self-sustaining; unity of agriculture and hand-manufacture, etc"
(l'iarx, K: Grundrisse 1857-8 p.386 quoted in Draper 1978 p.534)
What little trading structure existed in pre-colonial China was fragile.
Border trade was established and maritime traders were known on the
shores of Vietnam as early as 300 BC. By the second century BC there
appear to have been Chinese trade routes through Yunnan to the Irrawaddy
and Saiween valleys. During this period, Tongking (and not Canton) was
the major southern port (Purcell 1951). Between the fifth and the eighth
centuries AD, the spread of Buddhism in China led pilgrims regularly to
Indonesia and India. This contributed to the development of the carrying
trade in South East Asia, which brought spices to China, India and Arabia
(Tay Erb Soon 1962). Chinese merchants, however, did not figure
prominently throughout South East Asia, trade being dominated mostly by
Xuslims from Persia and Arabia, The small Chinese populations which
resulted from trade In South East Asia, moreover, were quickly absorbed
into the local society such that in many countries (especially Thailand),
the numerous native inhabitants of Chinese descent confound classification.
Indeed, it was not until the Sung Dynasty (960 - 1279), one thousand years
after the first known traders abroad, that Chinese trade in South East
Asia was developed to any significantly more advanced degree.
The archaic social structure of China had survived intact through a
deliberate Imperial strategy of political, economic and social detachment
from the influence of other countries, exemplified by the 1712 Edict. The
permanent absence of a foreign ministry meant that dealings with countries
abroad were dispensed on an ad hoc, local basis, Fearing a similar fate
as befell Japan and India, the Chinese state ensured that their door to the
West remained firmly closed. In Japan, the "Christian century" (1550 -
1650), during which the missionaries had been largely tolerated, ended in
a Christian rebellion against the Imperial power.	 In India, trade with
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Portugal followed by the British East India Company had led to political
penetration and eventual conquest. Russia was the only European power to
have stricken any formal agreements with China (the Treaty of }erchinsk
1689 and the Treaty of Kiachta 1727), as even Portugal's control of Macao
(a southeastern Chinese trade port) in actuality was not based upon any
treaty with the Chinese Manchu government. Very much an outgrowth of the
political and social status quo, the offi:cial attitude to foreigners, or
'barbarians' as they were known, assumed an elaborate philosophy:
"The Chinese believed that the world is square, that heaven is round, and
that heaven projects its circular shadow onto the center of the earth.
This circle, the "zone beneath heaven" (tianx.ia), is the Chinese empire
itself, The outer pieces formed by the four angles of the square (called
the "four seas") do not receive the celestial emanations, and they have
therefore become the domain of foreign barbarians yi), demons, and sea
monsters" (Chesneaux et al. 1977 p.9)
The rise of Chinese merchants to positions of commercial dominance
throughout South East Asia went hand in hand with the stamp of European
colonialism. "The free trade proclaimed by the British was especially
important... The European had the resources of international organisation
and political influence or control; the Chinese had local knowledge and
connections throughout Asia." (Thy Erh Soon 1962 op cit p.39). Free from
localised sentiments of nationalist resistance and from the legal
restrictions imposed by national governments upon dcmestic traders,
Chinese commercial networks were actively nurtured by the colonialists at
the colonial ports of Penang, l'alacca, Singapore and Hong Kong (ibid
pp.38-40; see also map overleaf), The new trading relations wrought by
colonialism opened up further opportunities for the fast growing Chinese
mercantile class and a few moved into the ranks of the nascent local
bourgeoisie.
This transformation errupted during the nineteenth century with the
Western race for the Chinese markets. It was eventually to overturn the
traditional foundations of southeast Chinese state and society, as
expressed vividly by Xarx (1968 p4):
"Complete isolation was the prime condition of the preservation of Old
China, That isolation having come to a violent end by the medium of
England, dissolution must follow as surely as that of any mummy carefully
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preserved in a hermetically sealed coffin, whenever it is brought into
contact with the open air."
THE OLD CHINA TRADE
By the time the British first opened a trading establishment at Canton in
1865, Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch maritime merchants were already
established in China.	 However, from the mid eighteenth century Sino-
British trade intensified.	 The East India Company was the sole firm
allowed by Parliament to deal in the Far East, as was the Cohong (a self-
appointed guild of local merchants) the only official Chinese body to
trade directly with foreigners at Canton. The Cohong met with tacit
Chinese governmental approval, since it was a source of considerable
profit for many local officials. The Cohong monopoly presided over rising
levies for foreign merchants but relatively constant customs duties for
the government. The power of the Cohong was consolidated by an imperial
decree in 1757 limiting trade with foreigners to Canton alone, (despite
attempts by English merchants to open Amoy and Ningpo as trading ports),
and also by winning formal recognition by the emperor in 1760. Its
member merchants were responsible for unloading foreign goods,
establishing their market prices, paying customs duties, liaising with
foreign merchants in all affairs and supervising their personal conduct.
The value of all British goods (which included woollen fabrics, cotton
cloth, cotton yarn and metal products) legitimately imported into China
from 1781 to 1793 amounted to 16,870,000 silver dollars - only one sixth
of the value of the teas China exported to Britain (Foreign Languages
Press 1976 p.5). This was mainly due to the fact that China's domestic
textile production and trade were largely self-sufficient, as noted by the
Lazarist Evarist Huc:
"One excellent reason why China is only moderately fond of trading with
foreigners is that her home trade is immense... China is such a vast, rich
and varied country that internal trade is more than enough to occupy the
part of the nation which can perform commercial operations." (quoted in
Chesneaux et al. 1977 op cit p52)
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Thus, eager to expand their markets and continue buying tea and silk but
keen also to retain their silver, the East India Company found a way of
balancing trade with China by swamping the country with opium, an
addictive drug. As such, its sale exploited an enormous potential market
at a time when Indian cotton could claim approximately only one quarter of
imports to China and British woollens about one eighth. Opium therefore
emerged as the single commodity which clinched Britain's 'triangular' trade
profits from the East. (British manufactured goods were transported to
India, Indian products to China and Chinese products to England, where
profits were amassed or invested in India - a process which involved the
movement of profits along a geographic course that resembled a triangle.)
Pay (1976 p.lO) described the effects of opium thus:
"And if' he makes opium a habit, ... sooner of later he will experience,
should he try to stop, not simply the absence of bliss but positive
misery:... Coleridge suffered from vomiting, stomach cramps, and
excruciating pains in the head and limbs. De Quincey felt himself freezing
to death whilst heaped with blankets by a blazing fire in midsummer. And
both endured torments of the mind and of the feelings extreme
nervousness, fits of uncontrollable weeping, fear, shame, anger, and
dreadful nightmares ."
In 1773, the British government of India adopted the policy of large scale
opium export to China and granted the East India Company the right to
monopolise the opium trade in India. To ensure the implementation of this
policy, in 1797 it also gave the Company the sole right to manufacture
opium. By the year 1800, opium occupied more than half of British cargo
to China from India (Li 1956 p.2?), annual exports to China having reached
two thousand chests, ten times the figure for 1767 (Foreign Languages
Press 1976 op cit pp.B-9). As opium imports increased, the Ch'ing
government issued successive orders banning the drug in 1796, 1800, 1813
and 1815 but to no avail. During the early nineteenth century, opium
imports to China rose further still, By 1820, an annual average of 9,708
crates of opium were documented to have been smuggled into China
(Chesneaux et al. 1977 op cit p.54). Ten years later, during the period
following the end of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe, this figure had
doubled to 18,712 (ibid) and by 1839, approximately forty thousand crates
per year were successfully sold on the Chinese market (Holt 1964 p.65),
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representing well over sixty percent of Chinese imports (Chesneaux et al.
1977 op cit p.55).
As an illegal drug, opium incurred no taxes in China and thus became an
extremely lucrative commodity for both Chinese and British merchants, The
enormous extent to which British companies benefitted was stressed clearly
by the Hong Kong Research Project (1979 p.9):
"Already by 1830 the export of opium to China from warehouses belonging
to the East Company of India paid both for England's tea imports from
China and for English cotton exports sold to India, as well as for a
considerable part of the Indian administration. In 1830 the Auditor
General of the East India Company stated flatly: "India does entirely
depend on the profits of the China trade", Suggestions that BritaIn was
somehow officially against the opium trade are quite untenable. The opium
business was crucial to the economy of British colonialism in Asia."
William Jardine, the biggest of the British opium dealers, disclosed in a
private letter that "in the good years ... gross profits were sometimes as
high as $1,000 a chest" (Greenberg 1951 p.105). Having amassed a large
fortune, Jardine entered the House of Commons in 1841. Another opium
smuggler, James 1tatbeson, bought an island off the west coast of Scotland
upon his return from China in 1841 and spent .329,000 on its reclamation
alone (Foreign Languages Press 1976 op cit p.11). He was later knighted
by Queen Victoria.
American merchants were also amongst those who shared in the opium
profits, buying their supplies from Turkey and Persia. Their involvement
in drug smuggling, however, was not as heavy as that of the British as
they lacked the East India Company's grip on plantations and. labour.
Nevertheless, by supplementing opium sales with ginseng, furs and
sandalwood (each gained by unscrupulous barter with the native peoples of
the New World and South Pacific), America's trade with China was reported
by Dulles (1974 p.49) to have brought the greatest profits of any branch
of American foreign trade, having paid for the founding fortunes of "a
long line of merchants in New York Philadelphia, Boston and Salem" (ibid).
By 1790, trade with China accounted for one seventh of America's imports,
only six years after it had begun. By 1825, "seven eighths of the China
trade was in the hands of four firms: Perkins and Company, of Boston;
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Archer, of Philadelphia; Jones Oakford and Company, of Philadelphia; and
T,H.Smith, of New York." (ibid p.113)
In 1793, the first British ambassador, Lord (acartney, sent to China to
extend and consolidate Britain's trading privileges, met with a similar
response to his predecessors from Portugal, Spain and Holland. Regarded
as a tributary envoy, he was requested to kow tow (a ceremony of three
kneelings and nine bows) before the emperor, which he refused to do in the
spirit of his mission. He subsequently returned to Britain unsuccesiul.
Amongst his unmet demands were the legitimate use of more ports along the
southeastern Chinese coast, storage for goods at key cities in China, the
abolition of import and travel tariffs and permission for English
missionaries to teach Christianity in China. The saga was repeated by
Britain's second ambassador, Lord Amherst in 1816, with the exception that
Amherst also managed to incur the wrath of the emperor by his arrogance.
Upon Amherst's failure, the Select Committee of Supercargoes of the East
India Company (responsible for import and export arrangements) started to
advocate a more forceful approach:
"We are decidedly of opinion that with little sacrifice of Commerical
Interests and without any acts of aggression on the unoffending Natives of
the Country it (the Chinese Empirel could be readily brought to a sense of
its own comparative weakness, and an intercourse infinitely more
favourable be established to any which Foreigners have hitherto enjoyed.
This we believe could be accomplished either with or without the
acquisition of an independent settlement." (quoted in Graham 1978 p.25)
Towards the 1830s, Sino-British relations became increasingly strained as
British merchants openly flouted local Chinese rules and regulations,
operating a thriving opium trade from the small island of Lintin just
offshore from Canton, This culminated in 1834, when the East India
Company's trade monopoly with China was ended, resulting in a deluge of
opium imports to China, and Lord Napier was subsequently appointed as
Chief Superintendent of Trade in China, On arrival, Napier's refusal to
use the medium of the Cohong in dealings with the governor-general of
Kwangtung led the Cohong to suspend trade with the British. In response,
Napier sailed up river to Canton using armed force and issued a public
challenge to the emperor on behalf of the king of England and the British
merchants,	 The Chinese authorities relented, trading was resumed and
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1apier withdrew to Macao, where he died shortly afterwards on October
11th 1834. The following Superintendents, Davis and Robinson, purstied a
more conciliatory strategy.
eanwhile, widespread opium addiction in China started to drain the
country of silver after years of a balance of trade in China's favour.
Between 1823 and 1834, 25.2 million Spanish dollars in silver were
exported from China, followed by another 4½ million in the next fiscal
year alone (Foreign Languages Press 1976 op cit p.17). The dearth of
silver was felt not only in the coastal provinces but also throughout the
country.
"The most conservative estimate is that at least 100 million dollars'
worth, one-fifth of the total amount of silver in circulation in China was
drained from the country in the 20 years 1821-40 before the Opium War.
This means there was, on the average, an annual loss of 5 million dollars
in silver, one-tenth of the Ching government's annual revenue." (ibid)
As a result, the exchange rate of copper (the other form of currency in
China) more than doubled in relation to silver (ibid p.18). The
depreciation of copper was particularly severe in the south. Peasants and
artisans were the hardest hit, the price of their produce being assessed
in copper whilst their taxes in silver.
Throughout the 1830s, whilst Chinese merchants and corrupt bureaucrats
favoured the legalisation of opium, growing popular sentiments for total
prohibition of the drug resulted finally in the appointment of Lin Tse-hsu
as Commissioner at Canton in 1839 to implement strict new controls. In
two months, he ordered the arrest of sixteen hundred opium dealers,
confiscated eleven thousand pounds of opium, forced foreign traders to
surrender their stocks of twenty thousand crates and two thousand sacks
which were publically destroyed on the beach at Humen (Chesneaux et al.
1977 op cit p.63; Foreign Languages Press 1976 op cit p.29). He also
entreated foreign merchants to sign bonds promising to cease all trade in
opium. In response, Elliot, the new Superintendant of Trade, urged the
British government to declare war on China and directed British merchants
to continue large scale armed smuggling of the drug. Tension mounted
until on November 3rd 1839, Elliot commanded British ships to open fire on
Chinese patrol boats, whereupon ensued the battle of Chuenpi. Six further
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incidents, all provoked by Elliot, during the following ten days in the
Pearl River estuary formed the prelude to war. By January 1840, an
imperial decree formally declared the stoppage of trade with England and
military action followed.
THE OPIUK WARS
Having gleaned polItical, economic and military intelligence since 1823 on
all the important ports along the southeastern Chinese coast (Foreign
Languages Press 1976 op cit) the British government was well prepared for
war. In June of 1840, British naval forces were poised just off the
Kwangtung coast ready for invasion. Thwarted at Amoy, they succeeded in
taking Tinghai, the Ch'ing government only having prepared for war in the
provinces of Kwangtung and Fukien.
"The men forced their way into every house and ransacked every drawer and
chest, and the streets were strewn with books, paintings, furniture,
utensils and foodstuff ... all of which were taken away... The plundering
only stopped when everything •
 of value was gone. Such barbaric behaviour
on the part of the British took place not only in Tinghai, but throughout
the entire course of the war." (ibid p.40)
From Tinghai, the British fleet sailed northwards towards Tientsin and
pressed hard their demands on the Chinese authorities. Resistant to any
form of compromise the British forces, led by Henry Pottinger, intensified
hostilities and retook Tinghai and moved on to occupy Chinhai, Ningpo,
eastern Chekiang, Chapu, Woosung, Shanghai and Chinkiang, a central link
between northern and southern China. Such was the ferocity of the British
troops that upon storming Chapu, they discovered that "in terror at the
coming of the invaders many women had drowned or hanged their children
and then followed them to death, and husbands had hanged their wives and
cut their own throats" (Holt 1964 op cit p.144) On August 29th 1842, the
Chinese emperor conceded to the Treaty of Nanking.
Hostilities had not seriously damaged profits, British trade having
continued under the auspices of the American flag at Canton. gore
importantly, Britain had seized the upper hand in future business affairs
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with China. As a result of the first Opium War, the British government
wrested from the Chinese sovereign control of the island and harbour of
Hong Kong; the opening to British trade of the five "treaty ports" of
Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai; 21,000,000 Chinese silver
dollars indemnity payment; political parity; the abolition of the Cohong
monopoly and slashed trade tariffs [see Table 1). 5mb-Western relations
were placed on a new footing as the subsequent Treaties of Vhampoa and
Wanghia signed with America and France extended to their merchants
similar privileges to those awarded the British, Autonomous foreign
administration of the 'treaty ports' combined with the intimidating
policing of the southeastern Chinese coastline by British 'gunboats'
ensured a flourishing opium trade. By the middle of the nineteenth
century, approximately 800,000 chests per year were being imported to
China from India alone (Foreign Languages Press 1976 op cit. p.l12)
through Hong Kong, the new centre for smuggling.
TABLE 1 EFFECTS OF THE TREATY OF NA1KING ON CHINESE TARIFF RATES
Comrnodi ties	 Rates before
1843
Cotton	 24.19
Cotton yarn	 13,38
1st class cotton cloth 29.93
2nd class cotton cloth 32.53
Rates in
1843
5.56
5.56
6.95
6.95
reduced
77.02
58.45
76.78
78.64
Source Yan Zhongping et al: aelection of Statistical Xaterials on the
History of the 1'odern Chinese Economy, Kexue Chubanshe, Beijing, 1955 p.59
The effects of the first stage in the "opening" of China, as it is
euphemistically termed, soon had a devastating effect on people throughout
the entire southeast region of the country. Any economic stability which
bad become established around the controlled trading through Canton and
its established inland communication routes was suddenly overturned,
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rendering many people destitute and vagrant (Chesneaux et al 1977 op cit
p.72-?3). Heavy taxes were exacted from the peasantry to finance the
indemnity payment wanted by the British government. A sharp rise in tea
and silk export was matched by a flood of British cottons on the Chinese
market. Cotton yarn imports, for instance, which amounted to 380,000 lbs
in 1830 grew to 3,419,560 lbs in 1840 and multiplied further still to
6,210,024 lbs by 1843 (Siu 1982 op cit pp.187-188). increased
specialisation of textile production demanded by the level of trade
accelerated the separation of handicrafts from agriculture in the rural
areas of southeast China, transforming established divisions of labour.
From the shaken foundations of the traditional social structure emerged a
series of peasant revolts which severely weakened the Ch'ing autocracy.
The most prodigious of these was the widespread Taiping Rebellion which
swept southeast China throughout the 1850s, establishing separate
autonomous Taiping states in the major areas it controlled. This was the
period which also witnessed the start of the transportation of indentured
Chinese workers (derogatorily termed "coolies") to different parts of the
British empire to fill the labour shortages created by the abolition of
slavery in 1834, The massive diaspora of indentured Chinese workers was
qualitatively different from all previous Chinese emigration in its
intensity, its oppressiveness and most importantly, its economic and
political impetus. Whereas former emigration had not altered the
equilibrium of the existing Chinese social structure, the "coolie"
emigration was part and parcel of the disintegration of traditional China.
The trading advantages grabbed by Britain in the first Opium War proved
riot to be as great as had been hoped. All formal negotiation with China
was still conducted through senior Chinese officials rather than directly
with Peking and the British had still not been able to claim Canton as an
"international concession" with independent rule as they had done at other
treaty ports, despite several armed attempts. The opium trade, though
incredibly lucrative, was still illegal. The import of cotton textiles from
Xanchester, had increased but had not reached anticipated scales. Dyed
and printed cotton imports, for instance, rose only from 169,521 rolls in
1843 (the year immediately following the first Opium War) to 198,105 rolls
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in 1855, the figures having fluctuated considerably in between (Peng 1957
p.491). Kore and more, the attention of British merchants turned to the
northern and inland ports to widen their scope for trade. They pressed
for a "revision0 of the Treaties but were not entertained by the }[anchu
government.
With the allied forces of France, British troops seized Canton by force in
1856 and continued northwards from 1859 until they reached Peking, which
they captured and looted in 18€0. The justification used for invasion was
the arrest by Chinese authorities of the crew of the Chinese lorcha, Arrow
for piracy whilst it was flying the union jack and the execution of a
French missionary, Father Chapedelaine, found in an inland province
designated out of bounds by the Treaties of 1842 and 1844.
With the Summer Palace burned and ransacked, the emperor agreed to the
treaty of Tientsin, drawn up in 1858, and the 'Peking conventions" of 1860.
The seizing of vast territories in the northeast by Russia whilst the
Chinese army was fighting both the European invasion and the internal
peasant uprisings was ratified and eleven more ports were opened to the
Europeans, including Tientsin and Hankou. Western vessels were allowed
access to certain inland waterways and Western missionaries and merchants
were granted the right to travel about the country and buy land. The
opium trade was legalised arid other foreign commodities were exempted
from transit tax. Both France and Britain received a war indemnity of
eight million taels and acquired the right to send permanent diplomatic
missions to Peking. Britain also gained sovereignty of the Kowloon
peninsula and Stonecutters Is land (both adjacent to Hong Kong island).
This second Opium War, having immediately rekindled Britain's dwindling
balance of trade with China (see Table 2> and yielded from the emperor the
desired privileges, also witnessed an abrupt end to the British neutrality
towards the Taiping rebels and British troops were sent to aid their
suppression and the slaughter of twenty million people (Chan 1982 p.516).
"UBJy 1865, the once fertile valley was 'strewn with human skeletons, their
rivers polluted with floating carcasses, no hands were left to till the
soil'. Another eye witness reported that many 'have been driven to
cannibalism to satisfy the craving of hunger'." [4]
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TABLE 2: DECLARED VALUE OF BRITISH IYLPORTS TO CHINA (in Sterling>
	
1852	 1853	 1854	 1855	 1856	 1857
Cottons 1,905,321 1,408,433	 640,820	 883,985 1,544,235 1,731,909
Woollens 434,616
	
203,875	 156,959	 134,070	 268,642	 286,852
Others	 163,662	 137,289	 202,937	 259,889	 403,246	 431,221
Total	 2,503,599 1,749,597 1,000,716 1,277,944 2,216,123 2,449,982
Source: Har On China 1968 p.89
The deluge of British goods upon the Chinese market following the
uopening I
 of China was further expedited by the opening of the Suez Canal
in 1869 which lowered shipping costs drastically. Also caine the rapid
industrialisation of the textile industry through the spread of foreign
owned factories and the corresponding demise of indigenous handicrafts,
Together with massive imports of opium, kerosene, cereals and sugar, these
developments combined systematically to undermine and eliminate the
economic base of traditional Chinese society and with it, the long
established roles of men, women and the family. Hundreds of thousands of
economically displaced peasants were forced to migrate to the fast growing
urban industrial centres in search of a wage. In many areas, this
migration involved all the economically active (Siu 1981 op cit p.84).
Even during the twentieth century, working conditions, especially in the
foreign owned factories, were appalling. 	 Women workers suffered the
worst, sometimes being compelled
"to urinate at their workpoint or to give birth to babies in the hallways
of the factories. In fact, due to the 'complications' attached to married
women, factory employers were usually reluctant to hire them, with the
result that most women workers were between 10 and 18 years old." (ibid
p.89)
PUSHED THROUGH THE "OPEN DOOR"
It was by virtue of China's "open door" (a phrase coined by the American
government) achieved upon the country's defeat in the second Opium War
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that the trafficking of "coolie" workers intensified greatly, resulting in a
wave of emigration from China on a scale hitherto unprecedented. The
"coolie" trade drew upon limitless numbers of destitute peasants: the
economic, political and social penetration of China by the Western powers
and the bloody suppression of the Taipings had supplanted millions.
Starved to desperation, they were forced into indenture often never to
return. For many, the choice was simple: "leave China or perish in the
agony of poverty... So many Chinese were forced to combat death with
glazed eyes and bloated bellies that the call for labour ... was not
difficult to resist" (Chan 1982 op cit pp.516-517). Whilst this system in
essence may have appeared more humane than the brutal slave trade which
in large part It replaced, in practice there was little difference. At
Shanghai, Amoy, Swatow, Kam-oa, Canton and Xacao, British, American,
French, Spanish and Portuguese "agents" used deception or intimidation to
acquire as many Chinese men as possible for shipment under contract to
companies in North and South America, the West Indies, Africa and South
East Asia for years of hard labour.
"Sometimes the coolies were ruthlessly abducted from their homes and kept
prisoner until the boats sailed for their sad new world; sometimes
ignorant villagers were persuaded by smooth-tongued agents to sign
agreements giving their services for a number of years, and thus became
voluntary emigrants; but when they reached their destinations in the
British colonies or in South America, where they were sold to planters at
prices ranging from 400 to 1,000 dollars a man, the same cruel treatment
was given both to the volunteers and to the men whom Chinese crimps had
dragged from their homes, William H. Seward, Abraham Lincoln's Secretary
of State ... was not exaggerating when he called it 'an abomination
scarcely less execrable than the African slave-trade'." (Holt 1964 op cit
p.250)
"[T]he British consul, Sir Rutherford Alcock, said in a report that in
Canton "when no man could leave his own house, even in public
thoroughfares and open day, without danger of being hustled, under false
pretences of debt or delinquency, and carried off a prisoner in the hands
of crimps, to be sold to the purveyors of coolies at so much a head, and
carried off to sea, never again to be heard of, the whole population of the
city and adjoining districts were aroused to a sense of common peril." In
Shanghai, even some working people who came into the foreign concessions
to sell farm produce were seized by British traffickers." (Foreign
Languages Press 1976 pp.115-116) 15]
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The fully armed vessels which transported the "coolies" from China were
commonly described as "floating hells". Closely confined, poorly
ventilated steerages and oppressive guards entailed a death rate at sea as
high as 45% (ibid). More still, perished attempting to mutiny or as a
result of the austere, slave-like conditions which awaited them at their
destinations, In some places like Cuba, Chinese "coolies" worked side by
side with African slaves (Williams 1964 p.29):
TABLE 3: CHINESE LABOUR ON CUBAN SLAVE PLANTATIONS
Plantation	 Negroes	 Chinese
Flor de Cuba	 409
	
170
San Martin	 452
	
125
El Progreso	 550
	
40
Arnioni a
	 330
	
30
Santa Rosa
	 300
	
30
San Rafael
	
260
	
20
Santa Susana
	
632
	
200
Source: Cantero, J,G: Los Ingenios de la Isla de Cuba, 1857, La Haban:
p.218 in Williams (1964: footnote 125)
Marx (1951 p,39) made a telling remark on the Chlnese situation when he
wrote
"We hear nothing of the illicit opium trade, which yearly feeds the British
treasury at the expense of human life and morality. We hear nothing of
the constant bribery of sub-officials, by means of which the Chinese
Government is defrauded of its rightful revenue on incoming and outgoing
merchandise. We hear nothing of the wrongs inflicted "even unto death"
upon misguided and bonded emigrants sold to worse than Slavery on the
coast of Peru, and into Cuban bondage. We hear nothing of the bullying
spirit often exercised against the timid nature of the Chinese, or of the
vice introduced by foreigners at the ports open to their trade ... because
it is the part of policy and prudence not to agitate toDics where no
pecuniary advantage would result. Thus the English people at home, who
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look no further than the grocer's shop where they buy their tea, are
prepared to swallow all the misrepresentations which the Ministry and the
Press choose to thrust down the public throat."
THE CREATION OF CHINESE 'BUSINESS' COMMUNITIES
Indentured Chinese labourers were imported to colonies throughout South
America, the Caribbean, South East Asia and into the expanding industries
of the Old Commonwealth, where their immediate living and working
conditions appeared to be uniformly wretched. However, the specific
economic and political conditions of each country which influenced the
subsequent experiences of the indentured Chinese entailed for them
profoundly diverse historical legacies. In situations where Chinese were
accorded much the same rights as the indigenous population (or rather,
where they were denied as many rights), they seem more or less to have
become totally assimilated into their local social and economic
environment, This appears to have applied in certain South American and
Caribbean societies, such as Peru and British Guyana. On the other hand,
where the material conditions of emigration entailed political and
economic distinctions to be drawn between Chinese and other labour, a
proportion of the Chinese remained both economically and socially
distinguished, Jamaica being a case in point. The societies of the Old
Commonwealth, where the state sought systematically to undermine and
penalise imported Chinese workers as original demand for cheap labour
began to subside, are those in which the Chinese even today are found to
be most heavily concentrated in entrepreneurial economic activity. The
development of Chinese 'business' communities in South East Asia, however,
has been slightly different. There, Chinese workers have been associated
both with the exploitative economic structures that served to bolster the
hegemony of the Western colonialists as well as with the latent threat of
China's contemporary military might. Nationalistic movements which have
been thrown up in these situations have made scapegoats of generations of
Chinese, who have retreated increasingly to self-employment and ethnic
insularity. The section below illustrates some of the examples above in
greater detail.
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In Peru, Chinese "coolie" labour "for more than a quarter of a century,
was the greatest single source of Peruvian wealth" (Stewart 1970 p,95).
During the 1860s, over 90,000 Chinese were transported to Peru
specifically to shovel and sack bird manure, despite a formal contract
stipulating "that the coolie should not be put at labor in the guano beds"
(ibid p.96). Ruthless taskmasters and vile climatic conditions accounted
for a constant twenty five per cent sickness rate [6], ill health only
being acknowledged when a person had no strength even to stand [7].
Duff ield (1877 pp.77-78), describing the "coolies" lot, wrote
"No hell has ever been conceived by the Hebrew, the Irish, the Italian, or
even the Scotch mind for appeasing the anger and satisfying the vengeance
of their awful gods, that can be equalled in the fierceness of its heat,
the horror of its stink, and the damnation of those compelled to labor
there, to a deposit of Peruvian guano when being shovelled into ships."
As early as 1854, a group of Englishmen [8] noted that
"two dozen lashes makes them Lie. "coolies"] breathless, and when released
after thirty nine lashes, they seem slowly to stagger over, reeled and
fell, and were carried off to the hospital - in most cases, if they
recovered, committing suicide".
Time did not bring improvements. A United States consul to Peru writing
in 18'70 [9], commented that
"many of them too weak to stand up are compelled to work on their knees
picking the small stones out of the Guano, and when their hands become
sore from the constant use of the wheelbarrow it is strapped upon their
shoulders, and in that way they are compelled to fulfill their daily task
tie. clearing 4 to 5 tons of guano] ... Life to the Chinaman under such
circumstances possesses no attractive feature ... This feeling necessitates
the constant employment of a guard around the shores of the Guano Islands,
where they are employed, to prevent them from committing suicide by
drowning..
However, by 1879, the first "coolies" had fulfilled the conditions of their
indenture and thus became free workers, ?1any took the Spanish names
allocated to them by former owners, converted to Christianity and married
local women. On this subject, an American diplomatic despatch to Liina
[10] wrote, "They intermarry with the lower class of whites, mestizas, and
cholas, and by these are looked upon as quite a catch for their make good
husbands,	 industrious,	 domestic,	 and	 fond	 of	 their	 children".
Comparatively very few returned to China.
"The remainder yet alive were quietly and efficiently adjusting themselves
-to Peruvian society, either as free workers in agriculture and industry or
in some other occupation . . and the descendants of those early Oriental
immigrants are now almost indistinguishable from the mass of Peruvian
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citizens - be they white, black red, yellow, or mixed." (Stewart 1970 op
cit pp.228-232).
A similar sequence of events characterised the experiences of the Chinese
transported to work on the sugar plantations of Guyana. The ten thousand
or so discernable Chinese "coolies" recorded in 1866 (Patterson 1975
p.340) gradually declined as they were steadily 'creolised' through
intermarriage and prolonged social integration. By the twentieth century,
Clenienti (1915 p.359) described the situation thus: "British Guyana
possesses a Chinese society of which China knows nothing, and to which
China is almost unknown",
The Chinese presence in Jamaica, by contrast, continues to be a salient
feature of contemporary Jamaican society long after the decline of "coolie"
labour for the sugar plantations. For whilst a large proportion of
Chinese have become assimilated into the mainly Black population, retail
trade on the island is nevertheless dominated quite distinctly by Chinese
family firms (Patterson 1975 op cit). According to Patterson (1975 op
cit), the difference between the situation in Jamaica and Guyana lies in
the fact that the Guyanese sugar industry was redeemed by the importation
of further indentured labour from India towards the end of' the nineteenth
century during the world crisis of sugar prices. "Thus Guyana continued
to be a monocrop, plantation-based economy with a relatively simple social
and economic system, in which the mass of' the population remained largely
at the mercy of the planter class" (ibid p.342). In Jamaica, on the other
hand, the introduction of banana cultivation as a substitute hailed the
relatively rapid diversification and development of the local economy.
With fewer claims than Black workers to the land, those Chinese who were
unable to sharecrop tended to enter small scale retail trading, some with
considerable success, "Economic prosperity made ethnic consolidation
possible" (ibid p.329) and links with Far East were rekindled. Sons were
sent to China and Hong Kong for enculturation, Chinese wives were procured
from the Orient and ethnic trading associations were established (ibid).
In Guyana, however, the preferential treatment of Portuguese "coolies" over
Blacks and Chinese by the European ruling class tended to preclude
independent trade as an economic strategy for the Chinese. Thus, despite
the large Jamaican population of mixed Chinese and Black descent (ibid
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p.323) it is specifically those Chinese who cornered the retail and
wholesale trade and who subsequently reconstructed the boundaries of
ethnic exclusivity that are noted as the ethnic Chinese "business"
community.
Throughout South East Asia, the historical course for the evolution of both
small and large scale ChInese entrepreneurship was somewhat different
from the Jamaican experience. Part of the strategy of British and
European colonialists in manipulating the established South East Asian
trade networks to and from China was the specific development and
expansion of' the role of' Chinese merchants abroad, In this sense, Chinese
merchants fulfilled a similar role to that of the Asians in East Africa, as
described by Fees (1982 p.87): "They found themselves there largely
because a succession of British administrators found their presence
convenient, whether as indentured labourers.., or as traders and clerks in
the local bureaucracy". Since the Chinese generally were not amongst the
ousted trading hierarchies of the pre-colonial era, their economic
ascendence presented less of a threat to the hegemony of the East India
Company and others of the new order. Hence, a significant proportion of
those who owned the mines, plantations, factories, transportation
companies, brothels and other workplaces into which "coolies" were sold in
South East Asia were themselves Chinese who had amassed considerable
wealth under the auspices of the British empire (Tay Erh Soon 1962 op
cit). Conditions in the Chinese-owned firms of South East Aisa, however,
were no less atrocious than elsewhere for indentured workers. In the
British controlled Federation of IIalay States, for example, the "men
markets" of Singapore and Penang (both British colonies) furnished with
Chinese indentured workers the development of tin mining in Perak and
Selangor, the sugar plantations in the Protected Native States and also the
rubber plantations after the 1909 rubber boom (Campbell 1923).
"Wages were rarely paid ... On the Saga rubber Estate (Negri Sembilan)
general provisions or chandu were given the labourers in lieu of wages.
[In Perak] Mr J.R.Delmege, Medical Officer Krian, gave evidence: "Sanitation
as a rule nil" (ibid p.23)
Mutual self-hem and intra-ethnic bonding does not appear to have been the
order of the day amongst the Chinese labourers and plantation owners in
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South East Asia. In fact, "When British troops landed in the British
colony of Singapore on their way to invade China during the Opium Wars,
Chinese merchants in the colony gave their officers a mangificent feast"
(Tay Erh Soon 1962 op cit p.45). Nationalism amongst Chinese communities
abroad was only really generated after 1890 following repeated efforts by
the 'Ianchu government who were seeking financial aid from foreign sources
to fight the colonlalists and the subsequent rise of the nationalist
Kuomintang party (ibid). The growth of overseas Chinese nationalism,
however, still did nothing to improve conditions for Chinese "coolies"
indentured to Chinese employers.
The ascendance of Chinese merchants and capitalists and their political
allegiances have been often interpreted as a threat to national economic
independence during the decolonisation process in South East Asian
countries, Planned programmes of anti-Chinese discrimination have sought
to marginalise as far as possible the economic and political activity of
entire Chinese populations. In Kalaysia, for instance, certain areas of
land were constitutionally reserved for Malays only, statutory quotas
protected Kalays in public service, scholarships and appointment
committees favoured them in the university and government-supported
industries were strongly encouraged to favour the recruitment of Kalays
over Chinese (ibid p.36). The persecution of Chinese throughout post-
colonial South East Asian countries has assumed extreme political,
economic, social and physical dimensions, such as the massacre of
Indonesian Chinese ordered by President Sukarno during the 1960s. It is
within this context that many former Chinese labourers in South East Asia
have opted for self-employment.
Anti-Chinese labour programmes have not emanated solely from the emergent
nationalism of states oppressed by colonialism, In South Africa, for
instance, where 100,000 Chinese workers were indentured to the
Witwatersrand gold mines at the turn of the twentieth century, a
successful anti-Chinese labour campaign (in which a determining role was
played by the 1907 British Liberal government) actually led to the mass
deportation of all Chinese miners by 1910. The Chinese had been brought
in originally to replace the drain of Black South African miners after
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wages were slashed following the Boer War (Callinicos 1985 p.64). Working
conditions were tough and a high death rate prevailed. Subject to the
same strictures as Black miners before them, the Chinese were not allowed
to pass freely beyond the confines of mine property, perform any skilled
tasks, buy land, trade or pay rent for land (ibid p.65). The Transvaal
government had banned all possible means of mobilisation for Chinese
workers, including peaceful meetings, a rule tightly enforced by the
ruthless Chinese compound police. Nonetheless, a series of strikes, widely
publicised desertions whipping up white demands ± or Chinese repatriation,
lowered wages for Blacks and increasing pressure from the British state
brought Chinese settlement in South Africa to an abrupt end.
lii Australia and New Zealand the extensive employment of Chinese
indentured workers was coupled with restrictive immigration quotas,
financial penalties for residence and heavy taxation aimed specifically at
the Chinese. The adoption of "white Australia" and "white New Zealand"
policies served to maintain the subjugation of Chinese labour, thus
perpetuating the conditions which rendered "coolie" importation by the
colonialists a profitable option.
In the mid-nineteenth century, the height of the Australian 'gold rush' in
Victoria saw the introduction of the 1855 Victorian Act restricting
Chinese immigration. This was later reinforced by the introduction of a
licence fee of .1 on every Chinese resident who was not a British subject
in 1857. In 1859, the two previous Immigration Acts were substituted with
one which also imposed a 1O entry tax on Chinese arriving by sea, Those
arriving by land had to pay t40 and the residence levy was raised from 1
to .4 annually.	 The measures adopted in Victoria were replicated
throughout other states. In 1877, the Queensland government introduced
similar restrictions under the Chinese Immigrants' Regulation Act and the
Gold Fields Act. In 1878, a thirteen week strike by white workers against
the employment of Chinese "coolies" by the Australian Steam Navigation
Company, actively supported by the Queensland government, won the
withdrawal of Chinese seamen and fed minority demands for concerted anti-
Chinese action.	 In 1881 the Chinese Immigration Restriction Bill was
passed, which drastically reduced the entry of Chinese workers, bar the
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educated few who could pass the language test, together with merchants and
students (Campbell 1923 op cit pp.62-79). Anti-Chinese agitators
continued to mobilise against Chinese labour, inciting riots in Victoria
(ibid pp. 56-76) and eventually the Chinese were squeezed out of the gold
mines and into employment in the peripheral sectors of the economy, such
as casual agricultural labouring, market gardening, cabinet making and
laundering (Choi 1970).
The American case of Chinese labour exclusion is probably the best
documented of all. Recruited principally for the gold mines in California
by the Chinese compradores in San Francisco during the mid-nineteenth
century, "coolies" at first met with little hostility either in the mine
camps or in the local 'boom towns' which serviced them. During this
period, California was known in southeast China as "the golden mountain"
(Sandmeyer 1973 p.14). As the gold yields declined, however, the Chinese
found themselves increasingly reduced to working exhausted seams either by
legislation or by physical intimidation, whilst the richer territory was
monopolised by white mining contractors. Before long, "Like the Jewish
ghettoes of the !(iddle Ages, the boudaries of San Francisco's Chinatown,
and some others, were demarcated by authorities" (Rose 1985 p.188). In
the 1860s large numbers of Chinese workers were redeployed to build the
Central Pacific Railroad, boring the Sierra tunnel and driving the line
east across the deserts of Nevada and Utah.
Some were shipped north to Canada for work on the Canadian Pacific
Railway (CPR). One Canadian labour contractor, Onderdonk, saved $3-S
million by employing Chinese rather than white workers on the CPR (Chan
1982 op cit p.520). After completion of the CPR a poll tax of $50 was
levied on each immigrant at the instigation of British Columbia. This was
raised to $100 in 1901 and followed by Orders in Council to prevent
Chinese from diseinbarking. Finally the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923
forbade entry of persons of Chinese ancestry other than government
officials, Canadian born children, merchants and students (Black 1963).
Prevented from buying any land outright, the former construction workers
dispersed. The majority drifted towards the urban centres of the west,
where paid employment was more readily available. Some ventured to the
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United States and others went eastwards towards the Maritimes in search
of work. Fewer still settled in the towns and villages they caine across
along the way, selling low cost services like those which had been
provided for the railway workers on the CPR (Chan 1982 op cit).
The thousands of Chinese workers thrown into unemployment upon completion
of the Central Pacific Railroad on America's west coast were joined by an
influx of demobilised workers from the east at the end of the Civil War in
1870, increasing pressure on available employment. Some of the Chinese
construction workers remained with the company; others diversified into
agricultural labouring, manufacturing and domestic service in the towns
and cities of California. During this period, it was estimated that the
Chinese constituted as much as one quarter of California's economically
active (Saxton 1971 p.7). 1'ost of the jobs, however, were in the nascent
small firms engaged in retail, small scale cigar and shoe manufacture, the
bulk of industrial development in California being a post-1890 development
(Black 1963 op cit). Fierce competition for work led to the Chinese
eventually being pushed out of those sectors where white labour was
organised, such as construction (Saxton 1971 op cit). Racist mobilisation
was fired by a growing anti-Chinese political lobby generated from the
ranks of the petit bourgeoisie (Black 1963 op cit) which had achieved
moderate success in discouraging employers from giving jobs to the Chinese
for fear of reprisals. "Employers who could afford to yield generally
preferred to do so," (Saxton 1971 op cit p.6)
For single Chinese women, experience of life in America was acutely
exploitative and generally short lived. As successive legislation rendered
independent immigration by single women a virtual impossibility, most were
prostitutes shipped illegally to America as children by the San Franciscan
compradores and sold to brothels as far afield as Canada (Chan 1982 op
cit)
"A woman ... had a life expectancy of six to eight years. After that, she
was debilitated by disease, beatings and starvation and alowed to "escape"
to die at the Salvation Army, or at a "hospital"... erchants from Victoria
were part of the audience that saw women 'stripped and paraded on to a
Diatform where prospective buyers could inspect and bid" (ibid p.531)
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Xounting anti-Chinese racism, occasionally expressed in riots which drove
local Chinese from their homes in towns throughout California and forced
them to seek sanctury In the "Chinatown" ghetto of San Francisco,
culminated eventually in the passing of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.
This suspended immigration by Chinese workers for ten years, although
teachers, students, merchants and travellers were exempted. It also
prohibited the naturalisation of Chinese in the United States. The Scott
Act of 1888 disallowed the return of any Chinese workers who had left
America, effectively barring 20,000 from re-entry who had taken temporary
leave. Exclusion was extended an additional ten years by the Geary Act of
1892 and in 1904, the exclusion of Chinese workers from America was
enforced on an indefinite basis. The Immigration Act of 1924 prevented
the entry of Chinese women to America for residence. Previously, wives of
Chinese merchants and American-born Chinese were allowed to enter the
country, although the wives of Chinese workers were banned (Nee & Nee
1974, Appendix 2). As in Australia, New Zealand and Canada, these laws
systematically reduced and eroded the Chinese working class, whilst
disproportionately advancing the interests of those who were business
owners or who possessed professional skills.
Quite clearly, the original "coolie" diaspora induced under the auspices of
the British empire has spawned a plethora of Chinese settlements
throughout the world. Whether or not these have developed into 'business'
communities characterised by a high level of self-employment and ethnic
patronage has depended upon the specific economic and political structures
into which the indentured Chinese became inserted. In situations where
they have been most marginalised and vilified by the state and local
society, they have tended towards the most ethnically insular forms of
economic and social activity. These situations have been moulded out of
the global expansion of British and other Western capitalisms and
therefore can only be fully understood fully within this context, The
final section of this chapter turns to the position of the Chinese in
Britain. It illustrates in greater detail how processes of exclusion from
the general labour market similar to those practiced in the countries of
the Old Commonwealth led once again to the formation of a Chinese
community forced back onto its own resources for economic survival.
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THE EARLY CHINESE "BUSINESS" CONKUNITY IN BRITAIN
Like the "coolie" workers throughout the plantations and mines of the
Commonwealth, Chinese were recruited as cheap labour for the British
merchant marines during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The
first Chinese in Britain were thus largely transient, travelling also
within the country between the ports of Liverpool, London, Cardiff, Bristol
and Glasgow to their next outward berths. Chinese crew contractors, many
of whom doubled as boarding house keepers, would secure work for the
incoming seamen, who remained in the dock areas of the port cities where
they could be assured of Chinese company and procure necessary services,
Some of the services on offer to the seamen wouj,d be run by Chinese
settlers, but it was not until the twentieth century that the famous
Chinese laundries became established (Jones 1979), in response to the lack
of facilities at boarding houses for washing clothes.
It is worth noting that although the practice of hiring Chinese seamen for
British ships was started during the Napoleonic Wars (to substitute ± or
British seamen drafted into military service), Chinese seamen have
remained a cheap source of labour ever since. Even in 1982, whilst
Chinese (and other non-white) seamen were formally recognised as "British"
seamen - ie, "one who, whatever his nationality, is serving on board a
British ship" (Strouds Judicial Dictionary 1977 p.328) - their average
basic rate of pay at £208 compared adversely with that of UK seafarers at
£320 <NUS Executive Mnutes: Appendix 5, 1-3/12/82). 	 Wages paid to
Bangladeshi, Indian and Pakistani seamen were less still (ibid). This
inequality remains statutorily enshrined in the Race Relations Act of 1976
(MacDonald 1977 p.130). Since Chinese seamen historically have been in a
position to command relatively higher salaries than those from India (due
to the critical position of the British colonial port of Hong Kong in
South East Asia), their numbers in direct British employ have declined
since the Second World War, from just under eleven thousand in 1961 to
just under nine thousand in 1971 (The 1971 Census of Seamen) [11].
However, a practice which still thrives is the indirect employment of
Chinese seamen from Hong Kong by British firms at much cheaper rates
through the independent chartering of vessels under a "flag of
convenience" (Why Are Seamen Angry?) [12],
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One hundred years previously, anti-Chinese racism in Britain enjoyed a
higher profile, despite the relatively small numbers of Chinese settlers.
Kay (1973) discussed at length the central role of the popular press in
articulating, legitimating and fanning hostility towards the threat of the
amorphous "yellow peril". This was a popular derogatory reference both to
Chinese workers abroad and to the vast reserves of cheap labour in newly
industrialised China, which were percieved as a latent threat to British
markets, The journal Justice (3 August 1895, quoted in Kay 1973 op cit
p.116) rioted of the British capitalist, "Instead of bringing the Chinaman
here to use cotton machinery, he is taking the cotton machinery to the
Chinaman." Upon such developments, J,A.Hobson (in Imperialism 1902 p.307,
quoted in May 1973 op cit p.119) concluded,
"It is here enough to repeat that Free Trade can riowise guarantee the
maintenance of industry or of an industrial population upon any particular
country, and there is no consideration, theoretical or practical, to prevent
British capital from transferring itself to China, provided it can find
there a cheaper or more efficient supply of labour ... It is at least
conceivable that China might ... flood their markets with her cheaper
manufactures ,..".
Protection from the "yellow peril" both at home and abroad became the cry
of the day. Sustained media coverage of the use of "coolies" in Australia,
South Africa and America consistantly cast the mere presence of Chinese
workers as inimical to the interests of local organised labour during the
latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: "[Oil all races
of the world the Chinaman is considered the worst enemy of the British
working classes. He not only accepts conditions of labour to which they
decline even to listen, but he is a foe to trade unions..." (The Sunday
Chronicle 1906, quoted in Wailer 1970 pp.92-93). The threat to the
indigenous British people of the "yellow peril", as Chinese labour was
termed in the newpapers, appeared imminent.
"The isolation of China is a thing of the past, and in a century, if not
sooner, we are told, the Chinese will become the principal workman element
not only in America but in Europe... In 50 years steam navigation will
transport the Chinese at fabulously low prices to all parts of the world."
(The Times, 22nd Iovember 1878, quoted in May 1973 op cit p.1)
"They are too strange; their health and cutoms are altogether different:
they would constitute a foreign element, tendiig to lower and degrade us
and hinder our development; they would constitute a serious cause of
disturbance and disorder in our present social and political condition..."
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(Cromptori, H: "An infamous Project", Bee Hive 1st February 1873, quoted in
May 1973 op cit p.6)
"If Chinese labour - of which there is an enormous supply, should prove
generally effective, and remain as cheap as it is at present, the outcry
against the "Yellow Peril" is indeed a warning to which the Western world
should give heed, Labour at ten cents a day of twelve working hours ... is
a prospect appalling to the hardiest competitor.." [13]
Frequent recourse in the press was made to the use of Chinese to undercut
prevailing wages and to break strikes, such that the mere arrival of
Chinese workers was deemed to spell doom for local white labour. The
importation of Chinese into the Beaver Falls Cutlery Company, Pensylvania,
for instance, was reported in such a manner by the Times <1st January
1873) that its inevitable concomitant was redundancy for white workers.
The Chinese were said to have
"caused considerable dissatisfaction among the white workmen... it is
alleged that they were requested to instruct the Chinese in the finer
branches of the business, only to be discharged as soon as the Chinese
could do the work ... it is stated that the Chinese do the work for $25
(gold) per month which heretofore paid the white workmen $80 per month".
Later that same month, the Times (28th January 1873) also published a
letter from Francis Philips, Deputy Charman of the Ebbw Vale Company,
where workers were on strike, It read,
"I have had an offer from an eminent contractor to supply us with any
amount of Chinese labour, delivered at our works on moderate terms from
San Francisco, including skilled miners from Nevada. I shall place the
proposal before our board on Thursday next, and hope that prompt action
will be taken..."
Upon such issues, the Times (25th Aug 1877) commented
"the employer of labour may be glad ... that he has at command a more
docile race of beings ... Their influence on the labour market may not just
now be altogether welcome to the white labourer, but if it helps to make
him more reasonable, and more industrious than he would otherwise have
been, he may perhaps be of opinion by and by that it has not been without
its use,"
By the turn of the century, bureaucratic layers of the union movement had
begun to act in accordance with the publicity campaign, particularly
amongst the seamen, of whom Chinese workers accounted for a significant
proportion. In 1902, the subject of Chinese indentured workers was first
raised at the annual TUC conference and was addressed in terms of their
inherent threat to the interests of white labour, Chinese exclusion from
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America was generally applauded and within the following few years, anti-
Chinese speeches were made and exclusionary resolutions passed at a
number of union conferences, such as the National Dock Labourers, the
Navvie's Union and the l4iiners Federation of Great Britain (Kay 1973 op cit
pp.21-27) - in short, those unions "which had most to fear from a
potentially limitless supply of cheap, manual labour" (ibid p.122).
The economic confinement of Britain's early Chinese settlers was
compounded immeasurably by the Aliens Act of 1905, aimed principally at
stopping the entry of East European Jews [14i. This forbade the entry of
non-Commonwealth born migrants at all but eight authorised ports and
empowered immigration officials to reject anyone who could not prove
possession of "means of decently supporting himself and his dependants"
(quoted in Broady 1955 p.67), anyone suffering from contagious or
"loathsome" disease, one who was mentally afflicted or such as had
received any previous conviction for crime. Since the vast majority of
Chinese seamen were actually born in China <a non-Commonwealth country),
only those who were able successfully to falsIfy their place of birth as
Hong Kong managed to evade the new restrictions (Kay 1973 op cit),
Implementation of the Act, which conceded to racist demands by
legitimising the harassment of "alien" workers by the state, coincided with
the heightened political campaigning of the 1906 general election and the
demise of the Conservative government led by Balf our. It was during this
period that anti-Chinese hostility was intensified, especially in the port
cities where Chinese workers were to be found, In London, the arrival and
subsequent detention of thirty two Chinese arriving with only ten
shillings between them at London's Royal Albert Docks on November 19th
1906, for instance, was branded "unguarded dumping" by the Daily Telegraph
(Kay 1978 p.115) and provided journalist Claude Blake with an excuse to
publish a virulently racist article entitled "Chinese Vice in England" in
the Sunday Chronicle of the following week. It read
"I thought I had seen the worst of which the race was capable. But a
residence of a few weeks in close proximity to them (Ic. the chinese] n
Liverpool, with the opportunity of' stuying them by day and night in all
the phases of their life, has shown me that they are far worse than I
imagined - far less fitted to form an integral part of a civilised white
community... If I had a child, I would certainly never let him or her go
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near a Chinese shop... when they hear from their countrymen already here
that England is a good place where they are allowed to do as they like,
they will come in droves and form large colonies at all the ports, as they
are already beginning to do in Liverpool, and at Limehouse in London. A
serious problem looms ahead, and it had better be grappled with in time."
(quoted in Wailer 1970 op cit pp.90-91)
In Liverpool, amidst agitation in the local press, the Liverpool Trades
Council passed several anti-Chinese resolutions (Kay 1978 op cit p.114)
and a separate Chinese seamen's union was established (Broady 1955 op cit
p.63). However, the precise source of the apparent surge of feeling was
not at all clear, as expressed by the local Chief Constable who speculated
"that what is really at the bottom of most of it is the competition of the
Chinese with the laundries and boarding-house keepers" (quoted in May 1973
op cit p.115) in a letter to the Home Secretary dated 8th December 1906,
The popular press of the time abounded with anti-Chinese propqganda. Kuch
was alleged about the degradation of the Chinese residents and the
detrimental effects of their social integration with local British people.
Issues 6, 8 and 11 of the Uerpool Courier, for instance, called ± or the
expatriation of the Chinese in England as well as South Africa, warning
that "the race is in danger of becoming tainted with Chinese blood"
(quoted in Wailer 1970 op cit p.94). It continued,
"It is at once sorrowful and sickening to observe apparently decent
British woman succumbing to the attractions of the yellow man, but it is
to be seen not alone in Chinatown, but wherever Chinese laundries are
established, that is to say, all over Liverpool... The propogation of half-
bred Chinese and English in Liverpool is not a matter to be treated
lightly... Such a degraded type should not be allowed to grow up in our
midst to be a source of contamination and further degradation for
generations ahead..." (quoted in Wailer ibid)
Such was the degree of concern aroused on the subject of Chinese/English
marriages during this period that two special reports were commissioned
upon the subject, by Liverpool City Council (1906) and a later one in
London (1910). The latter concluded upon the subject that "however
undersirable this may be from an English point of view, thert is nothing
criminal about ±t' [15]. ionet:ieless, such attitudes did not silence the
journalistIc bigotry which at times reached fever pitch, advocating direct
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action against the Chinese. Claude Blake writing again for the Sunday
Chronicle expounded
"Is Great Britain going to profit by the bitter experience of America and
Australia, by the experience of all white communities cursed by the influx
of the yellow men? Or is she going to wait and deal with the scourge
after half a million or so of Chinamen have settled in these islands to
contaminate the white race?... 'We are not going to have Liverpool turned
into a yellow town' they say - and they are right. They are not going to
accept from the Flowery Land a civilisation and morality infinitely lower
than their own." (quoted in Wailer 1970 op cit pp.93-94)
Blake's inflammatory articles contrasted markedly with a considerably less
publicised letter by Birkenhead's Chief Constable to the Home Secretary in
1906 (H045 11843/139147, quoted in Kay 1973 op cit p.90) which stated
"The police find the resident Chinese quiet, inoffensive and industrious
people ... there is no evidence to show that their morals are any worse
than those of the rest of the community". Similarly, in a report entitled
"The English Illustrated" (G.A.Wade in Review of Reviews, quoted in Kay
1973 op cit p.91), passing reference was made to the local Chinese at
Limehouse, to the effect that "He is on good terms with his neighbours,
most of whom speak well of him. He is picturesque in a region where it is
sadly needed."
ew by-laws passed under the Kercharit Shipping Act of 1894 had subjected
all boarding houses to regular inspection by local authorities at risk of
having their licences withdrawn if evidence of opium smoking or gambling
were found or if the premises were unsanitary (Jones 1979 p.398).
Koreover, the Factory and Workshops Acts ensured laundries were
periodically insepcted for cleanliness (Wailer 1970 op cit p.98). Indeed,
Liverpool City Council's Commission of Inquiry had remarked favourably
upon hygiene standards in Chinese businesses (May 1973 op cit p.114). The
ex ;ercise of statutory controls, however, was not sufficient to stop
accusations in the newspapers that "nearly all" Chinese laundries, shops,
boaeding-houses and restaurants were simply blinds for the "gambling,
opium-smoking and indescribable vice which is carried on in the back
rooms and below and above stairs" (Blake 1906, quoted in Wailer 1970 op
cit p.91).
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The year 1906 also witnessed the introduction of the Merchant Shipping
Act which imposed a language test for all non-British recruits and a five
yearly census of seamen, both of which provided further fodder for anti-
Chinese agitators. Videly publicised were the Chinese seamen seeking to
evade the language test by claiming British citizenship by falsified Hong
Kong or Singaporean birth (eg. in The Seaman - the official journal of the
National Union of Seamen - February 1908, July 1908, May 1909; Cardiff
Maritme Review 8th July 1911) rather than the attack on seamen's
employment conditions enshrined in the new law. This racist publicity
drew credibility from the rising figures for Chinese and Lascar
recruitment readily available from the newly established seamen's census.
Formally barred from a diverse range of manual employment by the trade
union bureaucracy and compelled to ensure financial security under threat
of deportation, Chinese settlers turned to self-employment and ethnic
patronage. Such was the basis of the establishment of the first Chinese
laundries during the first decade of the twentieth century. By 1911, about
thirty laundries could be found both in Cardiff' and London, whilst
Liverpool supported approximately fifty (Jones 1979 op cit),
Anti-Chinese hostility continued to brew, especially amongst native British
seamen, amidst a climate in which a new Liberal government recently had
been returned on the pledge to rid South Africa of Chinese "coolies". In
London's East End on May 9th 1908, union pickets prevented a group of
Chinese seamen signing-on at the Board of Trade offices. Their places on
board a ship at Cardiff were subsequently filled by a European crew. On
the following Monday, events were repeated and pickets more numerous,
though on this occasion the police were summoned to escort the Chinese
seamen into the buildings where they were successfully engaged. The fact
that it was reported that very few of the Chinese involved could speak
English (The Daily Chronicle 12 May 1908, quoted in May 1973 op cit p.40)
underlined the organisational obstacles to mobilising British and foreign
workers together.
1911 was the year of the seamen's strike over union recognition wages and
conditions Lacking vital international support, strike funds and dockside
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allies, "Captain" Tupper, leader of the Seamen's Union turned frustrations
at Cardiff onto the local "yellow peril" in order to secure support from
the city's dockers (Evans 1980 p.7). The highly charged situation at
Cardiff errupted on July 20th in a night of violence leaving all of the
city's thirty Chinese laundries vandalised (Jones 1979 op cit p.399>. A
number of factors contributed to this. The almost exclusive export traffic
in freight at Cardiff meant that it was primarily a traditional 'signing-
on' port and therefore the virulently anti-union Shipping Federation was
able to operate a tighter monopolistic control over wages and conditions,
exacerbating competition for work, Cardiff contrasted to Liverpool, noted
for its import trade, where Chinese sailors were mostly disengaged (ibid
p.36> and were therefore not perceived so much to be in direct competition
with other seamen. Also, unlike Lascars, who generally remained with one
ship, Chinese seamen more frequently changed berths, resubmitting
themselves at British ports. The hostility generated by the activities of
Chinese seamen at Cardiff thus came to a head when shipowners repeatedly
attempted to draw in Chinese crews as strikebreakers (Kay 1973 op cit
p.58), Thus, although Chinese formed less than seven per cent of the
foreign seamen serving on British ships at the time [16], it was they who
were the scapegoats of the 1911 seamen's strike,
The laundry shops at Cardiff were an easy target. However, they were not
looted, nor were their workers sought out for personal attack, two features
which indicate that the strength of anti-Chinese feeling might not have
been as widespread as is often assumed (ibid p.128). Common conjecture is
that the seamen's union was at the root of the rioting. This may well
have been true but union membership never rose above twenty per cent
amongst seamen in Britain and of these, nearly half were foreigners
(Lindlop 1972, quoted in Lunn 1985 op cit p.11). The anti-Chinese
hostilities therefore can only have represented the sentiments of a small
fraction of seamen. Nonetheless, events at Cardiff were illustrative of
the general mood that favoured Chinese exclusion from the British labour
market, a mood doubtlessly sensed in no uncertain terms by the Chinese
themselves.
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In 1914, immigration and deportation controls were extended under the
Aliens Restriction Act as a war time measure, Under the Act, 'aliens'
could be refused entry on the discretion of an immigration officer, they
were required to register with the police and could be deported simply if
it was deemed "conducive to the public good" (quoted from Rees 1982 p.79).
They were also required to live in certain areas and were confined to
particular jobs (Gordon and Klug 1985 p.2), curtailing still further any
opportunities for Chinese settlers to diversify within the economy.
The exiencies of war swelled the numbers of colonial merchant seamen
serving on British ships as eight thousand natives were conscripted into
the armed forces and a further nine thousand from those countries
considered hostile instantly dismissed (Gordon & Reilley 1986) Many
Chinese, previously used on well demarcated routes to the East, were now
also engaged on the Atlantic trade (Evans 1980 op cit), These
developments culminated once more in activities directed against Chinese
sailors (amongst others) at the close of the war in 1919 when some of the
demo'oilised returned to find themselves dislocated from previous jobs. In
February of that year, seamen assembled at Cardiff and Newport, refusing
to join any ship on which Chinese were employed, calling upon the
Admiralty at Cardiff to repatriate the Chinese (Evans 1980 op cit p.i2).
In June racist violence, (this time including murder), errupted again at
Cardiff but it was also paralleled at Newport, Barry, South Shields,
Liverpool London, Manchester and Glasgow (May & Cohen 1974, Evans 1980 op
cit). The outburst at Cardiff again entailed vandalism against Chinese
laundries but was more "A general melee involving whites, blacks and
police" (Evans 1980 op cit p.14). At Liverpool, four crews of the Blue
Funnel Line (a company with an established tradition of Chinese
employment) refused to sail under a Chinese man as Chief Steward when
there were "thousands of Britishers wanting berths" (quoted in May & Cohen
1974 p.119)
The post war economic turmoil which gave rise to the 1919 'race riots', as
they have been termed, also witnessed the permanent establishment of the
stringent war time immigration controls under the 1919 Aliens Restriction
(Amendment) Act.
	 The new Act also prohibited 'aliens' from inciting
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'industrial unrest' where they were employed for under two years on pain
of imprisonment (Gordon & Klug 1985 op cit p.2). In 1920, under the
Aliens Order, non-British, non-self supporting residents were deported.
Many Chinese were expelled purely on grounds of gambling or opium smoking
(H045 11843/139147/157 cited in May 1978 op cit p.120). "The effect of
this restrictive immigration policy", explained Broady (1955 op cit p.67),
"was appreciably to reduce, if not stop, the immigration of Chinese
after 1919". In this a hostile environment, ethnic patronage for
employment amongst Chinese in Britain increasingly determined the
parameters of economic and social life for the Chinese in Britain, such
that by the time of the 1931 Census there were over five hundred Chinese
laundry shops in Britain (Jones 1979 op cit p.309). By 1945 there were
one hundred in Liverpool alone (ibid).
COCLUS IO
According to a method of political economy, this chapter has sought to
establish the historical foundations of entrepreneurial Chinese
communities. These foundations bear very little relation to aspects of
traditional Chinese culture. Indeed, the asiatic mode of production which
characterised China before the advent of the British actually discouraged
migration and trade. Rather, the 'business' oriented Chinese settlements
throughout the world have originated from the integration of China into
the world capitalist markets through subjugation to the imperialist
economies of the West (and particularly Britain). This central
relationship structured the emigration of millions of indentured Chinese
labourers to countries throughout the developing capitalist empires. Many
of these emigrants settled permanently where they were sent, eventually
merging with the local population. On the other hand, in societies where
the state divided off the interests of the Chinese substantially from
others, they remained both economically and ethnically distinct. This
depended directly upon the degree to which racism was emplo yed to define
their situations. The case of South East Asia has been somewhat different
in that a specific class of Chinese merchant traders was ceveloped,
consolidated and entrenched by the Western colonialists. 	 The vast
majority of entreDreneurtal Chinese communities, however, share a common
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history of labour market exclusion arid hostility from the surrounding
society. Such were the origins of the early Chinese 'business' community
in Britain, the seafaring settlers who were forced systematically to rely
uDon any available resources for economic survival.
The next two chapters focus upon the contemporary entrepreneurial Chinese
community in Britain. This was built partly upon the already existing
links with Chinese firms in the laundry trade, although under quite
different immediate circumstances, as revealed in Chapter 3. These
circumstances as much dictated the demise of the Chinese laundries as the
rise of Chinese restaurants, the modern 'business' niche for Chinese. What
is also revealed in Chapter 3 is how this situation was borne out of the
post War immigration of Chinese which was merely the latest stage in the
diaspora of Chinese labour underwritten by the British colonial
exploitation of Hong Kong. Largely unskilled, the majority of these
migrants were channelled by work permits and vouchers into jobs in which
they could demonstrate that their ethnicity was a specific and necessary
qualification for work.	 This precluded the laundry trade but not
speciallsed ethnic catering.
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CHAPTER 3
THE CATERING INDUSTRY. AIGRANT LABOUR
AD THE CHIWESE CO1OWITY
fliT RODUCT lO'l
Having set the general historical context within which Chinese 'business'
communities have developed, the study now turns to the contemporary
situation of the Chinese in Britain. This is one in which the ethnically
exclusive entrepreneurial niche appears to have endured over a century.
Indeed, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (1984-85 p.xi) reported
that "about 90 per cent" or more Chinese were employed in a single industry
(catering), of which "perhaps 60 per cent" were self-employed in family-run
ventures. However, a consideration of the material factors conditioning the
situation of the Chinese presented throughout the next two chapters
demonstrates clearly that cultural, biological or ecological forces have
played no determing role. Rather, the 'business' orientation of the Chinese
community today is still rooted in the legacy of British colonialism in
China and the continuing relationship this established between colonial
labour and the interests of capital at the metropolitan core. The more
specific circumstances structuring the present situation of the Chinese in
Britain however, are quite different from those which drew the original
merchant seamen into the laundry trade. The current position of the
Chinese community relates to the evolution of the capitalist economy in
Hong Kong under British rule in combination with the contemporaneous
development of the catering industry in Britain. Whilst the two processes
are inextricable in terms of structuring the lives of Chinese in Britain,
they have been separated out for analytical purposes in the following text.
This chapter deals firstly with the historical development of Britain's
catering industry, setting into perspective the objective conditions into
which Chinese migrants became incorporated into the British economy after
the War, The focus then turns upon the migrants themselves, the material
forces which underpinned their emigration and their personal responses to
it. This serves as a backdrop to the next Chapter, which discusses in
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detail people's present day experiences in the ethnic catering niche of the
economy as they relate to the pivotal themes of the study.
APPROACHING THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CATERING INDUSTRY
The development of the catering industry in Britain can be broken down into
four distinct periods. The first relates to the time prior to the Second
World War, during which catering was characterised predominantly by
domestic service and craft production. The second period corresponds to
the era of the 'war economy' and the introduction of factory canteens and
state restaurants. The third period, the most important in understanding
the emergence of the Chinese catering sector, begins with the post war
economic expansion. The final period, dealt with iii Chapter 4, relates to
the contemporary profile of the catering trade and the rise of monopoly
capital in the industry from the 1970s onwards.
The growth of industrial catering throughout these four periods has been
contingent upon two underlying factors. The first is the fact that the
general conditions surrounding the expansion of commodity meal production
for a mass market have borne an inverse relationship to the conditions
surrounding catering in the home. Stated more simply, as the material
basis for catering in the home has been increasingly undermined, (for
instance, by the re-entry of married women into the labour force), the
potential for the expansion of industrial catering has enlarged
correspondingly. This has contributed to the second factor, which is that
technological advancement within the industry has led to a substantial drop
in the cost of 'eating out' in comparison to cooking at home, further
expanding the potential for the catered meals market, This fall in the
price of 'eating out' over the years has reflected the unceasing attempts by
catering capitalists and the state to secure ever more productive
combinations of capital and labour in the race to increase profits in
accordance with the fundamental laws of capitalist production. These
factors constitute the basic framework within which the development of the
industry and the position of migrants within in it can be charted.
87
THE ORIGINS OF INDUSTRIAL CATERING
Industrial catering for the mass consumer market emerged relatively late on
the British scene, having developed rapidly in a relatively short period of
time. Prior to 1940 the scale of the industry was small and grounded In
domestic service. In 1881 one in seven of the working population was
employed as a servant (there are no figures for cooks alone) and even as
late as 1931, as many as 1.3 million people still earned a living from
service to the upper and middle classes (Wiggins 1985). As a "holding
category" for expectant urban workers [1], domestic service was filled
heavily by migrant labour. Catering work, therefore, has figured
traditionally as a characteristic of the migrant experience in Britain, Yet
only six years after the end of World 1ar II, employment in domestic
service had dropped by seventy one per cent. Indeed, the fifty years
between 1931 and 1981 witnessed a total reversal of the ratio of workers
employed in private, domestic service to those in public hotels and
catering (see Table 4 below).
TABLE 4: EMPLOYMENT IN THE FOOD SECTORS 1901-1981 (000s)
1901
	
1931	 1951	 1981
Domestic Service	 1340
	
1300
	
380
	
80
Hotels & Catering	 340
	
460
	
8.50
	
1350
Agriculture	 1050
	
830
	
810
	
50
Food Distribution	 550
	
770
	
850
	
950
Food Manufacture	 440
	
620
	
760
	
660
Source: Wiggins 1985
The enormous growth of employment in industrial catering over domestic
service was a direct outgrowth of the 1939-1945 War, during which time
enormous levels of .state investment and subsidy induced a dramatic shift in
the organic composition of capital in the catering industry.
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THE WAR YEARS
The Second World War was the first true total war in which civilians often
were as much on the front line of death and destruction as military
personnel. All potential productive forces within the economy were
mobilised, which entailed huge demands for labour during a period when
large sections of the population were already conscripted into military
service. Still dependant upon food imports, Britain soon faced imminent
food shortages. Without the intervention of the state, it was clear that
industrial production - the key to military success - would break down
under the exigencies of war. The regulation of food supplies (I.e.
rationing) and the widespread expansion of publically provided meals thus
were introduced.
Control of food consumption and the extension of communal feeding served
the 'War Effort' in many ways. Not only were they functionally necessary
for maintaining the productivity of labour in general; they specifically
freed large numbers of women from domestic cooking in the home for the
expansion of both state and private enterprises at a period when male
workers were being conscripted en masse into armed service. As commented
by the Labour Research Department (in Wiggins ibid p.4), "If women are to
enter industry ... they must be freed from the necessity of providing meals
far husbands and children.	 The extension of canteens in schools and
factories accomplishes this purpose." }oreover, the state regulation of
food prevented widespread profiteering and served to bolster civilian
morale during a time of crisis and the fragmentation of the family.
apoleon's conviction that a military army 'marched on its stomach' was
equally applicable to Britain's industrial army in the 1940s.
Within months of the outbreak of hostilities the state set about
establishing a national framework which would provide catering facilities
I or workers. The Factory Canteens Order of 1940 (No, 1993) directed owners
of factories engaged in War time or government work employing more than
two hundred and fifty workers to provide suitable canteen facilities selling
hot meals. In following years similar Orders where given to cover firms
engaged in construction, engineering and dock work. A Chief Inspector of
Factories was charged with the responsibility for ensuring that these
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Orders were carried out. By 1942, 7528 work place canteens had been
established and a further eight hundred were under construction (Labour
Research Department 1943 p.10). However, the rapid and enormous expansion
of workplace canteens still did not address the needs of the majority of
workers. Half of all factory employees were estimated to work in places
where the total number of staff was less than 250 (ibid). Indeed, the
Chief Inspector of Factories noted in his report for 1941 (ibid) that "The
feeding of the workers in these small places still presents many problems
Many smaller employers even if they the desire to so, may not have the
facilities for providing a canteen." Thus, in recognition of the shortfalls
of the factory canteens, the state also introduced a system of Community
eeding Centres throughout Britain providing subsidised and unratloned hot
meals at Bd to 1/- each. Many such restaurants developed a pre-packaged
food service and cash and carry schemes. Primarily targetted at workers
who failed to benefit from workplace canteens, these food outlets were used
also by housewives, evacuees and residents of bombed areas, for the reason
that, as Lord \'ioolton Minister for Food (in Hull & Jenkinson 1985) put it,
"A nation that is not well fed looses both the power to work and the will
to win."
The new subsidised restaurants constituted a difficult ideological pill to
swallow for the food and catering capitalists, so much so that the term
'Community Restaurant' was never officially adopted. Churchill (ibid)
thought it to be "suggestive of communism, and the workhouse" and renamed
Community Restaurants, 'British Restaurants'. By 1943, two thousand British
Restaurants had been opened, serving in excess of a daily six hundred
thousand meals (Labour Research Department 1943 op cit). At peak growth it
was estimated that at least two restaurants were opening every day
throughout the UK. Most were run by local authorities, although a few
voluntary agencies were also involved. Set up in pre-fabricated buildings,
requisitioned shops and schools, British Restaurants provided many
thousands of people with their first formal taste of 'eating out'.
Clearly, this state-induced extension of mass public catering expanded the
productive capacity of the industry but it did not necessarily entail state
control. Despite British Restaurants and industrial canteens accounting for
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66.5 million meals per week and approximately one thousand new eating
places per year, the private sector still provided a weekly sixty two
million meals (ibid p.10). Throughout the War private catering businesses
continued to consolidate their market position, often taking advantage of
the profitable opportunities offered by new legislation. The relatively
small size of most factories meant that many owners simply were not able
to offer canteen facilities. Thus, subcontractors soon became an attractive
means of complying with government legislation. By 1942 the National
Society of Caterers to Industry claimed that their members operated some
two thousand works canteens serving half a million meals daily (ibid),
Other sources reported over one third of the industrial canteen market to
be in the hands of sub-contractors of one form or another (ibid).
Flourishing conditions for the expansion of small and large scale private
caterers also witnessed the absorption of many migrants into the industry.
The Labour Research Department (ibid p.il) noted that "Hotels, restaurants,
and pubs have had to fall back on refugee and Irish labour to a great
extent".
Whilst the introduction of readily available hot food was an important
benefit to most workers, the meals themselves often were not quite the
appetizing experience that some War time menus seem to have suggested. For
example, a report carried by a 1943 edition of New Propellor, paper of the
Engineering & Allied Trades Shop Stewards Council, told of maggots
"thriving" on the pies served by particular catering firm. Such variable
quality of catering service was indicative of the low profit margins
generated by the 'contracting system', of which the underlying rationale was
to reduce production costs. Companies tendering the most competitive bids
(i.e. lowest costs rather than quality of service) secured the greatest
number of contracts. This practice highlighted the extremely marginal
economic postion of food catering which was under constant pressure to
keep wages and operating expenditure to a minimum. 1any catering
companies sought to do this by operating a franchise sytem of management.
In many canteens, managers were responsible for achieving profit targets
(of up to 30% and 40%). "In some cases the manager's own wages depend on
the profits macic - in other cases if he does not make enough he is told to
get out" (Labour Research Department 1943 op cit).
	 The pressure to
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maintain profits, therefore, not only restrained wages but also invariably
resulted in low quality products.
By 1Q42 over 108 million meals per week were being eaten outside the home
(ibid p.10). Clearly food rationing, workplace canteens and British
Restaurants, introduced to cope with food shortages and a radically
reorganised workforce, did more than simply sustain people through a
difficult time: they also brought about lasting changes in mass consumer
eating habits.
"Of all the changes wrought by war-time conditions, those pertaining to our
food, its amount, its quality and the conditions under which many of us eat
have been as widespread as any... Although many of our pre-war favourite
dishes are missing, the population as a whole has never been better
nourished. The outstanding change has been the new habit of taking more
meals away from home. The packet of sandwiches that used to come to
accompany a number of workers for their midday meal is, in many cases, no
longer possible. The navvy carrying his basin wrapped up in a red
hankerchief, or cooking for his breakfast a rasher of bacon on a shovel has
largely disappeared. There is no longer enough on the ration to provide
the sandwiches, and a rasher of bacon today is a comparative luxury. Under
these circumstances it is not surprising that works canteens and British
Restaurants have become popular. In both, the quality and variety of food
is excellent. People who never used to eat in public are now doing so.
Moreover, they like it." (Hull & Jenkinson 1985 op cit)
The establishment of 'eating out' on a regular basis created an enormous
potential market for private catering firms, such that even before the War
had ended, catering capitalists were making substantial headway into this
new consumer market. The Food Boards, set up to regulate the supply and
orgartisation of the War time food economy, increasingly became
representative of private sector interests alone. Through the Food Boards,
major national companies like Lyons were able to exert strong pressure to
curtail the growth and scope of state-provided restaurant and canteen
facilities, which they feared would gradually undermine their profit
margins. Deputations from local and national trading associations led Lord
Woolton to decree that before any British Restaurant could be opened, local
businesses had to be consulted. More significantly, Restaurant subsidies
were brought more firmly under control, with local authorities being
instructed to charge prices that would cover all running costs and repay
initial capital expenditure on restaurant construction. Thus was launched a
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concerted drive to establish British Restaurants as profit-making
enterprises. Of the three hundred and twenty two local authonities who
furnished trading accounts, one hundred and sixty two made a profit in
1942. This put pressure upon the rest to increase prices whilst other
authorities became more cautious about setting up new restaurants,
particularly as losses would have to be borne by the ratepayer. As the
Labour Research Department (1943 op cit) stated, "This is just what the
private caterers want".
THE ECONO'1ICS OF POST WAR CATERING PRODUCTION
The intervention of the state during the War had transformed catering from
a private, domestic service enjoyed only by few to a commercial utility
accessible to many. However, in comparison to other industrial sectors,
catering still remained a relatively minor feature of the immediate post
War economy. For the removal of food catering from its former domain of
the home and the family (in other words, its 'socialisation'), achieved
through massive War time state investment, did not maintain momentum
following the end of the War, Demobilisation of the armed forces swelled
-the pool of available workers, pushing women out of the labour force.
Between 1947 and 1948, 1.4 million women left engineering employment alone
(German 1987). In addition, an end to the disruption caused by bombing,
conscription and evacuation had reduced the underlying imperative for the
state to perform a leading role in key areas of social reproduction such as
food catering. Thus the years immediately after the War witnessed the
systematic withdrawal of the state from its direct intervention in many
aspects of economic and social life, one of these being the subsidisation
and provision of meals to the general public.
This did not mean the total abstention of the state from catering and meal
provision. Food rationing, for example, continued until 1953 and whilst the
civic restaurants and emergency feeding stations rapidly disappeared, the
factory canteen legislation remained, Moreover, included amongst many
ether post War reforms conceded by the state was the introduction of public
sector institutional catering services established under the new Health and
Education Acts, These new facilities drew upon a ready supply of staff
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trained during the War, Bevin estimated that the army alone had employed
over 100,000 cooks (Labour Research Department 1943 op cit p.24).
Nevertheless, the overall level of state intervention still dropped
dramatically from War time levels, the cost of socialised meal provision
having been a heavy burden for both state and private sector capital.
Quite simply, the logic of regulated food rationing and subsidised meals for
all who needed them was not that which underpinned a capitalist free
market economy like that of Britain. Hence, the future development of food
catering was to rest with private sector capital investment depending upon
the profits to be reaped within the industry.
The development of industrial catering after the War was predicated upon
the realisation of profit rather than the satisfaction of social need.
Consequently, with the withdrawal of state subsidies to public catering, the
number of meals consumed outside the home began to fall as meal prices
rose to a level which rendered surplus values for catering capital. In
short, 'eating out' became more expensive and, as a consequence, less
popular. For these reasons, profitable mass meal production was difficult
to sustain amidst a general economic climate of high growth and investment.
This was because of the comparatively low ratio of fixed capital (ie. the
instruments used for production, such as machinery, tools, etc) to the
amount of labour necessarily employed in order for profits to accrue in
industrial catering. This low ratio of technology to labour power which
prevailed In catering just after the War (in Marxist terminology, this was
a specific stage in the org'anic composition of capital in the industry)
entailed a comparatively large amount of labour time for the production of
catered meals, which pushed up the value of meal products relative to other
commodities. The relatively high price of cooked meals therefore
encouraged a return to unwaged cooking in the home, which was in turn a
disincentive for industry investment and development.
The dearth of historical data makes an extremely difficult task of
analysing the precise implications of the low rate of profit in the
catering industry immediately following the War. 	 Nevertheless, broad
patterns indicate that the withdrawl of state investment in catering
clearly curbed its expansion of the War period. This was compounded by the
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relatively low rates of profit rendered by food catering compared to other
sectors of industrial investment, despite conditions of general economic
growth. Thus, lacking the substantial competition of the state or monopoly
capital, continued development of the industry rested on small businesses,
many of which by this stage were run by migrants and refugees.
CATERING FOR CHANGE: 1945-1970
"Twenty years ago we would sell literally hundreds of breakfasts. Now it's
down to twenty - even that is on a busy day ... I think the traditional
breakfast has just finished." (Cafe owner quoted in Hull & Jenkinson 1985
op cit)
Despite the reduction in state investment and low rate of profit, both of
which had restricted growth in the catering industry following the War, a
period of general economic expansion soon brought about a resurgence in the
need (as opposed to effective demand) for ready-cooked meals. Before long,
existing catering capitalists surmised
"The amount of people who eat out is likely to grow over the next four
years. Already there are any number of families who never sit down to a
meal together ... cooking in the home is on the decline. The serious loss
of family cohesion is, not for the first time, a benefit to our industry."
(reported in Catering Times 1983)
The "loss of family cohesion", both during and after the War, was the
product of women drawn into the labour force. For even though the numbers
of paid women workers had declined significantly following demobilisation,
they increased again by roughly the same number during the 1950s,
reabsorbed back into the labour market as a result of the shortage of
workers engendered by the economic boom (German 19S7 op cit). In America,
for instance, ten million more married women joined the labour force in the
twenty years after 1945 (Friend & Xetcalf 1981 p.57). In Japan, the number
of women working outside the home rose from two to twelve million between
1950 and 1970 (ibid), Similarly, in Britain, although the increase was not
so dramatic, a 2.2 million rise in the number of working women accounted
almost entirely for the 2.4 million increase in the working population as a
whole between 1951 and 1971 (ibid). By 1971, women were forty per cent of
the domestic workforce (having risen from twenty nine per cent in 1931)
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and by 1976, fifty eight per cent of all women of working age in Britain
were In paid employment - one third working full time and one fifth
working part time. As Friend & Metcalf (ibid) commented,
"Increasingly, the maintenance of family living standards has come to
depend on two or more wage packets and all adult female labour has become
potential wage labour - as many as a quarter of the mothers of pre-school
children are employed."
Women's growing rate of participation in paid employment continued into the
1960s and 1970s (Bruegel 1979) and by 1981 they constituted 42.6% of the
working population (Census of Employment 1981). In some sectors (namely
part time, lowly paid jobs) such as catering, women account for up to sixty
seven per cent of all employees (Wiggins & Lang 1985 p.37)
The increasing proportion of waged women workers in the post War period
has been paralleled by the re-emergence of catered meal commodities in the
form of 'fast food'. The term 'fast food' denotes a specific technological
and organisational trend within the contemporary food catering industry
whereby standardised meals are produced at rapid rate for immediate
consumption either on or off the premises where they are purchased.
Production characteristically comprises extensive use of highly developed,
labour-saving cooking equipment combined with simplified, standardised
ingredients. Whilst the major hamburger, fried chicken and pizza outlets
have taken this trend to its most advanced form by capital investment in
labour-saving technology on a massive scale, 'fast food' is a term which
also describes the trade of fish and chip shops, cafes, snack bars, 'take-
aways' and many restaurants. The term is least applicable to haute cuisine
restaurants, where labour intensive meals are produced on an individual
basis by specialists.) 	 This phenomenon was recognised by Angela Davis
(1982 p.243):
"enterprising capitalists have already begun to exploit women's new
historical need to emancipate themselves from their roles as housewives.
Endless profit making fast food chains like McDonalds and Kentucky Fried
Chicken bear witness to the fact that more women at work means fewer daily
meals prepared at home. However unsavoury and unnutritious the food,
however exploitative of their workers, these fast food operators call
attention to the approaching obselescence of the housewife."
Whilst the idea that fast food was developed primarily as a result of
women's struggles is perhaps somewhat contentious, Davis' example
nevertheless reflects the important relationship between the development of
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post War commercial catering and the growing presence of women in the
labour force.
Other factors too, have influenced the development of the fast food market,
As production processes have become Increasingly complex and sophisticated,
the qualitative conditions of paid employment have been transformed
accordingly, such that labour power has been used more rationally and
intensively. Lengthened commuting distances to work for a growing number
of people has increased demand for quicker and more convenient meals. The
effects on general eating habits have been noted by Hull & Jenkinson (1985
op cit): "Lunch has become more of a snack, people are rushing in and out.
The average home now tends to have its meal in the evening as against
lunchtime, which it used to be, thirty or forty years ago." In addition, the
technological advances in contraception, affording greater personal
regulation of fertility, have entailed families becoming smaller in size but
greater in number. Indeed, it has been estimated that family units over the
last decade have been increasing by an average of 13,000 per year (Desmond
et al. 1981 p.107). As a result, the average consumer household is
estimated to be gaining greater collective spending power with the shift
towards more than one member of the household being a wage earner, Less
than one third of UK households now have only one wage earner and the
trend is expected to continue (Fast Food 1978). Given these changes, the
price of 'eating out' has come increasingly within the reach of the mass of
the population in terms of time and money. This is particularly so since
women's wages have grown as a proportion of total household income.
In sum, the conditions leading to the development of the post War fast food
catering industry have been but a part of the demographic and social shifts
in the general restructuring of the economy. These have culminated in
considerable technological development within the catering industry itself
during the late 1960s and early 1970s, which have raised considerably the
level of productivity and profits through the expansion of flexible
production techniques and range of products (see Chapter 4 for more
detailed discussion), }[ainly due to the cheapness and pliability of their
labour (enforced through institutional racism) migrant workers have played
a key role throughout this process. The case of the Chinese perhaps is one
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of the clearest illustrations, since the particular circumstances of their
migration have led them to concentrate almost exclusively in the fast food
catering trade, The remainder of the Chapter therefore is devoted to the
post War labour immigration and experiences of the Chinese.
IMM1GRATIO1 PJD THE BOOM
As stated at the beginning of the Chapter, the history of migrants in
catering work dates back to the late nineteenth century, as documented by
Hull & Jenkirison (1985 op cit) from Birmingham's City Museum archives:
"There was a man with a horse an' a hot machine at the back of him - he
used to shout, - 'tattles and latte' - he was an Italian. You'd go to him -
'a penn'orth please'. He'd say 'help yourself to the salt'. You'd put your
fingers in the salt and put it in the bag - you'd say 'blimey that's hot'."
Also by this period large scale international immigration had become a
normal phenomenon of the world capitalist economy. For instance, the years
from 1820 to 1924 witnessed the migration of some thirty six million
people (87% European) to the United States alone (Miles 1982 p.161) and in
Britain during the 1840s the Irish population doubled to reach almost eight
hundred thousand (Walvin 1984 p.4O).
In 1945 there were no more than twenty five thousand people in Britain of
New Commonwealth origin (Alexander 1987 p.29) but from the late 1940s
onwards the situation began to change as the world economy entered a new
and prolonged period of expansion. Between 1953 and 1961 the volume of
industrial production rose by one third (Petras 1980 p.l42), fuelled by
reconstruction capital from America: $22,800 million in public capital alone
flowed from the U.S.A. Into Western Europe between 1945 and 1955 (Brinley
1961 pp.35-38). Between 1960 and 1970 the most advanced economies of the
West added $700 billion to their annual real incomes (Power & Hardman 1984
p.7).
The spectacular expansion of the Western European economies and the
acceleration in the, accumulation of capital triggered an enormous demand
for labour. The decimation of the European workforce during two World Wars
and the persistant pattern of low birth rates meant that industrial labour
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requirements could no longer be satisfied within national economies (Petras
1980 op cit) . Thus, for example, having exhausted a supply of twelve
million East German refugee workers in the post War decade up to 1955, the
West German government met further demand for labour by signing
recruitment agreements with Italy (1955), Spain (1960), Greece (1960),
Turkey (1961), Morrocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and
Yugoslavia (1968), As a result the number of foriegn workers in Germany
rose from ten thousand in 1954 to over six hundred and fifty thousand in
1962 and further still to over 2.3 million in 1972 (Power & Hardman 1984
op cit p.7)
The general economic conditions in post war Britain were little different
from those in West Germany and the other advanced Western European
economies. Initial labour shortages (some of which had started to emerge
during the war) in agriculture, mining, textile manufacture and the metal
foundries had been met substantially by refugees recruited from the camps
of Western Europe and migrants from Eire. Between 1946 and 1950 some
seventy seven thousand refugees were brought to Britain as European
Volunteer Workers. This was in addition to eighty eight thousand members
of the Polish armed forces and eight thousand Ukranian prisoners of war
(1'iles 1986 p.54). By 1949 157,300 Polish migrants had settled in Britain
following the Polish Resettlement Act and between 1946 and 1951 one
hundred thousand new workers arrived from Ireland (Walvin 1984 op cit).
However, the continued need for workers was reflected in the King's 1951
opening speech to Parliament, in which he declared, "lty government views
with concern the serious shortages of labour, particularly of skilled
labour, which has handicapped production in a number of industries" (Foot
1965 p.124). Labour scarcity being widespread in Europe, the British state
turned instead to the New Commonwealth (Power & Hardman 1984 op cit). In
1948 the British Nationality Act was passed, according British citizenship
and the automatic right to live and work in the country to everyone born in
Britain and its colonies from 1949 onwards as well as bestowing upon
Commonwealth subjects the entitlement to register as a UK citizen after one
year of residence in Britain,
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From 1954, substantial numbers of workers were recruited from the West
Indies, India (from 1955 onwards> and Pakistan (from 1957 onwards), A
Cabinet minute of 3rd Nov 1955 noted that it was "the condition of full
employment here that was attracting those immigrants". The role of the
state was in this process was not only to encourage the supplies of labour
(Cardechi 1979) but also to contribute to a social climate in which
migrants were confined to those sectors where labour shortages were most
apparent (Corrigari 1977; Berger & Mohr 1975). These sectors shared a
common set of characteristics, as described by Castles and Kosacic (in
Friend & Metcalf 1981 op cit p.60):
"Immigrant workers in France, Germany, Switzerland and Great Britian are
usually employed in occupations rejected by indigenous workers..,.
Typically, such jobs offer low pay, poor working conditions, little
sercurity and inferior social status."
Workers from the Caribbean as well as Asia and the Far East were directly
recruited by London Transport (see Brooks 1975 for the Caribbean) and by
the newly formed National Health Service and the British Hotel and
Restaurants Association (Gordon & Klug 1985 op cit). In the case of the
Hong Kong Chinese, a special quota system expedited their emigration to
Britain (Watson 1975).
Such patterns of labour recruitment reflected more general changes within
the British economy. Whilst the post War boom on an international scale
had given rise to a vast increase in the volume and range of manufactured
goods (and consequently an absolute rise in maunfacturing employment) it
was also accompanied by a wave of technological transformation (Friend &
Metcalf 1981 op cit p.48). Thus, as automation spread and labour
productivity increased, there arose consequently a relative decline in
manufacturing employment, such that as a proportion of the entire labour
market, jobs in manufacturing fell from 37.3% in 1951 to 32.6% in 1971
(ibid p.49).	 In the decade from 1966 to 1976 the absolute numbers in
manufacturing employment declined from 8.6 million to 7.2 million (ibid).
In addition to this, from the mid 1950s onwards the level of investment in
British manufacturing declined significantly as compared to other national
economies. Throughout the 1950s UK capital continued to flow out of
Britain into the relatively developed economies of the Old Commonwealth
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such as South Africa, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, such that by 1968
British and American capitalists held 75% of of the world stock of direct
company Investment abroad (Ibid p.50). The exit of British capital to
countries abroad accelerated during the 1960s, making Britain a leading
overseas investor: between 1968 and 1978 the outflow of capital investment
from the UK domestic economy averaged 1,4% of Gross Domestic Product as
opposed to 0.7% for the USA, 0.3% for Japan and 0.5% for Germany (ibid).
In contrast to the decline in domestic manufacturing, the level of
investment in service sector industries grew dramatically. OECD labour
force statistics, show that all major economies registered a six point jump
In service work as a percentage of total employment between 1957 and 1968.
Indeed, by 1968 service work (including financial services) accounted for
between 40% and 61% of all jobs in each of the main OECD countries, except
Canada and Italy (ibid p.48). This structural change within the British
economy set the context within which labour was recruited to Britain
throughout the period. As JUles (1982 op cit p.164) put it, "the demand for
labour was not spread equally across all sectors of the economy but was
limited to certain sectors of production and distribution".
One of these sectors was a group of industries (e.g textiles, metal
manufacture) which had been integral to the early domination of British
capitalism but which had since become less competitive on the world market
and was consequently in decline. Decreasing profit margins, outdated
technology and a subsequent lack of new investment meant that profitable
production could only be maintained by employing cheaper labour, Faced
with a relative decline in wages during a period of full employment,
indigenous workers in these industries simply sought employment elsewhere.
Thus Braverman (1974) noted how "In these circumstances migrant labour
became replacement labour and in many cases was recruited during periods
of deskilling." This was confirmed by the Department of Employment in a
1977 report on "The Role of Immigrants in the Labour Market" (in Friend &
Metcalf 1981 op cit p.60):
"the main role of immigrants in the British labour market has been to
provide certain industries with a relatively cheap labour pool at a time
when it would have been necessary for employers to reduce shift hours and
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increase rates of pay in order to maintain and attract an indigenous
workforce."
In a general sense, therefore, immigrant labour was recruited into the more
labour intensive sectors of the economy, such as the declining
manufacturing industries and the new 'services', where its role was to
expand production without having to reinvest profits in costly
mechanisation and automation. Petras (1980 op cit p.441) noted how this
applied especially to "construction, hotel and restaurant industries or
services in which economies of scale are difficult to organise because of
the necessarily small units of production." Thus when the demand for
labour diminished, immigration also began to decrease, falling from over an
annual rate of forty thousand between 1955 and 1957 to less than thirty
thousand between 1958 and 1959. When numbers increased again in 1960 to
57,700 and further still to 94,000 during the first six months of 1962, it
was primarily to "beat the ban" to be imposed by the impending
Commonwealth Immigrants Act (1962). This was designed specifically to
reduce drastically the numbers of workers coming from the New Commonwealth
and "to tailor immigration more closely to the needs of the British
economy" (Gordon & Kiug 1985 op cit p.4).
XIGRATION UNDER THE COKXONWEALTR IXMIGRANTS A1
The 1962 Act introduced the condition that all prospective Commonwealth
immigrants be issued with an employment voucher for a specific job for a
single, named employer in Britain before being allowed to enter the country.
Those who were not Commonwealth-born were required to secure the more
constricting work permits. This category included by far the majority of
migrants, as shown in Table 5 below. Subject to greater economic
restrictions and fewer rights to citizenship, permit holders were
increasingly preferred to Commonwealth Voucher holders, whose numbers were
drastically cut following the abolition of vouchers for the semi-skilled and
unskilled after the 1965 White Paper, "Immigration from the Commonwealth".
Work permit regulations were described by Rees (1982 op cit p.84) thus:
"The work permit has to be applied for to the Department of Employment by
the prospective employer, who is obliged to satisfy the Department that the
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Commonweal tb Employment
Voucther Holders
31,125
14,705
12, 880
5, 461
4,978
4,691
4,021
4,098
3,477
1,803
worker in question is qualified and required for a specific job, that the
employment is necessary, and that there is no suitable British or lon& term
resident foreign labour available... Department of Employment permission Is
necessary for a work permit holder to transfer to another employer, and
such permission Is by no means automatic... A work permit holder may apply
to have the time limit and other restrictions attached to his employment
removed after four years" (my italicsJ
He continued (ibid p.BS),
"The object of the work permit is principally to promote a supply of labour
from overseas where the domestic supply is inadequate... In the latter part
of the 1960s and the early part of the 1970s the majority of permits were
issued to workers in the hotel and catering industry and in hospital
employment."
TABLE 5: IMMIGRATION FOR WORK 1963 - 1972
Year
	
Work Permit Holders
1963
	
39, 663
1964
	
42, 584
1965
	
48, 874
1966
	
48, 637
1967
	
45, 867
1968
	
45, 142
1969
	
47, 852
1970
	
47, 384
1971
	
41, 286
1972
	
36, 705
Source: Home Office Statistics 1963 - 1972
in Gordon and Klug (1985 p.5)
It was during the period when the 1962 Act was in force that the majority
of Chinese came to Britain, as shown in Table 6 below. This indicates the
scale and timing of Chinese migration to Britain. It was assumed for the
Table that the majority of migrants born in China, Hong Kong and Singapore
were of ethnic Chinese origin - Singapore's population is seventy six per
cent Chinese (Claininer 1982 op cit p.127). The inconsistancy of aggregate
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categories and the lack of any exact data on ethnicity, however, preclude
any more of a precise indication of the development of the Chinese
community. What is clear, however, is that unlike the majority of migrants
from the Caribbean and the Indian sub-continent, a sizable Chinese
community was not established until after implementation of the 1962 Act.
Imposition of the Act thus dictated the limited range of employment open to
the Chinese. This was compounded by a social climate of growing racism
which proved a further obstacle to occupational diversification, although in
the case of the Chinese this has remained virtually undocumented.
The vast majority from Hong Kong and China were channelled into jobs in
catering, as witnessed by one who arrived before 1962:
"When I first came here in 1956 I got a job in a warehouse. There was
hardly any Chinese here then. If there was a Chinese family living in the
area, everybody would know who they were. But in the '60s when one came,
they all came. Restaurants was the game. That was the only job it seemed
we could get. They had all the connections set up over here in the trade
and they all knew about the forms you had to fill in. I don't suppose
anybody thought you could do anything else, really. And why not catering?
It was better than starving in Hong Kong."
Nevertheless, Table 6 also indicates a sizable immigration from Singapore
which matches that from Hong Kong during the 1960s. However, Chinese from
Singapore hardly figure at all in the Chinese catering trade, nor are they
represented in ethnic community organisation. This is because most Chinese
from Singapore (and, as a general rule, 1{alaysia and urban Hong Kong) came
either as students for higher education or as partially and fully trained
workers with a knowledge of spoken and written English, They were thus at
liberty to diversify into a far greater range of employment compared to the
unskilled and relatively poorly educated Chinese from the New Territories
and China who spoke little or no English and who were bound by the
strictures of the work vouchers and permits (see Baxter 1986). On the
whole, it is generally believed that of the Singaporean Chinese who settled
in Britain, women are tend to be nurses and men tend to be employed in
technically oriented jobs such as electrical engineering. (The total lack
of official documentation on ethnic economic specialisation in Britain,
however, precludes accurate quantification of these trends.)
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TABLE 6: CHINA AND FAR EASTERN BORN RESIDENTS IN BRITAIN
XALES	 FEXALES	 TOTAL
1951: Commonwealth citizens
born in Far Eastern Colonial
Territories (England & Wales)
	 5,823	 5,894	 11,717
the largest proportion of whom
were aged between 20 to 30 years
1961: Persons born in China
	 4,520	 4,672	 9,192
of whom 2,095 were 'aliens'
Persons born in Hong Kong
	 6,260	 3,962	 10,222
of whom 548 were 'aliens'
Persons born in Singapore
	 4,981	 4,839	 9,820
of whom 50 were 'aliens'
(England & Wales)
	 29,234
1971: Persons born in China
	 6,760	 6,735	 13,495
Persons born in British Isles
to parents born in China
	 1,530	 1,900	 3,430
[the largest proportion of
both males & females was
aged between 20 - 40 years]
Persons born in Hong Kong
	 17,010	 12,510	 29,520
Persons born in British Isles
to parents born in Hong Kong
	 3,700	 3,785	 7,485
[the largest proportion of
males was aged between 20 - 30
and females under 20 years]
Persons born in Singapore
	 13,745	 13,590	 27,335
Persons born in British Isles
to parents born in Singapore
	 9235	 ,9?5	 18,210
[the largest proportion of
both males & females was
aged under 20 years]
(England, Scotland & Wales)
	 99,475
1981: Persons born in China
	 5,446	 6,358	 11,804
Persons born in Hong Kong
	 31,689	 27,228	 58,917
Persons born in Singapore
	 15,965	 16,482	 32,447
(England, Scotland & Wales)
	 82,525
Sources: 1951 Census (England & Wales Preliminary Report General Tables,
Table 37); 1961 Census (England & Wales Birthplace & Nationality Tables,
Table 2); 1971 Census (Great Britain Country of Birth Tables, Table 1); 1981
Census (Great Britain Country of Birth Tables, Table 1)
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In order to understand how and why Chinese from Hong Kong and China
almost exclusively entered catering work in Britain, it is necessary to
study the actual process of their migration and incorporation into the
British economy. This has been structured not only by the demands of the
domestic British economy and legislature but also by the socio-economic
development of Hong Kong and southeast China in the course of British
colonial domination.
INDUSTRIALISATION AND AGRICULTURE IN HONG KONG
Like the five "treaty ports" ceded to the British government in 1842, the
course of Hong Kong's economic and social development was set upon a
singularly distinct course from that of the rest of China. The colonised
territory now known as Hong Kong was enlarged considerably following
China's defeat by Japan in the War of 1894-95. This final phase of the
colony's formation included a major part of China's richest area, the
Yangtze Valley, plus a ninety nine year lease of the rural hinterland of
Kowloon (known as the New Territories) covering three hundred and sixty
six of the colony's four hundred square miles, plus a number of surrounding
small islands. As a major trading foothold for Britain in China and the
Far East, Hong Kong became a significantly developed entrepot port
specialising in warehousing, shipping services and banking. British
manufacturing investments, however, were still directed to the Chinese
mainland, principally Shanghai, where the British government also enjoyed
extraterritorial "rights". During the revolutionary upsurge in China from
1924 - 1927, when working class action shook Canton, Shanghai and Wuhan,
British rule and profits in Hong Kong also came under serious threat, first
by a seamen's strike, then a boycott of British goods, followed by a general
strike of more than fifty thousand workers for sixteen months (Hong Kong
Research Project 1974). Upon the failure of the revolution in China and the
retreat of the Chinese Communists into the countryside, the colonial regime
effectively crushed the organised working class of Hong Kong (ibid),
When Japan invaded China in 1938, some five hundred thousand refugees fled
to Hong Kong from Canton, amongst them a sizable group of Chinese
capitalists. Their numbers were swelled following the end of the Japanese
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Occupation which signalled the reversion of Shanghai to Chinese rule and
the setting up of government in China by Mao's Chinese Chinese Communist
Party in 1949. With this Influx of capital and labour from China began the
rapid industrialisation of Hong Kong. "About two-thirds of total investment
at the start of industrialisation in 1948-50 came from Shanghai and
Guangzhou (Canton), so much so that Hongkong has been called a 'transferred
economy" (Benton 1983 p.19).
British rule has accounted for the colony's untrammelled post War economic
growth. Offering the added bonuses of a natural deep-water harbour and
close proximity to Pacific shipping lanes, the colonial status of Hong Kong
has enticed capitalists with technology and trade links throughout South
East Asia in the wake of successive Indo-Chinese political revolutions.
Industrialisation of the colony has been speeded further by the Imperial
Preference granted to the colony at the Ottawa Conference of 1932 and the
United Nations trade embargo on China during the Korean War in 1951, in
conjunction with the relative absence of local industrial militancy. The
population has grown from under two million before 1949 (ibid p.13) to five
million by 1981 (Hong Kong Government Office 1985). This expansion has
been due largely to the entry of workers from China, carefully regulated
according to demand (England & Rear 1975, Hong Kong Research Project 1974
op cit, Benton 1983 op cit) and their Hong Kong born descendants. Adequate
accommodation remains difficult to obtain and housing standards,
particularly on the earlier built public housing estates, would not be
considered fit for family habitation in Britain. There is no minimum wage,
no limit on working hours for men and secondary education until 1979 was
neither free nor compulsory. In the fiscal year 1969-70 (a period of rapid
expansion), public expenditure on the police, defence and prisons in Hong
Kong amounted to HK 269,042,483, whereas social welfare spending accounted
for a mere HK 19,204,686 (Hong Kong Research Project 1974 op cit p.28).
Rapid post war industrialisation in Hong Kong has absorbed by far the
overwhelming majority of local and migrant workers from China over the
last forty years Those who were not so readily accommodated, however, are
those who are of immediate interest to this study, for it is they who now
form the bulk of Britain's Chinese 'business' community. 	 These people,
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mostly from the rural New Territories of Hong Kong were also the subject of
a study by Watson (1975 op cit), the only other contemporary published
study of Chinese migration to Britain to date. Watson set out to document
the effects of emigration upon one particular village, San Tin, home of the
Mans lineage [2]. As an anthropological study, however, Watson's discussion
of the dislocating political and economic determinants of emigration for
the Mans (and subsequently, their incorporation into British society) was
both brief and cryptic, since his primary focus was fixed upon the cultural
aspects of emigration. Nevertheless, his being the only substantial study of
its nature, it affords a valuable insight into the background to emigration
from Hong Kong's New Territories as a whole.
Watson related how during the period following 1949, the British government
of Hong Kong actively sought to sever the colony's dependance for imported
food upon the newly established Maoist China (ibid p.44). For this reason,
agriculture in the rural New Territories was developed from subsistence
rice farming to labour intensive, high yield vegetable crop production
geared towards the needs of the urban centre. This transformation was
facilitated through newly established government-sponsored trucking co-
operatives which transported produce to Kowloon for centralised
distribution. Cheap, high quality long grain rice was imported from
Thailand whilst remaining rice crops grown commercially in. the New
Territories catered for a more specialised market (ibid p.48). "In 1954, 70
percent of the total agricultural land in the Colony was under paddy rice
cultivation; but by 1966, this figure had fallen to 44 percent" (ibid). By
1985, thirty five per cent of Hong Kong's vegetables, fifty four per cent of
the poultry and eighteen per cent of the pigs consumed in Hong Kong came
from local farms, which covered a mere nine per cent of the colony's 1,067
square kilometres, a considerably smaller area than in the years
immediately following 1949 (Hong Kong Government Office 1985).
The transition from rice to vegetable farming throughout the New
Territories was not a smooth one. Its effects were exacerbated by the
influx into the colony of refugees and workers from China following the
War, placing greater pressure upon available farm land and local jobs (ibid
p.45).	 Livestock farming, which required intensive investments of both
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capital and labour, was not an easily accessible alternative for the
majority of rice farmers, Moreover, the simultaneous drain on established
sources of agricultural labour due to the pull of burgeoning industries
together with the expansion of vegetable farming entailed rising wage
levels for agricultural workers that increasingly only could be met through
vegetable cash cropping. Thus, within a very short period of time, the
entire basis of the pre-War system of rice farming throughout the New
Territories was undermined. Village economies which previously had
centered around rice cultivation were compelled to switch to "landlording"
high yield vegetable production and industrial employment, displacing many
of the poorer rice farmers. Those who could not afford to invest in the
new system of vegetable production, or whose inferior land was unsuitable
for growing vegetables (a case in point being the rice farmers of San Tin
village) such a conversion was not possible. The people worst affected
were mainly from Hakka villages. The Hakka, or ifuest people, as they are
called, are an ethnic minority amongst the predominantly Punti, or
Cantonese locals. Having migrated to the regions of southeast China at a
much later period than the Punti, the Hakka had to content themselves with
less fertile farmlands than the longer established Punti. Distinctions
between the Hakka and Punti of Hong Kong, however, are rapidly diminishing
and most Hakka people are fluent Cantonese speakers.
Aside from the "vegetable revolution", agricultural land formerly available
for rice farming in the New Territories was further eroded by substantial
"new town" development at Tsuen Wan, Tuen Nun, Sha Tin, Tai Po, Pan Ling,
Yuen Long and Junk Bay. The subsequent extension of housing, industry and
commerce throughout these areas has firmly consolidated the transformation
of the pre-War New Territories rice economy.
To those who were dispossessed of a living from the obselete rice economy
in the New Territories, emigration was swiftly presented as a solution.
Watson remarked how "The colonial government ... encouraged emigration to
the United Kingdom and other parts of Western Europe as part of the
• general program to ease unemployment in the New Territories" (ibid
He added
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•1 t is clear that the government tried to make passports and work permits
readily available to the villagers. A 1958 memo circulated within the New
Territories Administration stressed that emigration should have the rfullest
encouragement" because of the high unemployment In parts of rural Hong Kong
(Yuen Long District Office file no. P,S.412/57 I)" (Watson 1976 op cit p.76
footnote).
Like colonial workers from throughout the world, many of the New
Territories Chinese emigrated to fill jobs in the rapidly expanding service
industries of Britain's domestic post War economy, often drawn by the
active recruitment campaigns by British employers in the colonies (Rees
1982 op cit p.83; Gordon & Klug 1985 op cit p.3). Between 1963 and 1966,
seventy three per cent of all UK 'A' category work vouchers for migrants
from Hong Kong went to New Territories applicants (Watson 1975 op cit
p.97), facilitated under "special" quotas for certain Dependant Territories
in recognition of their "unique problems" (ibid p.98) and Britain's implicit
responsibility for them.
Industrially unskilled and unfamiliar with the English language, most of the
New Territories Chinese relied upon Chinese sponsors already established in
Britain to gain legal entry and a job. As such, they swelled the niche of
ethnic firms established by their predecessors, Not all of these were
concentrated in. the catering industry by this stage. For instance, In the
days when the majority of households did not possess a washing machine,
there were still a number of Chinese laundries in existence. However, the
stipulations of specialised skills and experience not already available from
the existing domestic labour market set out by the conditions of the work
permit and voucher system precluded any large scale Chinese recruitment to
those sectors where Chinese firms had managed to survive purely through
the employment of cheap and flexible labour. Only in the ethnic catering
trade, which specifically exploited ethnic difference, could a case readily
be made for the necessity for Chinese workers to fill available jobs. This
was congruent with the general conditions of expansion and continued
demand for labour in the catering industry as a whole and the fact that the
jobs that Chinese workers filled did not actually require any previously
acquired rele vant skills or- experience at all. (The recognition of ethnic
difference as a genuine occupation f or particular forms of work is still
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operated through Section 5 (C) of the Race Relations Act 1976,) It was
thus to jobs in the ethnic catering industry in Britain that the vast
majority of New Territories Chinese were directed (see Table 7 below).
Some also went to work for British firms elsewhere, like the British
Phosphate Works on Nauru arid Ocean Island and the oilfielde in Brunel, (In
Table 7 below, Chinese "aliens refers to Chinese born in China and not
Hong Kong. Although this category does not include all those who emigrated
to Britain, the Table nevertheless illustrates the scale of entry into
catering work.)
TABLE 7: CHINESE ALIENS ENTERING BRITAIN FROJ HONG KONG
	
1953
	
1964
	
1965
	
1966	 1957
	 1968
	
1970
Industry	 58
	
69
	
68
	
101
	
72
	
77
	
78
Catering	 256
	
354
	
380
	
475
	
719
	
720
	
833
Entertaining	 10
	
9
	
0
	
23
	
3
	
10
	
6
Nursing	 109
	
132
	
180
	
283
	
290
	
262
	
304
Domestics	 53
	
49
	
81
	
65
	
91
	
71
	
66
Students	 25
	
48
	
52
	
60
	
52
	
55
	
48
Totals	 511
	
661
	
761
	
1007
	
1227
	
1195
	
1335
Source: Watson 1975 p.113
Watson offered no explanation for this phenomenon other than the sudden
"discovery" by British people of Chinese food (Watson 1974 p.214), when
"British people began to change their eating habits and developed a taste
for foreign cuisine" (Watson 1977 op cit p.183). By failing to concentrate
upon the centrality of historical economic and political factors which
structured emigration for the New Territories workers, Watson also missed
the essential significance of the emigration. This lay in its reflection of
the demise of the New Territories village economies,
	 Thus, far from
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propping up "many other aspects of San Tin's traditional culture besides
lineageu
 (Watson 1975 op cit p.213), the New Territories exodus reelected
the final destruction of the material basis upon which local traditional
culture was founded.
The encouragement of emigration amongst the New Territories rice farming
villagers deriving from the colonial relationship between the economies of
Britain and Hong Kong in combination with the channelling of migrant labour
in Britain into the catering industry by the 1962 Act were the two main
factors which defined the general situation for Chinese migrants. The
manner in which they mobilised resources within the community to establish
a foothold in Britain provides the other half of the equation as to why and
how the ethnic Chinese niche in Britain's catering industry became as
firmly entrenched as it is today. This is the focus of the remainder of
the Chapter. It addresses the system of immigration and employment
patronage for both the men who came first and their families who followed
afterwards and its Implications for binding migrants to their sponsors.
This is set against the subjective responses of the Chinese to their first
taste of life in Britain.
THE CHINESE CONUNITY & CATERING
The work permit and voucher system compelled the Chinese to make use of
whatever resources lay within their reach to fulfil the legal requirements
of the 1962 Act, Thus, they soon established networks for immigration and
employment patronage through the employers of friends and relations both
in Hong Kong and Britain. Employers in Britain would be asked to sponsor
the immigration and employment of a required employee and employers in
Bong Kong would be asked to testify that the prospective employee
possessed the necessary specialised skills and experience for the job. In
many cases, this service cost money at both ends of the migration chain.
(The current rate for legal immigration to Britain from Hong Kong in this
way under the much tighter restrictions prevailing today is expected to
cost in the region of 1O,OOO). This system of patronage facilitated the
emigration of entire village populations from the New Territories, In the
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case of San Tin, Watson (ibid p.100 if) documented how the Mans lineage
served as an "emigration agency".
Four people recounted their own personal experiences of migration through
this channel:
"In them days, it was really easy. If you wanted to come over to this
country to work, all you had to do was get proof of identity and something
to show you'd worked somewhere, It was all easy enough to fiddle - for
some tea money - know what I mean? If you wanted, say to come to England
and work as a chef, you could probably get somebody to write you a
reference and say, "Yeah, he worked here for ten years as a chef" and you
showed that to the Home Office and that was it."
"My uncle worked in a restaurant, you see - The Golden Dragon in Chatham,
just outside London. He got the form signed for me to come. In those
days, someone I knew would be coming over every week. My uncle came first
and I came later. He got me a job working in the same restaurant as him."
"I come from a village where the whole village - about two and a half,
three thousand people - are all called Chung. This whole village, these two
and a half, three thousand people, are all in Europe; say, three or four
hundred in Amsterdam in Holland, about two or three hundred in West
Germany and the rest here. We all helped each other get across and with
all the paperwork."
"All my friends now are the ones I knew before from my village. They're
all over here. Now in our village, there's just old people or very young
children but some of them are children of people here who sent them back
to be looked after. It's really like a ghost town. England's our home now.
We all came roughly the same time because once a few people arrived, they
could help the others to come."
The dependence of Chinese workers upon their immigration sponsors placed
them in a particularly vulnerable position. Restaurant management was
often arbitrary and rapacious, the working week was long and hard and
annual leave, sickness and holiday pay were virtually unknown:
"It was very hard in the early days, during the early 1960s. You could
start work one day and if you didn't work hard, you'd get the sack the next
day because there were so many queueing up for a job. During the '60s and
'70s, work permits were very easy to get, so if the boss didn't like you he
could easily replace you with someone else from Hong Kong. In Liverpool,
they had the main Chinese community. They had a place where people who
hadn't got a job could go to eat and sleep, so when restaurant owners
wanted staff, they could just go there. When my father was out of job, he
113
went there. But it was very low pay in those days. It was like slavery.
They got paid £5 a week,"
Wages and conditions were poor by local standards but expectations were
also generally lower:
"In China there was not enough rice to eat. Everyone was so poor. Hong
Kong was also very hard. You know, working in a Cantonese restaurant (in
Hong Kongi you only got £15 a month - a month! And all my money I sent
back to China so my family could eat. Then I was a builder. Building,
building, building - a lot of hard work. 1968 I came to England because
you couldn't get a job that paid enough to put food in your mouth. My
uncle got me a job working in the same place as him. No wages - just food
and somewhere to live - no money. It wasn't supposed to be a real job, you
see. But once I found a job with pay, it was so much better than Hong
Kong. I got £17 for the week. In Hong Kong I got £15 for the month!"
Dormitory employment, whereby workers were given housing related to their
jobs, compounded their dependence upon employers and mitigated against
permanent settlement and family life. Even after another decade, the
situation had not Improved significantly:
"I lived in Teddington Lock when I first came, on top of a restaurant there.
It's a small town in Middlesex near Richmond in London. My father, he was
working there before me and I took over his job. He went up north
somewhere. Sc the first two days I did nothing. I was sleeping all that
time - must have been twenty four hours non-stop. Then, the fourth or
fifth day I started working In that restaurant doing service as a waiter
but I couldn't speak a word of English! I just said, "Order by number" and
wrote down what the customers showed me. They asked me for a fork and
spoon, I gave them chopsticks and that sort of thing. They asked me for a
glass of water and I didn't know what they were saying, so I had to call
the manager over. But that was a very small restaurant - only about nine
or ten tables - so the boss was the manager, the waiter and everything.
The only other waiter was me, so it was just two of us working. We did
from half past eleven in the morning till half past three - that's with all
the clearing up, the hoovering and all that stuff. Then we'd have a break
and start again half past five getting ready for the evening until
midnight, one o'clock, something like that, depending on what time the
customers left. Seven days a week... yes, seven days a week. I'll tell you,
I'd never heard of all these perks you get here - money for going sick,
money for going on holiday, workers' rights and all that stuff. All I cared
about was the money. That's what I needed; that's what	 needed - my
family I mean. I sent what I could back to my Mum in Hong Kong. Oh, I
was a young boy then - no bad habits. 10 drinking, no smoking, no
gambling, no nothing! At that time I was getting paid about £17 a week.
It wasn't bad for the time; 1971, '72. And you got tips on top of that, so
the average -would be about £25 a week. Oh yeah, board and everything like
that was free. Whenever you work in a Chinese restaurant, accommodation,
food and all that's free, so all you have to do is work there and pick up
your pay. But you can't afford to loose your job! Anyway, I worked there a
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year and got my experience. Then I got a better job In Reading with better
pay, still doing the waiter's job.0
The situation was more precarious for unauthorised workers, such as 14:r Ng
who has now lived in the country for sixteen years:
"I came through a traveller's visa because I thought I would only stay a
little time. I thought I'd try my luck because we were so short of money.
But it was quite difficult because I didn't have a proper work permit so I
could never earn as much as the others." (je. ot,ber Chinese worker's in t.be
same tradeJ
As an illegal 'overstayer' on a visitor's visa, Mr }Tg consistantly has had
to content himself with a lower than average wage in the Chinese catering
economy. The last full-time job in which he was employed paid 60 per
week in 1984. His 'illegal' status has precluded tax and national insurance
deductions from his salary, so that now he is no longer able to work
through illness, he cannot claim any welfare benefits and therefore must be
supported totally by his wife who joined him in 1973 under a work permit.
On top of all, familiarisation with the British way of life invariably
entailed an abrupt introduction to British racism. This was explained by
Alan, who came to Britain in 1970 as a waiter straight from school and
with no knowlege of English.
"When we were in the restaurant we had some terrible fights. Not just one.
Every week. Every Thursday night we had to fight. All the youngsters
would come in and eat a meal and slip out the door or they would just tell
you "I want a fight before I pay the bill". I don't know why. They just
didn't like us. I've hurt a lot of people - broken a lot of legs and arms
and that. Of course, they started the fights. We wouldn't start them. To
us they were customers - business, Why would we want to start fighting
with them? We wouldn't fight with them until they got nasty with us.
If there was new people who didn't know us, always they'd want to fight.
I remember one very bad fight in Luton Town. There was three of us
serving and these five young people were there, They had a meal and then
two of them tried to run but we knew as soon as they came in the door what
sort of customers they were. So as soon as one of them tried to run, we
held the other one, then the other two started fighting us. Me, at the
time, I was holding a plate and I just threw it like a frisby straight at
his head and he went straight out. When the police came, I said, "Oh, he
tried to run out and I was just holding a plate and he just ran into me and
hit his head on it." We had to go to court for that one, It was always
the youngsters. They would say, "Right, outside you chink" and that sort of
thing, you know, Once, this one was shouting at me "Chink, chink, chink",
so I chased him for about four or five streets and I dragged this young guy
back to the restaurant and kicked him and kicked him. I was quite annoyed
then. We didn't care about swearing and all that but when they started
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calling us "chink, chink, chink", we got angry. So we used to chase them
around the streets and beat them up in the restaurant.
Back in the early seventies - and even more in the sixties as well, before
I came here - a lot of European people came in to eat and fight. I don't
know why, Just because we were Chinese, That was before Bruce Lee came
out. He helped us a lot. In '71, '72, '73, we had to fight a lot, a lot.
When his films came out in England, the fighting settled down very fast.
That's my personal view anyway."
Assault and racial harassment of Chinese waiters was an accepted part of
the job. 1g (1968) told of one incident in 1963 at St. Helen's when one of
a gang of white youths who preferred to fight rather than pay a bill for a
Chinese meal was killed in the scuffles. His death led immediately to
racist demonstrations outside the restaurant. Usually, however, fighting
was merely part of the weekly routine, as recounted by Mr Li, who now runs
a take-away business with his wife and two daughters.
"Anywhere I worked, Birmingham, London, Coventry, Wolverhampton, Dublin, all
the time people were calling the Chinese "X, Y and Z" and all that. Gangs
of youths used to come in drunk and complain about nothing and easily a
fight would start. The restaurant people couldn't understand what they said
half the time. I remember once, a man asked me, "Do you serve crabs here?"
I said "We serve anybody here"! But that's just one of the funny things
that happened. The fighting was every weekend, the same old story. But
unless we stood up for ourselves, the boss would dock our pay the price of
the meal. When you saw what was going on, you just went over and added a
few kicks and punches and that was it. Usually the Chinese won by
throwing hot fat or something. That's the only way we could win against
double our number."
The economic and social instability attendant upon emigration combined with
the strictures of legislation intially precluded most families from coming
to Britain, with the result that the majority of earlier Chinese catering
workers were men. Tied accommodation provided by employers was generally
insecure, overcrowded and unsuitable for families. Most, therefore, remained
in Hong Kong, supported by the remittances sent by relatives abroad,
supplementing this income with marginal farming activities (see also Watson
1975 op cit):
"When my daughter was born in 1974, her father went to England after she
was six months old. So it was me and my mother-in-law who brought her up.
He used to send money to us for our living expenses - about 5O a month -
and we could earn about 25 from farming. He had some land, yot. see, about
one or two acres, and I worked on that, Everyone was the same then, not
just my family."
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Such arrangements were prone to abuses, as another woman remembered:
"My Dad came here first, He sent money over regularly to look after us.
Then when my Mum caine, I think she only caine to see if she liked it here
but she must have because she stopped. Meanwhile, I was being looked after
by my relatives in Hong Kong. I was passed around to different people. An
uncle had me first and I can remember being very ill treated by that
couple. I can't remember much except lots of beatings. They used to beat
me a lot. I remember once, she pushed me and I fell onto a corner of a
stool and gashed my eye, just there. There's still a scar, isn't there? I
can't remember how my Mum found out about it but then they moved me onto
another relative."
As 'eating-out' in cheap, Chinese 'chop suey houses' became a well
established and popular working class institution, the families of the first
male settlers started to join relatives in Britain after years of
separation. It was a gradual process, wives being generally the first to
come, followed by children (and sometimes also elderly dependants) but at a
later date. This was due to the long and awkward working hours demanded
by restaurant work and the difficulties this presented for childcare:
"I was actually born here, you know. But you wouldn't have thought sc ten
years ago because I didn't actually come here until I was eight. I was sent
to live with my auntie in Hong Kong until then, from when I was a baby
because my parents were too busy working over here. I hadn't seen my
mother for four years before I came and I don't ever remember my father in
Hong Kong."
Family reunification was accelerated by the impending 1971 Immigration Act
(implemented in 1973) under the Conservative government. By dividing
people into the categories of' 'patrials' and 'non-patrials', the 1971 Act
effectively targetted Black and New Commonwealth citizens alone for more
stringent immigration control (Gordon and Klug 1985 op cit). It also
stripped wives and children of Commonwealth citizens already settled in
Britain of their previously statutory right to join husbands and fathers in
this country, although the Rules under which the Act was administered did
make provision for this. Immigration Rules, however, were easier to change
than legislation. Moreover, the new Rules not only dictated that the
majority of New Commonwealth immigrant women were formally relegated to
the status of 'dependant', being disallowed the independent right to bring
husbands or fiances to juin them in Britain; they also became obliged to
demonstrate that they could be accommodated and maintained by their
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'sponsor'.	 The threat of the 1971 Act (which also abolished the work
voucher system) hastened the reunification of Chinese families in Britain,
such that 'dependants" immigration greatly outnumbered that of work permit
holders (Hong Kong Government Office figures).
Many women and children were absorbed inLn Chinese restaurant work as
kiLr hen hands and cleaners generally at substandard rates of pay:
"My sister can't speak English so she just washes dishes in a restaurant,
I was the same when I first come to this country. My husband got me the
job in the same place as he was learning to be a cook but it was hard work
and I didn't get much pay."
Children often received no wages at all for it was assumed by employers
that their labours were spent in part payment for accommodation:
"When me and my brother first came to this country, when I was twelve, we
went to live above a Chinese restaurant in Wales. We had to work there on
Thursday and Friday nights and every weekend because my parents had to
work so hard in those days, they couldn't keep up with the business. When
the boss felt good, he gave us 1 or 5Op. When he didn't, we didn't get
anything because we were living and eating there with our parents. It was
one of the biggest restaurants in that town and the money was supposed to
be quite good. But when we got there, the 'boss said the pay was less
because he was supplying a room to live in. But this room was literally a
rubbish tip. It was just full up with rubbish, We had to get a shovel and
shovel it out before we could move in. None of the staff stayed long."
Where continued residence in staff houses became impossible for families,
they turned to shared, private sector rented accommodation. Most did not
know their entitlements regarding eligibility for public sector housing or
how to gain access to it. This resulted in overcrowded living conditions
becoming the usual experience for most Chinese families upon arrival in
Britain, which exacerbated other problems of social adjustment, as three
women eKplained.
"I came here in 1972 but I just couldn't get used to it. My nephew was
here already with his wife but I brought their three children with me so we
could all live together again. My nephew and his wife slept in one room
and I slept with the children in another room. The youngest one was so
young, she had to use a potty all the time. We had to cook and eat in the
same room. It was really horrible. There were mice everywhere. There was
only two good things about it: the rent was only about 6 or .7 a week for
all of us and it was easy to make friends. 'Everyone was Chinese so we
could all look after each other."
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"When I came in 1968 1 went to live with my husband above his uncle's
take-away shop for a year. We both worked there in the evenings and he
gave us free food and never asked us for any rent but we didn't get paid.
Then we rented a fish and chip shop for a couple of years but it didn't do
too well, so we moved to Chinese Street. Our two kids had come by then.
In those days, all the Chinese used to live there in the big, old houses.
There were five families in ours - well, one was only a single man. But
the rent was only 3 a week, which was all we could afford. Only three
families used to cook there - the others ate at work, so things weren't too
bad. At that time my husband was working away from home. He had lots of
different restaurant jobs, all over the country. Usually he came home once
a month - he couldn't afford to come more often. The children didn't really
get to know him. Actually, I was quite unhappy myself - very lonely. I
used to cry a lot - not for any particular reason. There was just no-one I
could really talk to. I've been trying to learn English ever since I came
but it's very difficult when you've got nobody to talk to."
"When I first came here, my parents didn't have their own place. What they
had was a rented room in somebody's house. It was a small room and the
reason why I remember it so well was because they went to work and I had
to stop in the room all by myself. She'd have the dinner waiting for me in
a little bag but I had to stay there all the time, I can't remember ever
having played out or anything like that. It sounds cruel now but it wasn't.
I was fine by myself. I can't remember what I used to do because there
wasn't any television or anything. I never went downstairs. It was a
small terraced house, you see and we had the room upstairs and another
family lived downstairs. I didn't hardly see them at all. Then when I
started school, they'd be at work when I came home, so I just stopped in
the room on my own after school until it was time to go to bed. Then, when
my Mum became pregnant with my brother, we moved to another place, another
rented place, about three years later. This was a big house but there was
a few families there and we shared a kitchen but I never really saw much
of them either."
For many relatives, simply becoming reunited with one another after such a
long period of separation was a bewildering experience in itself, like for
Madame Tsang.
"My husband has been here twenty years now. His father before him was
here for many, many years. I never met him because he died over ten years
ago. He had an English wife as well, you know, and had two kids but they
lost contact. I know when he sent for his son, it was a lot of hard. work.
I hadn't seen him for about six years before he came to England because he
had already gone to Hong Kong to work in a clothing factory. But the
wages here were good, I think. I stayed on our farm in China and grew
vegetables and my husband would send us quite a lot of money. The only
time I went to Hong Kong was to catch the aeroplane to England. It was
very different - so modern and so busy. When I came to London Airport, I
didn't even recognise him! I waited and waited for about two hours and
still nobody came for me. In the end I talked to someone in Chinese and-
they announced me on the loud speaker. Then it turned out he had been
there all the time in the same place as me!"
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Many children joining their parents were often also as confused, as two
people who came to Britain at an early age described:
"Can you imagine standing in front of two strangers and suddenly your
grandmother telling you to call them father and mother and to respect them
as your father and mother'? And in your mind you're thinking you haven't
seen them before because it's such a long time since they left you. That's
what it was like at Heathrow. Then can you imagine getting Into a car with
them and not having my grandmother with me because she had to stay with
my other uncle In Somerset. That was the very first time we were
separated. Can you imagine being in a car with those complete strangers?
Then the houses were all different and the roads were so big and massive.
That was my first impression because I was used to seeing fields all day
everyday and dirt tracks, you know, not concrete and tarmac. I had really
mixed feelings. Inside me I was frightened because everything was so new
and in my mind I kept thinking about my friends back in the New
Territories - I can't really describe the feeling. It was quite a shock,
anyway."
"All I can remember is one day I was at school and someone came up to me
and said I had to get on a plane and come to London. I don't even remember
my uncle having told me "You're going to England on so and so date at so
and so time" or anything like that, So I went home from school and packed
my bags and got taken to the airport and then I was on the plane to
England. A lot of it's a blur now but that's all I remember, just being
dragged off from school to get on the plane. Somebody looked after me on
the plane and my parents were at the other end waiting for me but I wasn't
very emotional because I hadn't seen them for so long."
CONCLUSION
This Chapter has attempted to identify the material basis underlying
Britain's contemporary Chinese community which has been characterised by a
high degree of ethnically exclusive firms. Superficial appearances might
suggest to many that such a phenomenon is evidence of the enduring cultural
proclivities of Chinese towards entrepreneurship and self-help. However, an
historical analysis of the situation reveals that the Chinese 'business'
niche has been underpinned by the thousands of Chinese ousted as a result
of the demise of the New Territories rice farming economy and encouraged to
emigrate to the colonial metropolis. This was a process attributable to the
unique circumstances of Hong Kong as a "free market" colony integrated with
the economic interests of Britain, a situation established following China's
defeat in the Opium War in 1842. In Britain, the experiences of the
migrants have been shaped by the general need for cheap labour in the
expanding post War catering industry and the manner in which this has been
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administered by the state through the issue of work permits and work
vouchers, Within this system, the Chinese were left with little option but
to exploit their ethnicity as a specialised requirement for jobs in order to
facilitate migration. However, in so doing, they consolidated and
entrenched the ethnic niche in catering.
The Chinese 'business' community has flourished due to the particular
vulnerability of Chinese workers, obliged to employers for sponsoring their
immigration and statutorily bound to their jobs. Tied housing, racial
harassment, frequent assault and dependant families in Hong Kong were the
factors which bound them still further.
As the 1960s drew to a close, an increasing number of families became
reunited in Britain, many prompted by the threat of the 1971 Immigration
Act. The situations into which they entered magnified the level of
exploitation within the ethnic Chinese catering trade, often entailing the
additional sweated labour of children. These conditions, however, were
relatively short-lived, For no sooner had Chinese 'chop suey houses' become
an established part of the British scene than the catering trade was
further transformed, this time as a result of the influx of American capital
into the industry. The precise implications of this development and its
impact upon the Chinese community are the subject of the following chapter.
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GAPTER 4
ETHNIC FAST FOOD, COMJWNITY AN1) CLASS:
TUE CHI!ESE EXPERIENCE
INTRODUCTION
The advent of the multi-national fast food company at the end of the 1960s
marked a corresponding transformation of the Chinese catering industry.
This was the demise of the popular 'chop suey houses' and the rise of
smaller, family-run take-away food shops. Such a shift also entailed a
concomitant transformation of the class position of many Chinese, from that
of paid worker to self-employed entrepreneur. Again, this might be
interpreted as the emergence of the deep-rooted cultural orientation
towards business activity amongst Chinese. However, this Chapter shows
that such a transformation has been a direct result of the general
conditions of economic ration.alisation and increased competition within the
catering industry, manifested in fast food production. The Chapter
illustrates this process in detail, dividing the discussion for analytical
expedience as in Chapter 3, concentrating firstly upon a study of the
catering industry post 1970 followed by a consideration of both its
objective and subjective effects upon the Chinese community. Two points
are finally revealed. The first is that the ethnic take-away family
business Is merely another locus for the continued oppression and
exploitation of Chinese and for Chinese women and children in particular,
generating on the whole, low levels of profit. The second is that remaining
distinctions between capital and labour within the Chinese catering
industry are as pronounced as ever.
THE FAST FOOD BOOM & CAPITAL CO10EITRATIO1
The origins of the fast food boom in Britain lie in the over production of
the catering industry in America, Heightened competition in the US gave
rise to a saturation of the American fast food market and a corresponing
decline in the rate of profit. In order to ref late their sagging returns on
capital, the giant fast food corporations looked to Britain, Western Europe
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and much of the developing world for new opportunities (Jones 1985;
Desmond et al. 1981 op cit).
The attraction of the British market far US fast food investors was high
profitability at a rate of productivity capable of far outstripping those of
existing . domestic producers. Based on more sophisticated production
techniques, the American advantage depended on a much higher ratio of fixed
capital to labour power than was to be found in the UK catering industry.
Competing with the American fast food 'giants' would have entailed for
British firms raising the level of investment and expanding production on a
scale beyond the means of the majority of small domestic catering
cOmpanies. Thus the main investment initiative in Britain's fast food trade
came originally from outside the domestic economy. By 1982 the top forty
American fast food companies were trading from sixty seven thousand units
with a combined turnover of almost $35,000 million (Jones 1985 op cit
p.SS). Spurred by this lead and by government policies aiding company
merger, the larger British-owned food producers then followed the American
example, diversifying within and across industrial sectors. Between 1976
and 1978 McDonalds increased its fixed assets from £2 million to almost
£17 million, the turnover of McDonalds restaurants having virtually doubled
each year since 1976 as a result (Desxnond et al, 1981 op cit p.82). By
1983 Wimpy (a British firm) was investing £5 million alone in new
technology (Popular Food Service 1984/5 op cIt pp.44-45). Mullan (1983)
described this process:
"The multi-national combine 'Unilever' for example, produces inter alia,
Birds Eye frozen foods, Vesta packaged meals, Batchelors tinned vegetables
and soups, Walls ice cream and meat products, Blue Band, Stork, Summer
County, Flora and Echo margarine, Spry and Cookeen lard, Crisp 'ii' Dry
cooking oil and detergent and toilet preparations such as Lux, Persil, Omo,
Comfort, Sunlight, Rexona, Breeze, Vim, Sunsilk, Twink, Harmony, Sure, Shield,
Gibbs Toothpaste, Close up, Signal and Pepsodent. Unilever also owns
shipping lines (Norfold Line and Palm Line), meat wholesalers and
processors, (Midland poultry and Unox), paper mills (Thames Board Mills),
and much more - 312 companies in 75 countries manufacturing over 1,000
products. Unilever is the most spectacular example of a vertically
integrated, multi national agribusiness corperation but it is by no means
unique in controlling the inputs and outputs of the food system... At the
lower end there are the plantations, purchasing boards and trawler fleets
which between them harvest materials as diverse as herrings, groundnut and
timber, At the next level there are the oil mills, slaughterhouses, factory
ships and timber mills.	 At the third, the manufacturing operations:
detergents, soap, margarine arid container manufacture, food processing,
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freezing and canning, etc. At the fourth level there is all the
paraphenalia of selling, from the market research, advertising agencies,
distribution depots and retail outlets to fish restaurants, industrial
caterers and cleaners and meat pie shops."
In this sense, the fast food boom was merely reflective of the general
expansion and. technological progression taking place in all other branches
of food production. The 1960s had witnessed heavy investment in farming
and food processing as farmers moved to specialist crop production and
manufacturers shifted to batch, semi-continuous and continuous production.
By 1981 only seventeen per cent of farms were classified as operating
mixed patterns of production (Marsden 1980) and expenditure on plant and
machinery in food manufacture, processing and distribution rose from £168
million in 1976 to £580.8 million in 1978 (Wiggins 1986 op cit p.22).
Rising output, the heightened pace of competition and company
rationalisation brought about a rash of closures as food manufacturers
divested themselves of their least efficient and least profitable
enterprises. As a result between 1971 and 1981 over 100,000 jobs in food
manufacturing were shed (ibid). In this sense, the food industries have
merely reflected the development of the system as a whole, described by
Marx in Capital (Vol.1 Moscow Progress Publishers Rd. pp.592 in Hardach et
al 1978 p.22):
"The development of capitalist production makes it constantly necessary to
keep increasing the amount of the capital laid out in a given industrial
undertaking, and competition makes the imminent laws of capitalist
production to be felt by each individual capitalist as external coercive
laws. It compels him to keep constantly extending his capital, in order to
preserve it, but extend it he cannot, except by means of progressive
accumulation."
Viggins and Lang (1985 op cit p.12) provided similar evidence of the
accelerated pace of capital accumulation within the food industries in the
last two and half decades:
"in the top 100 grocery markets... the two main manufacturers in some 70 of
these markets have more than half the market between them. In just over 60
of these markets one manufacturer alone holds a share of over 40%."
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Tables 8 and 9 below illustrate the American-led capital investment in food
catering in Britain.
TABLE 8: EXPANSION IN MAJOR FAST FOOD CAPTIAL
Trading &
	 Estab.	 Worldwide	 Ho, of
	 Units	 New Openings
Company Name
	 in UK	 Units	 UK	 1984 1985 1986
Barnaby's (Host
Group Ltd)
	 1981	
-	 72	 59	 47	 -
Beefeater Steak
Houses	 1974	
-	 163	 20	 30	 -
Berni Inns	 1948	 342	 340	 8	 15	 -
Burger Express
(Granada Motorway
Services Ltd)
	 -	
-	 11	 -	 -	 -
Burger King UK
Ltd	 1976	 4000	 10	 1	 2	 -
Casey Jones
Burgers (BR)
	 1930	
-	 12	 4	 -	 -
Country Kitchen
Restaurants
(Granada)	 -	
-	 21	 1	 -	 -
Crispins (Manor
Caterers Ltd)
	 1976	
-	 44	 18	 -	 -
Crawfords (UB
Restaurants)	 1979	
-	 62	 3	 3	 -
Happy Eater Ltd
	 1973	
-	 48	 14	 18	 -
Kentucky Fried
Chicken	 1965	 7000	 369	 9	 25	 -
McDonalds
Hamburgers Ltd
	
-	 8000	 150	 30	 30	 34
Mr Big UK Ltd
	 1979	
-	 16	 7	 10	 -
New York New York
(UB Restaurants) 1979
	
-	 11	 -	 -	 -
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	2
	
1	 -	 -
	
22
	
6	 20	 -
	
16
	
1	 6	 -
	
21
	
7	 10	 -
	
28
	
1	 5	 -
	
54	 -	
-	 35
	
97
	
31	 30
	
38
	
3	 7
	
34
	
18	 -
	
34
	
2	 -
	50
	
15	 20
	
8
	
3	 6
	
7
	
0	 1
	
23
	
3	 4
	
13	 -	 6
	
4
	
2	 6
	
419
	
17	 15
Nordsee
Restaurants UK
Ltd	 1983	 160
Olivers UK Ltd	 1976	 -
The Pancake Place 1973
	 -
The Perfect Pizza
CUB Restaurants) 1978
	 -
Pizza Express	 1965	 -
Pizza Hut (UK)	 1973	 4000
Pizzaland CUB
Restaurants)	 1979	 17
Poppins Rest.
	 1979	 -
Roast Inns
	 1981	 -
Sarahs (Manor
Caterers Ltd)
	 1978	 -
Spud-U-Like Ltd
	 1974	 -
Strikes Rest.
	 1972	 9
Superfish (Rhodes
Foods Ltd)	 1971	 -
Vittle Inns Ltd
	 1980	 -
Wendy Restaurants
UK Ltd	 1980	 2800
Whats's Cooking
Ltd	 1978	 4
Wimpy mt. Ltd
	 1954	 570
Source: Popular Food Service 1984/5 pp.36-42
Clearly it was during the 1970s that the majority of fast food chains first
made their impact on the British market, increasing rapidly throughout the
subsequent decade. Table 9 gives an insight into the international scale of
this expansion.
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TABLE 9 LARGE FOOD CHAINS: WORLD RANKING BY NIJMBER OF OUTLETS 1983/84
Ranking Company
1
	
McDonalds	 (US)
2
	
Kentucky Fried
Chicken	 (US)
3
	
International Dairy
Queen	 (US)
4
	
Pizza Hut	 (US)
5
	
Burger King	 (US)
6
	
Allied Lyons	 (GB)
7
	
Wendys Internat.	 (US)
8
	
Hardees	 (US)
9
	
Kozo Sushi	 (JAP)
10
	
Chef & Brewer	 (GB)
No, of World-
wide Outlets
7589
6989
4763
4300
3455
2770
2671
2180
2060
1500
Ranking Out-
side the USA
4
3
9
10
1
2
Source: Hotels & Restaurants International 1984 in Keynote 1985 p.3
The influx of American capital into the expanding '±ast food' trade in
Britain had important repercussions throughout the domestic catering
industry. Amplified competition (an inevitable concomitant of the growing
number of outlets) not only squeezed the profits of existing traders, it
also widened the availability of cheap and convenient meal products on a
scale unparalleled since the War. As a result 'eating out' increased
dramatically, rising by sixty three per cent between 1973 and 1978 alone
(Desmond et al. op cit 1981 p.107). Every person now consumes an average
of over three meals a week outside the home (see Table 10 below),
generating an estimated annual revenue (in 1980) of 7.6 billion for the
private catering industry (London Food Commission 1986 op cit). By 1983
total annual consumer expenditure on food catering alone amounted to 9,967
million, constituting 5.6% of the total (ibid).
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TABLE 1O WEEKLY NUMBER OF MEALS CONSUMED OUTSIDE THE HOME PER PERSON
1977 - 1980
At Kidday	 Ot.ber (mainly evening)	 Total
1978	 1.75	 1.26	 3.01
1979	 1.81	 1.39	 3.20
1980	 1,77	 1.46	 3.23
Source: National Food Survey In Keynote Reports 1984 p.9
This increase in consumption has been matched by a growth in catering
employment. From 1971 to 1981, jobs in the trade rose between fourteen and
fifteen per cent (see Tables 11 & 12 below).
TABLE 11: EMPLOYMENT IN HOTEL AND CATERING TRADES 1851 -1981
(England & Wales 1851 - 1951, G.B. 1961 - 1981)
Kale	 Female	 Total
1851	 50346	 69888	 120234
1861	 96328	 98329	 194657
1871	 113068	 129061	 242129
1881	 118945	 73836	 192781
1891	 131722	 131423	 263145
1901	 165250	 177116	 342366
1911	 202468	 285554	 488022
1921	 159085
	 268698	 427783
1931	 198174	 257864	 456038
1961	 995230
1971	 1148560
1981	 1352880
Source: Census of Population 1851 - 1981
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218. 1 250.6 +14. 1
608. 1 564. 0 -7.2
245.8 267.9 +9. 0
168.4
214.9
94, 5
192.4
227,7
138. 2
+14.3
+6.0
+46. 2
TABLE 12: COMPARISON OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE FOOD INDUSTRIES
BETWEEN 1973 & 1981
	
1973	 1981	 Z Change
Food, Drink & Tobacco
Manufacture	 728.1	 669.3	 -8.1
Food, Drink & Tobacco
Wholesale Distribution
Food & Drink
Retail Distribution
Hotels & Other
Resid. Establishments
Restaurants, Cafes &
Snack Bars
Public Houses
Clubs
Source HTCIB Statistical Review of the Hotel and Catering Industry
(Catering Intelligence Unit) 1984
Despite the impact of American capital, however, the catering industry iii
Britain still displays a highly uneven pattern of development. In 1985, for
example, the top ten companies controlled only fifteen per cent of the
market (London Food Commission 1986 op cit), although for contract catering
the market share enjoyed by the top ten companies had reached fifty eight
per cent (ibid; see also Table 13 below). This contrasted sharply again
with the restaurant sector, where less than two per cent out of a total of
some seventy thousand restaurants were part of restaurant chains (Keynote
1984 op cit p.3). Such unevenness reflects both the diversity of the
industry and the selective effects of new investment upon different
elements within it.
Prior to the investment boom of the 1970s catering production had remained
largely labour intensive. This rule applied to state and private sector
'factory kitchens', small haute cuisine restaurants and cafes aLike. Whether
aimed at the production of luxury meals in restaurants or at mass public
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consumption, catering technology had advanced little since the War. As a
result, the productivity of labour and the profits extracted from it were
relatively low, The investment drive of the 1970s thus effectively sought
to improve productivity and thereby profitability by means of Increasing
and expanding the level of technological 'hardware' employed in catering
production.
TABLE 13: BRITAIN'S TOP FIVE CONTRACT CATERING COMPANIES (1982)
Trusthouse Forte
Grand Metropolitan
Berni Inn
Stakis PLC
Mecca Leisure
Turnover (ni)
915.4
135.3
105.4
88.2
76,8
Pre-Tax Profits (sm) Z of Turnover
	57.1
	 6.24
	2.8
	
2.13
	
4,7
	
4.52
	
4.4
	
5.06
3
	
4.02
Source: "The British Catering Industry" (Jordans 1984) in London Food
Commission 1985
New technology, however, proved only of limited value to the disparate
sections of the catering industry, due to their differing requirements for
particular configurations of labour and capital. Specialist haute cuisine
restaurants, for example, by definition operate on a highly skilled, labour
intensive production process accessible to a restricted consumer market.
This contrasts with the implied technological needs of mass producers
seeking to sell as many meals as cheaply as possible. The investment boom
In catering hardware of the 1970s therefore acted to catapult specifically
the mass meal fast food producers into a dominant position within the
sector, Before showing how these changes affected Chinese restaurants, it
is necessary to examine in greater detail exactly how technological
investment has altered the productivity of catering labour.
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TECR&OLOG ICAL DEVELOPMENT
"Technology discloses man's mode of dealing with nature, the process of
production by which he sustains his life, and thereby, also lays bare the
mode of formation of his social relations, and on the mental conceptions
that flow from them." (Marx 1954 p.406)
Raising the productivity of labour and hence the rate of profit through new
investment in the catering industry was actually achieved by extending the
'chain' of food production (ie. the amount of work actually expended on
producing food commodities). This expanded the number of points at which
it was possible for catering capitalists to realise surplus value.
'Convenience foods' is the most visible arena in which the value-adding
process has taken place, frozen food sales having more than quadrupled
between 1973 and 1982 (Gallup Estimates in Wiggins & Lang 1985 op cit
p.22). Data from the Ministry of Agriculture's National Food Survey shows
convenience foods as a proportion of total food consumed to have increased
from 17.5% in 1972 to 22% in 1982 (ibid).
The development of convenience foods has allowed food retailers to move
from low profit margin, packaged groceries to high profit foodstuffs.
Progress in 'cook-chill' technology has meant that catering companies can
now offer consumers totally prepared meal products. Leading retailers who
have expanded into this market now employ their own chefs and food
technologists to develop catered meals for consumption in the home.
Wiggins and Lang noted that at Marks and Spencer's store in Birmingham,
convenience food sales accounted for something in excess of forty per cent
of turnover (ibid), However, the most important function of the increased
proportion of fixed capital investment has been to raise the efficiency of
labour actually expended and to more tightly control the labour process.
Braverman's work in Labour & Monopoly Capital (1974) has been of seminal
importance in advancing this argument at a general level: "While capitalist
development has tended to increase the productivity of living labour, it has
also reorganised the labour process to becalm worker insubordination."
In as much as the productivity of labour power is not a fixed entity but
must be transformed into living labour by capitalists (a process which
according to Braverman rests upon the intervention of managers), pseudo-
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scientific strategies of mediation are employed to the following ends
(Braverman 1974 op cit):
a) a restructuring of the 'craft' elements in the labour process such that
production becomes comprised of a series of simple tasks
b) separation of the mental ('conception') and manual ('execution')
components of the labour process
c) use of managers' 'scientific' knowledge of the labour process to plan in
detail, and thus control the tasks required of each worker.
These strategies serve to deskill and thereby cheapen the cost of labour as
well as bring under tighter control the pace and quality of production, in
such a way that
"The subjective factor of the labour process is removed to a place among
its inanimate objective factors. To the materials and instruments of
production are added a 'labour force', another 'factor of production' and the
process is henceforth carried on by management as the sole subjective
element." (ibid p.171)
The use of technology, therefore, is much more than simply a neutral,
innovative input into the organisation of production: it is a functional
component in a particular system of domination and control, In short, new
technology is capitalist technology (Wilkinson 1983 p.14).
The impact of new technology upon catering production is divisible between
that which affects the labour process by more sophisticated forms of
management (1) and that which now constitutes fundamental technological
hardware in the industry (ii).
Ci) 'Scientific management' and advanced marketing techniques have thrown
up a plethora of format-run fast food outlets dominated by major
multinationals such as cDonalds and franchise chains such as Pizzaland and
Burger King. Their semi-continuous production strategies yield marginal
unit profits but rely upon a large product turnover and the capacity to
respond to changing demands for food products throughout opening hours.
Consequently, a cheap and flexible labour force is absolutely essential to
profitability. This entails the interchangable use of staff at different
stages of the production process, so that during peak consumer periods all
efforts are focussed on cooking and serving, whilst in quieter periods the
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workforce can be assigned other duties such as cleaning and stock taking.
This method of job rotation, often presented under the gu±se of 'job
enrichment', also prevents workers from developing speclalisms enabling
them to exert greater control over their work. Of greatest importance,
'scientific management' allows the employer to break down the cooking task
into a series of simple procedures which require no prior knowledge and
which can be timed to within seconds to ensure that workers are carrying
out their respective functions at an optimum level. As noted by the Centre
for Business Research (Desmond et al. 1981 op cit p.53)
"Most of the fast food chains maintain that in order to keep costs low and
the speed and efficiency of service, high specialisation and simplification
of job roles within the outlet are essential. By dividing each job into a
number of component parts, each easily learned in a short period, training
becomes less of a problem - staff have little to learn and can reach
maximum effectiveness in a very short time."
These principles guide recruitment policies such that the majority of non-
managerial staff are employed on a part-time and/or shift basis precisely
tailored to fluctuating demands for food during the day. Deskilled work is
used as a justification for low pay and fringe benefits are either marginal
or non-existent. Terms of employment such as these tend to draw the kind
of workers for whom the job is seen as their only possible source of
employment, as a temporary stepping stone, as an additional source of
income or as convenient to other commitments which they must meet at
certain hours of the day. Consequently, the employment profile of the
industry is characterised by young, female and ethnic minority workers.
Transitory, short term and part time employment mitigates against labour
organisation, which in many companies is totally absent, thus obstructing
any long term qualitative change in the employment circumstances of
workers.
(ii) The extent of technological hardware in catering is shown in Tables 14
and 15. The production techniques mentioned in the Tables have been
developed to satisfy at least one of four objectives - to make food a more
manageable commodity in terms of transportation, storage, processing, edible
lifetime and consumption; to expand the range of saleable food products; to
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increase the locations at which they can be consumed; and most
signifcantly, to lower the costs necessary for its production.
TABLE 14: MAJOR PROCESSES IN CATERING TECHNOLOGY
Mechanical - Cutting, Mixing, Kneading, Sifting, Moulding, Vending
Machining
Physical	 - Heating, Freezing, Cook/Chill, Cook/Freeze, Microwave,
Infra Red.
Chemical	 - Organoleptic modifiers, Preservatives, Processing Agents
Biological - Fermentation
Electronic - Electronic Point of Sale, EFTS, Food Trolley Start Up, Food
and Beverage Control
Source: Wiggins 1985 pp.8-9
TABLE 15: THE IMPACT OF CATERING TECHNOLOGY ON THE LABOUR PROCESS
Ultra Heat Treatmenmt
(U,H,T.)
Irradiation
Cook/Chill
- Portion control improvement, Increased stock
holding
- Increased centralisatian of kitchen
facilities, Deskilling of food purchasing,
Job loss
- Deskilling, Centralisation, Job loss
Electronic Point of Sale - Reduction of cash handling, potential for
(E,P,O.S,)	 differential pricing, Improved stock
control, Job loss
Process Automation	
- Increased use of vending machines
Retort Pouch	
- Increased use of processed foods, Deskilling
Source: Wiggins 1985
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Whilst technology has now become an indispensable element in fast food
production it has also entailed a very high level of investment in the
production process. For example, a 'milk shake' machine capable of
dispensing three shakes a minute can cost up to 3,OOO; an ice machine
producing 400lbs of ice a day (a standard amount for a large fast food
outlet) requires an initial outlay of more than 2,OOO. The specialist
nature of such equipment adds further to maintenance costs. If machines
break down, such as Kentucky Fried Chicken's "Benny Penny" which can
pressure fry thirty six portions of chicken in eleven minutes, customer
turnover is immediately affected (Desmond et al 1981 op cit p.52). It is
this increasing cost of fast food production that has had the most
important implications for small catering producers competing in the mass
consumer market.
THE FAST FOOD REVOLUTION AND CHINESE CATERING
"The major chains in the fast food markets are now virtually all controlled
by large corporations. Relatively few chains now stand alone as fast food
only ventures, McDonalds and Wendys being really the major exceptions.
Within the UK market the main competitors are operated by UK subsidiaries
of US corporations or by UK based companies utilising licensing or know-
how based on successful North American chains. Contrary to some popular
belief fast food is no longer an open business for small operators except
possibly as a franchise business." (Desmond et al 1981 p.64)
The major effect of the rise in investment was to heighten the pace of
competition, impelling existing producers for the mass market also to raise
productivity through the introduction labour saving machinery. The effect
on other catering firms such as specialist restaurants is less clear, f or
whilst competition has increased in general terms, the need to
'technologise' in haute cuisine restaurants has been less of an imperative
in view of their craft based forms of production. This increasing
separation between the economics of mass meal and specialist meal
production underlies one of the most important changes in the development
of the industry as a whole over recent years, which is the rapid rise in
food 'take-away' shops. Table 16 below shows that despite an overall
expansion in restaurant trade, restaurants have been superseded
increasingly by take-aways catering to the mass market 11].
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TABLE 16: TRENDS IN CONSUMER EXPENDITURE ON FOOD CATERING (em)
	
1977	 1978	 1979	 1980	 1981
Restaurants	 880	 950	 1000	 1150	 1300
Take-Aways	 870	 1075	 1235	 1500	 1750
Pubs and Clubs	 460	 635	 810	 1025	 1225
Hotels	 490	 590	 655	 775	 875
Total	 2700	 3250	 3700	 4450	 5150
Source: Euromonitor in Keynote Reports 1984 p.7
According to a recent estimate, the fast food market is growing currently
at an annual rate of fifteen per cent and totals 2.3 billion (London Food
CommissIon 1986 op cit) with predictions of sustained growth for the
industry into the 1990s and expectations of a fifty percent increase in
sales between 1984 and 1990 (see Table 17). However, whilst the market for
catered food has grown in general, it has been specifically the fast food
chains which have accounted for the major proportion of Increased, sales, a
trend which also seems set to accelerate into the 1990s. Whereas projected
sales for fast food chains are anticipated to have increased by more than
double between 1984 and 1989, sales for ethnic take-aways show little sign
of growth (see Table 17 below).
TABLE 17:PROJECTED SALES THROUGH TAKE-AWAY BSTABLISHXENTS 1984-1990 (m)
	
1984	 1985	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989	 1990
Fast Food Chains	 670	 800	 930	 1,050	 1,160	 1,275	 1,400
Fish & Chip Shops	 470	 460	 455	 460	 470	 465	 455
Ethnic Take-Aways	 215	 210	 205	 200	 205	 210	 215
Sandwich Bars	 425	 440	 460	 480	 500	 530	 560
Total	 1,780	 1,910	 2,050	 2,190	 2,335	 2,480	 2,630
Source: Euromonitor in Popular Foodservice 1984 p.46
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The greatest growth has been in the American format chains which rely upon
large capital Investment In labour saving technology and a high rate of
turnover. For instance, Kentucky Fried Chicken, established in the UK In
1965, was the first nationwide multiple to challenge the fish and chip
market with eighty per cent (by value) of Its trade represented in take-
away form. The company now has three hundred and sixty five outlets in
Britain, one hundred and fifty of which are run as franchises (Keynote
Reports 1985 op cit p.6). Hamburger chains, to take another example, have
been synonymous with the fast food industry from the beginning. Indeed,
the trends within the hamburger market continue to reflect those within
the sector as a whole. Wimpy, the oldest British owned hamburger fast food
chain dating back to 1955 (Popular Foodservice 1984/5 p.44), achieved a
sales turnover in 1983 in excess of 30 million (ibld) and in 1984 opened
seventeen new stores. However, it continues to be the large US firms which
account for the greatest e^pansion. McDonalds boasts the highest sales
turnover and has opened close to two hundred outlets in Britain with plans
for opening between thlty to forty new units each year until the year 2000.
At this rate, by the end of the century, forty thousand people will be
working in McDonalds retail outlets (Wiggins & Lang 1985 op cit p.13).
Again, in the pizza market, Pizzaland started thirty one outlets in Britain
during 1984, followed by a further thirty during the following year.
Major independents and susidiaries of multinational corporations are
growing at a dramatic rate. Concentration, therefore is proceeding on a
massive, international scale. When Pepsico, the American soft drinks giant,
bought Kentucky Fried Chicken from Nabisco at a cost of £570/$850 million,
Kentucky's six thousand and five hundred restaurants with an annual
turnover of $1.3 billion were added to Pepsico's existing stock which
Include Pizza Hut and Taco Bell outlets, giving it a total of over 14,000
restaurants worldwide (Financial Times 25th July 1986 p.1). Intensif led
competition from foreign-owned companies has led British firms to
rationalise and restructure their operations. Wimpy, for instance, as one
of the leading franchise chains, has sought to upgrade the quality of their
products and increase the rate of turnover by a f5 million (in 1983)
investment programme in new cooking technology, moving from predominantly
a waiter to a counter service. 	 In the same year, this resulted in the
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closure of fifty two existing outlets arid the opening of sixteen new outlets
in new locations (Popular Foodservice 1984/5 op cit pp.44-45).
The precise impact of the investment boom on the Chinese fast food trade
is difficult to assess due to the lack of comparative statistical data.
However, it is clear from community sources of information that the market
position of Chinese businesses has only been maintained by considerable
shifts in the economic basis of the ethnic catering economy. Intensified
competition for the mass consumer market as the international chains gained
ascendancy entailed a choice of four main options for Chinese in the 'chop
suey house' operations of the 1960s.
The first was to seek employment on the wider labour market. However, for
many Chinese lacking industrial skills in the onset of economic recession
(which had become apparent in some industries during the 1960s) and a
social climate of growing popular racism, prospects were bleak. These
factors combined to exert strong pressure upon Chinese to remain within the
ethnic catering trade. A second alternative was to compete on the same
basis as the fast food giants but the very nature of Chinese settlement in
Britain entailed that most neither possessed nor were in a position to
raise the necessary capital resources. There were apparent exceptions, such
as Jo Kwan I{andarin Kitchens, a Chinese restaurant group which sought to
enter the factory kitchen market producing plastic sealed, reheatable meals
by means of franchised outlets. However, it was specifically Hong Kong
based, drawing its capital from outside the ethnic Chinese catering
industry in Britain. A third option was to move towards specialist haute
cuisine catering for a small but relatively lucrative market. whilst this
obviated the heavy cost of investment in expensive labour saving technology
necessary for competition with the fast food giants, the limited market
size and problems of recruiting adequately skilled cooks restricted the
numbers of restauranteurs able to enter this market. The final alternative
was to continue to compete in the mass consumer market, substituting even
cheaper labour for costly labour saving technology by means of the family-
run take-away shop. This most accessible resort was consolidated by the
arrival of many Chinese families in Britain at the beginning of the 1970s.
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The early 1970s thus saw the demise of the cheap Chinese 'chop suey houses'
and the simultaneous growth of smaller capital units in the form of take-
aways and chip shops staffed by increasing numbers of family relatives
from Hong Kong who represented a ready supply of compliant workers. This
process has structured the experiences of most Chinese families in the fast
food industry, the following account being a typical example:
"Twenty years ago there wasn't any take-aways. It was all restaurants. 1'e
and my husband used to work in one of the big ones in the city centre. He
was just learning then, like me. It was no good as a job but what else
could we do'?. Then we got a job in this take-away for two years. He
worked in the kitchen and I worked at the counter. There was another cook
as well but he got the sack soon after because business wasn't very good
then - not enough customers. Then after two years, we'd saved enough and
bought the business, That was ten years ago. The old owner, he's got
another business now. That's where he works with his family. We run this
place on our own now, with our two sons."
Capitalisation and running costs for take-away or fish and chip shops are
considerably lower than for restaurants, as remarked by one restauranteur:
"Running a restaurant inva.l yes a lot of money. But to open up a take-away
only costs about a third of what it costs to open up a restaurant, The
profit margin is about the same - in fact it's more without the heavy
outgoings. All you need is one chef in the kitchen and one waiter at the
counter."
Chinese accountants informed that the average starting-up costs for a take-
away shop were between £10,000 and £15,000 for rented premises, but rising
anything up to £50,000 if premises were purchased. Restaurant start-up
costs, by contrast, were quoted as only beginning at £70,000, amounting
easily to well over £100,000 if a conversion of premises were required
(figures quoted were for the Birmingham and West 1'[idlands area only).
Interestingly, the difference was said to have magnified considerably over
the years. As it was phrased by one accountant, "Nowadays we're talking
about the big boys. The traditional old fashioned small chop suey houses
aren't around any more. These are high class places around now; interior
designers and the lot." Bank loans, personal savings and loans from family
and friends were the usual means by which take-aways and chip shops were
capitalised, bank loans accounting for the heaviest proportion of initial
outlay.
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For many Chinese, the move into take-away and chip shops also presented a
welcome opportunity to resume some semblance of family life, seriously
eroded by dormitory restaurant work and hampered by the statutory
requirement to demonstrate that incoming dependants could be accommodated
and maintained by their sponsor (see Chapter 3 for fuller discussion):
"Ny parents both worked for the same restaurant at first. Then my Kum got
a job as an orderly in a hospital and my father stayed in the kitchen as a
cook. But when she had my brother, she went back to the restaurant again,
part time in the kitchen. So most of the time I had to look after my
brother, feed him and change him and all that on my own. But I was only a
kid then myself. A few years after that, though, they got a take-away and
we moved to Stoke, so we could have our own place at last, That's when we
brought my sisters over from Hong Kong."
By far the most important consideration, however, is that the transition
from restaurants to family take-away shops also entailed a wholesale
redefinition of economic roles for a great many Chinese families in the
fast food industry. Becoming proprietors of small, family-run meal shops
actually meant that many waged workers joined the ranks of the petit
bourgeoise and that in their businesses, the family became the essential
unit of production. 'Petit bourgeois', however, is a description which
necessitates considerable clarification if its implications for the Chinese
community are to be understood clearly.
THE PETITE BOURGEOISIE DEFI1ED
Much of the extant sociological literature does not sharply distinguish the
'petite bourgeoisie' from the more general 'middle class', a term which has
been cast over a variety of white-collar, non-manual, technical and
managerial waged occupations (eg. Parkin 1971; Poulantzas 1975; Roberts et
al, 1977; Giddens 1981). A particularly important case in point are the
contemporary 'middleman minority' theorists (eg. Bonacich 1973; van den
Berghe 1981) discussed in Chapter 1. This lack of distinction serves to
confuse rather than clarify analysis principally because the petite
bourgeoisie occupies an objective relationship to the means of production
which is not shared by supervisors, bureaucrats, clerks, teachers and
skilled non-manual workers, etc. The petite bourgeoisie are circumscribed
by their use of capital in conjunction with their own labour in order to
140
generate an income. In this they differ from the vast majority of paid
workers, including those who might be ascribed to t:he category of 'middle
class', 'new middle class' or 'new petite bourgeoisie'. The latter are
defined (somewhat arbitrarily it seems) upon such highly relative criteria
as autonomy at work, supervisory functions, level of skill, income,
occupational 'culture' and political affiliations: those deserving specific
mention include the "market capacity" of workers (Giddens 1981), their
perceived status (Lockwood 1958) and the degree to which non-productive,
"intellectual" labour is required (Poulantzas 1975). ('Non-productive' was
meant in the sense of labour which does not directly realise commodities
that can be exchanged for profit.) In such a way, Poulantzas (in Wright
1978 p.55) was led to conclusion that the American proletariat accounted
for a mere twenty per cent of the country's workforce, whilst the "new
petty bourgeoisie" constituted seventy per cent.
Without diverting into the debates on productive and non-productive labour,
suffice it to say that such descriptive or impressionistic definitions of
the 'new middle class/petty bourgeoisie' provide precious little analytical
mileage for grappling with the transition in the Chinese community from
restaurants to take-away and chip shops and the objective and subjective
implications which follow from it, As stated by Wright (1978 op cit pp.49-
50)
"both productive and unproductive workers are exploited... In both cases,
the capitalist will try to keep the wage-bill as low as possible; in both
cases the capitalist will try to increase productivity by getting workers
to work harder; in both cases, workers will be dispossesed of control over
their labour-process. In both cases, socialism is a prerequisite for ending
exploitation. It is hard to see where a fundamental divergence of economic
interests emerges from the position of unproductive and productive labour
in capttalist relations of production."
Many of the emergent 'new middle class' occupations may afford greater
relative control over labour and the production process but their central
relationship to capital is essentially that of the paid worker. The petite
bourgeoisie in the Marxist sense, on the other hand,
"comprise those who make their living primarily by the exercise of their
own labour with their self-owned means of production (tools) or other
property (like a shop). They are typically self employed, small proprietors
or tradespeople, carpenters working in their own shop, tailors working for
their own customers, small merchants, and so on; in short, largely self
employed artisans and shop keepers." (Draper 1978 p.288)
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In short, whereas the petite bourgeoisie "denotes a specific class that can
be rigorously defined, middle class or middle classes has no fixed meaning
whatever; this term takes on a meaning only from its context and the
declared inten tion of the user" (ibid p.290). To this Bechhofer and
Elliott (1976 p.78) added, "The small businessman gets his living by mixing
his own labour with his own capital. The clerical and administrative
workers do not; consequently they have significantly different interests."
In the same vein, Scase and Gof fee (1982) drew the distinction between the
salaried and the entrepreneurial middle class to clarify the specific
position of the petite bourgeioisie in relation to capital.
Draper (1978 op cit) and Scase & Goffee (1982 op cit), were careful to
differentiate the petite bourgeoisie (referred to by Scase & Gof fee as the
'self-employed') from the small bourgeoisie (or 'small employers' to use
Scase & Goffee's term), although it was said that the two categories "shaded
off" in both directions, They were distinguished by "the degree to which
wage-labor figures in the enterprise. The petty-bourgeoisie earn their
living by dint of their own labor and. their own property; the bourgeoisie
live on earnings from the labor of others" <Draper 1978 op cit p.289).
Scase and Goffee (1982 op cit) added that the self-employed were "generally
dependent upon the unpaid services of their families and the utilisation of
domestic assets for business purposes" (pp.23-24), distinguishing them from
three other forms of entrepreneur/employer including the bourgeoisie proper.
However, it is essentially the position of the self-employed petit bourgois
as distinct from higher and more clearly defined forms of entrepreneurial
capitalist which concerns the present discussion.
A further qualification of the petite bourgeoisie suggested by Bechhofer and
Elliott (1976 op cit p.7?) was "the dominance of relatively low technology"
in production, which was "typically rather traditional and subject to little
alteration". This entailed "weakly developed forms of differentiation" in
the labour process, such that "the social organisation of work is simple,
the span of authority small, (andl the petit bourgeois concern cannot be
given a bureaucratic structure" (ibid). However, whilst the elements of
"low capital and simple material and social technology" which were said to
characterise the petite bourgeoisie nay well "hint at its anachronistic
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nature" (ibid) within the overall evolution of capitalism, it is important
to recognise the role of the class in the nascent stages of capitalist
development in specific industrial sectors. Examined from this perspective,
the particular circumstances of the petite bourgeoisie in each industry
sector can provide a valuable illumination of the precise point of
development in the process of accumulation within that industry.
THE PETITE BOURGEOISIE AID CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT
"In every capitalist country, side by side with the proletariat, there are
always broad strata of the petty bourgoisie, small proprietors. Capitalism
arose and is constantly arising out of small production. A number of new
'middle strata' are inevitably brought into existence again and again by
- capitalism (appendages to the factory, work at home, small workshops
scattered all over the country to meet the requirements of the big
industries, such as the bicycle and automobile industries etc),"
(Lenin 1949 Vol.15 p.39)
Lenin clearly acknowledged the persistence of the petite and small
bourgeoisie in capitalist accumulation, despite "the fundamental and
principal trend of capitalism' which was "the displacement of small-scale
by large-scale production" (ibid Vol.22 p.70). In the same way, Marx before
him had pointed out that
"Accumulation and the concentration accompanying it are, therefore, not only
scattered over many points, but the increase of each functioning capital is
thwarted by the formation of new and the sub-division of old capitals.
Accumulation, therefore, presents itself on the one hand as increasing
concentration of the means of production, and of the command over labour;
on the other, as repulsion of many individual capitals one from another."
(Marx 1954 Vol.1 p.586)
The case of Britain's Chinese in the catering industry is just one
illustration of this process. The general tendency towards capital
concentration on an international scale forges ahead cheek by jowl with the
persistence of the petit bourgeois family shop.
The production of commodities by the petite bourgeoisie (who employ no
labour in their independently-owned means of production) entails that
essentially, it falls outside the capitalist mode of production. However, in
so far as petit bourgeois production operates within a framework within
which ..apitalist relations predominate, it assumes a capitalist form and is
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assimilated into the capitalist system. Hence, in an abstract sense, the
petit bourgeois can be split into both capitalist (as owner of the means of
production and profiteer) as well as wage-labourer (producer of surplus
values), After this fashion, Draper (1978 op cit p.292) described the class
as representing "a living duplex, a class amalgam with an internal class
struggle of their very own, a social schizoid ("cut up into two persons") ."
As such, the petite bourgeoisie, on both an objective and subjective level
are squeezed from above and below, internalising within themselves the
contradictory interests of both ruling and working classes,
Subjectively, the petite bourgeoisie as property owners "can rejoice in their
identity with millionaires and thrill to orations on the Rights of Property"
(ibid p.292). As workers, "they can appreciate the grievances of the
working classes", sharing with them "a community of interest, especially in
the long run, with the proletariat as against the evils of the capitalist
system" (ibid). In short,
"Through the small amount of capital it owns, it [the petty bourgeoisie]
shares in the conditions of existence of the bourgeoisie; through the
insecurity of its existence, in the conditions of the proletariat."
On an objective level, "From above, they are crowded out by the pressure of
more efficient capitals and oppressed by the policies of a government
interested in the expansion of big industry •.. tandl suffer all the miseries
of the proletariat" (ibid pp.292-293). This already has been amply shown
-to be the case for the Chinese. Alternatively, "the poor mini-capitalist is
driven to supersweating in order to extract ... that which is needed to
balance the advantages of a bigger competitor" (ibid p.293). The
consequences of this condition for Chinese families in business and their
subjective responses to it are the subject of the next part of this chapter.
THE PETITE BOURGEOISIE AD THE CHI?ESE COMMUNITY
The prominence of Chinese fish & chip and take-away shops throughout the
UK in relation to the size of the ethnic population as a whole is a measure
of the prominence of the petit bourgeois class within the community. For,
as described above, virtually all of these are staffed by individual
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families. As stated above, the Home Affairs Committee (1984-85 op cit
p.xi) estimated the proportion of family-run fast food shops to account for
as many as sixty per cent of all Chinese presently engaged in the catering
trade (see also Chapter 3) but no substantiated information exists as to
their market share in the industry as a whole. From information gleaned on
Birmingham, however, Chinese family shops were approximately one fifth of
the city's five hundred and fifteen take-away food outlets (Birmingham City
Council, Environmental Health Department 1985), their proportion in relation
to larger concerns confirming the figures of the Home Affairs Committee
(1984-85 op cit). Less than one third of all Chinese catering
establishments employed any workers at all (West 1'idlands County Council
i986), larger restaurants with an average of ten to twenty staff accounting
for the majority of those which did (ibid). The few remaining businesses
with hired labour comprised an average of one to three staff.
For the majority of Chinese in the fast food industry, therefore, the family
is an Institution which structures both social and economic life, a
situation uncommon to most waged workers who sell their labour power
independently on the open market. Indeed, most of the petit bourgeois
businesses are entirely dependent upon the effortscffamily members, as
remarked by one Chinese accountant: "If they make money, it's because of the
family's contribution. If they had to pay the market rate for workers, the
businesses wouldn't survive." The profits from such family businesses were
not notably high. Accountants again confirmed that approximately half
made a nett profit of less than £10,000 per year, with only about ten per
cent managing to raise over £15,000 (for Birmingham only). One third of
family businesses were believed to be constantly struggling to remain
solvent, turning over roughly £600 per week (including VAT). Yet another
sixty per cent were estimated to turn over between £1,000 to £1,500 per
week, which was considered average. Only a successful five per cent
managed in excess of a weekly £3,000 business turnover. As such, business
ownership tended to change hands frequently, the average length of a
particular family business being five years. An accountant explained,
"These take-away businesses are not meant to be permanent. If people are
successful, they try to get rid of them and make some money. If not, they
cut their losses and get out."
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The Wong family were running a take-away shop above which they lived in
the south of Birmingham. It occupied a favourable position just off a main
road and business was considered good. The father and mother worked full
time and their son, still at school, worked part-time, yielding an annual
average profit level of £8,000. Mr Wong, however, worked an eighty four
hour week, his wife thirty five hours per week and their son approximately
twenty five hours per week - a weekly family total of one hundred and
forty four hours. Taking only two days off every year, the annual number
of hours worked by the Wong ±amily totalled 7,467. This entailed an hourly
rate for each person of £1.07.
The Wong's schedule was typical for the average take-away shop, as verified
by Mrs Tsoi, who worked in a similar establishment nearby.
"I work seven days a week - but only in the evening, not in the daytime.
We don't open for lunch but a lot of our friends do. We both work there at
night but we can have a rest during the day, although we've still got to
prepare the food for five o'clock when we open. Thursday, Friday and
Saturday we work quite hard in the day - cutting the meat, getting 1t
ready, chips, vegetables - things like that. Anna, our daughter, helps us
when she's on her school holidays and sometimes at the weekend but she' got
her school homework. Some of the stuff we get delivered but other stuff
we've got to get from the wholesale market, You have to get up early for
that. It's very difficult sometimes because we can't go to bed until about
two o'clock at night and the market closes by eleven in the morning.
Weekends, it must be two or three o'clock before we're even finished in the
kitchen. You have to clean everything after you've closed at night, you
know. There's a lot of cleaning."
Certainly, as acknowledged by Bechhofer and Elliott (1981 op cit p.194),
"This familial basis to the activity ... means that husbands, wives and
children are often bound together in the most basic task of earning a
living." This 'binding together' however, is not a neutral process but one
which is structured by family relations that are inherently hierarchical
and oppressive under capitalism. Such relations are rooted in the moulding
of the family as the locus of reproduction during the nascent stages of
capitalist development.
Reproduction refers to the reproduction of labour; procreation, feeding,
clothing, washing, socialisation and general regeneration of present and
future workers. These functions, to a varying degree performed within the
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private domain of the family, have been achieved historically through the
material and Ideological subordination of women both inside and outside the
family. In this way, the cost of socially necessary tasks entailed in
reproducing labour power (childrearing, cooking, shopping, cleaning, etc)
can be shrugged off by capital and the state. The oppression of women
under capitalism is thus crystallised in the institution of the family and
its persistence is integral to the maintenance of the economic system.
Marx (in Engels 1978 p.66) wrote of the family, "It contains in miniature
all the contradictions which later extend throughout society and its state."
Operating within a system in which family relations are structured upon the
subordination of women, Chinese family-run take-away and chip shop
businesses as a rule intensify women's oppression. Chinese accountants
confirmed that the vast majority of Chinese take-away shops (eighty per
cent was estimated) was registered in the sole name of the male head of
household and that in virtually all cases (ninety per cent or more was
estimated) no wages or salaries were received by family members, Women's
labour Is used directly to produce profit, yet the overarching relations of
the family within which this occurs means that women's economic roles are
consistantly subsumed within their roles as mothers, wives and
housekeepers, systematically eroding their latent strength as productive
workers. Moreover, the confinement of economic activity to the social
boundaries of the family effectively denies women any collective basis from
which to challenge their subordination, in that they have no organic link
with workers outside of the family business,	 In this way, the degree of
control Chinese women command in the family business is not measured by
their productivity but by individualised, informal negotiation. In some
families, the material differences in wealth between husbands and wives are
pronounced, depite an equal contribution to the running of the shop.
Relegated to two paragraphs under the residual heading of "Other Matters"
in the Home Affairs Committee Report (1984-85 op cit pp.lxxvi- lxxvii),
Chinese women were often noted to become "dependent on their husbands for
finances", "withdrawn" and "extremely isolated". This scenario, however, is
probably best described by one Chinese woman and her daughter.
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"After ten years we'd saved up enough money to start our own business. My
husband's uncle helped us out a bit though. It's hard work but at least now
we can all be together. My husband and me do the cooking and my son - he
can speak English you see - he works at the counter. I get very tired
sometimes because when I'm not working at the shop, I've got to look after
Linda, David and Susan, my other children. They're still at school. I don't
get a wage or anything. It's my husband's business, He makes all the
decisions. But he gives me pocket money whenever we can afford it. Most
of the time I'm too busy or too tired to spend it, though. Sometimes I go
to play Mah Jeung at my friend's house. A lot of Chinese like to do that -
or go to the casino, That's all there is to do at one o'clock in the
morning when we finish work. Some of my friends just go to the casino to
watch the Chinese films. They're not even interested in the gambling. It's
a very boring life really but what else can I do? There's nothing for me
here doing this work, that's the truth."
"My parents are always on the go. When you work in a restaurant, when your
time comes for a break, you can take a break, whereas in a take-away, you
know there's always something to be done, even if you're supposed to be
having a break. You're on the go constantly. My Mum spends hours
afterwards cleaning things up, just scrubbing everything. So, whenever they
have any time off, they're quite happy just to sit and relax. They get up
about ten, well, that's when my Mum gets up. Actually, it's my Mum that
does most things, come to think of it. Anyway, they open at noon and close
at two, Then from two till half past, they're pottering around in the
kitchen doing little things. Then at three they'll have an hour's break.
They might decide to go into town and do a bit of shopping or they might
just sit and do nothing. Then about four, the're off again, starting to get
ready for the evening, until about one, half one in the morning or maybe
later at the week-end. That's after my Mum's finished clearing up. She
works a lot harder than my Dad, now I think about it, because she does most
of the cleaning up and preparation and she looks after us as well. I don't
know how she managed when we were little."
Amongst the generation of Britain's Chinese whose childhood as well as
their adult life have been shaped by the fast food industry, there is far
less of a resigned acceptance of the relentless routine of the take-away or
chip shop. Many reflect bitterly upon their situations, as illustrated by
the two examples below.
"I came to England when I was eight to live with my parents. When I
arrived we lived in Norwich where my father was working as a waiter. I
went to school there until I was twelve and then my father got a little
restaurant near Newcastle, so we all moved up there. My father still lives
in Newcastle but he's finished his business now, He's unemployed. I think
it did quite badly. I'm not sure, though, because to be honest, my
relationship with my parents isn't very good. Everything was under my
father's control. If he said, "Do it", you had to do it. He was very
strict, Everything had to be done his way. All of us older ones, we've
left home. I think my mother's working, though, in a take-away. When my
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father had a restaurant, my uncle and I were working in the kitchen. He
did the cooking, I prepared the food and my parents and sisters did the
waitering. We got home from school about five p.m. and started working
about half past, until we finished at midnight - every day for six years.
It was so tiring. I wanted to carry on studying but my father wanted me
to work in the restaurant. They never asked me how I was doing at school,
or anything. It was always the business first but that's not for me.
Sometimes I could get a couple of' hours off but I'd have to go back and
work, No time to watch telly or anything. I just needed some room to
breathe. That's why I ran away from home."
"I've had my family up to here for nineteen years and I need a break. I
just want some independence. When you're born in this country you grow up
with two different sets of ideas - Chinese and English - and you've got to
try to cope with both of them. It's a real strain sometimes. I've had some
terrible rows with my parents. I think it was worse in my situation
because I had to work for them all the time. I felt obliged to do it you
see. I just felt I had to do it because they worked so hard and there were
eight of us and all these things. I really resented it when I was about
fourteen or fifteen, I couldn't go out most nights because I was working.
All my friends would go to discos and parties and I could never go because
I was working. I just used to look at my friends and how they lived with
their families and I'd get so jealous. Plus all that, I had my homework as
well. That was very important to me because for me it was a way out, We
had a little table in the corner of the shop and I'd spread my homework out
and do it when there were no customers about."
The drudgery of the take-away shop for many second generation Chinese has
taken its toll on their educational and social development, as recounted by
another woman and man:
"I didn't think anything of coming here, I knew my parents were here and
my older sister was coming with me. In those days, my Dad was a waiter
and my Xum was a kitchen help. They'd worked in lots of different places -
Ireland, Dublin I think, and Scotland, But that's before I came. By the
time me and my sister arrived they'd settled down in their own shop. It
was good business then. We helped sometimes, chopping potatoes for chips
and things like that. We helped quite a lot really, especially at weekends
because they were so busy. It was tiring but I didn't get any homework so
it didn't disturb my schooling. There wouldn't have been any time for it.
I didn't like school anyway. When I caine, I only knew simple English like
'pen' and 'pencil', so I didn't learn a lot. I just sat around and watched
what was going on. I was in a class where everyone was slow, you see, so
how could I learn much? There were only three girls including me and the
other two didn't like me, so that was that. }y parents were too busy to
teach me anything - my Dad speaks English, you see - so I never learned to
speak it, not having any friends or anything and working in the kitchen
every evening. All my friends now are from my village in Hong Kong."
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"You know at one stage, I had to get up about six o'clock In the morning, go
to the wholesale market, come home and unload all the stuff, have another
hour's sleep, get up and go in and do my exams. At that time, my father
was having serious business problems. It was doing very bad. and he
couldn't work because he was sick, His back and. his shoulder had gone from
all those years of using a heavy wok and carrying all the groceries.
Before we got a car he had to carry all the stuff from the wholesale market
on the bus everyday and the bus stop's about half a mile from the shop.
During that time my sister was a great help. She's the one that's worked
hardest for the take-away out of all us children. She even gave up college
for me to give me more time to study when I was eighteen because she said
I was more clever than her and I'd get further if she did more of the
business."
For many younger Chinese, educational progress has not only been hampered
by the demands of the family business over which they have no control, it
has also been peppered with racism. The observations of Garvey and
Jackson (1975 p.?) that "Chinese children are bullied all the time,
systematically, consistently" were widely confirmed, the example below being
typical of the general experience. Such stories, incidentally, did not
support the findings of Fichet's study (1976 p.18) on Chinese children, in
which he stated that they "displayed a high degree of contentment and
philosophic adjustment to their new life in England."
"I left school with one '0' Level. I wasn't capable of taking '0' Level
exams because of the language barrier. So when everybody in school was
studying for '0' Levels I spent most of my time doing art and sports,
nothing else. And I got into lots of trouble fighting, because of racial
harassment ) oh yes. To give you an instance, the first day in school, I had
a fight. The first week in school, I had five fights. They had me in the
middle, four or five boys around me and they just pushed me about. Oh
yeah, first day. First thing, this boy kept saying things to me, well I
didn't understand what he was saying so I didn't care but then he started
pushing me about. By lunchtime I bad about four or five of them around me,
all pushing. The next break I was so scared I hid in the cloakroom the
whole break. That was the first day. When it was time for going hone, I
went straight out of the school really quick. The someone pushed me from
the back and I fell over. It really got to me then. I'd had enough and
that's how it started. Then as it went on and on, I sought protection from
the teachers but they can't be there all the time, can they? You know, that
time I had in junior school, that was what made me get such a bad name in
secondary school. Because I'd suffered so much when I was a kid in that
school, I took full advantage of people when I got to secondary school,
which gave me such a bad name and really ruined my eduation - because of
the violence. So at sixteen, I thought "If this is education, I don't want
to know because I feel such a mess, there's no hope." But secretly I knew
that meant I'd be trapped in that take-away for the rest of my life."
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Racism is not confined to the school playground. 	 It figures in all
aspects of life in Britain. Family-run Chinese fast food shops which
exist constantly on tight profit margins are particularly vulnerable to
racists. For example, one Chinese family who ran a take-away shop above
which they lived, were suffering weekly deposits of refuse scattered on
the pavement outside their home and on their glass shop frontage, which
also had been purposefully cracked on. several occasions. 10 insurance
company would issue cover for this, so the family paid the cost of
replacing the glass every time. The police had been informed several
times of the incidents but had refused to intervene. After some months,
the take-away owner borrowed a video camera and managed to film the
perpetrators as they were committing the acts. He then personally
delivered the film to his local police station only to receive another
refusal to respond.
Another man who has spent most of his life working in the catering
industry in Britain told of his varying encounters with racism:
"Twenty years ago it was very bad, like for my father's generation. They
actually spat at you in the street. He went to a pub for a drink. When
he finished it, the barman actually smashed the glass in front of him
because he said a Chinanian had drunk out of it and lie didn't want it
anymore. That was only in some places, not every place, of course.
When we had a take-away in Angelsey, there was this youngster and he
always used to make trouble. So we didn't serve him; we wouldn't serve
him anything. So he said, "If you don't serve me I'll smash your glass."
Then he just walked to the door and smashed the glass.
We knew everybody there because it was a very small village. But even
though you knew them, they were still bad to you because they thought if
you're Chinese, you're different to their people. They would come into the
shop and shout and sing and make a loud noise. They just liked to cause
trouble for you, even though you knew them. We did ask them to keep the
noise down but once you asked them, they got even noisier. Some of them
didn't want to buy anything. They just came in to cause trouble. They
liked to show off to their friends, It used to happen most weekends.
Because people didn't work weekends, they'd go out for a few drinks and
then they'd start causing trouble. Some of them were very friendly at
other times. When they hadn't had any drinks at all they were very good
friends with you. They were regular customers and nice to you. But once
they'd had a few drinks, they came for trouble. It was because we were a
different kind of people to them. If we were the same kind of people as
them, they wouldn't have done those sort of things. It does make you feel
bitter about them when you're having to face it every day. But I think
Angelsey was a backward place. What I mean is the people were all very
conservative because there wasn't much going on there. Other places I've
been, the people don't make such a song and dance if you're a foreigner."
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CAPTTAL, LABOUR AND THE CHINESE COMMUNITY
Clearly for many Chinese, the task of running a fast food shop as a small
family business is not a particularly rewarding experience. It is fraught
with economic insecurity, long and unsociable hours of work (which
compound the social disorientation that accompanies emigration), low
levels of remuneration and racist attacks. Producing meal commodities
within the asymmetrical sphere of the family binds both women and
children still further into their subordination. Their labour is crucial
f or the survival of the business but they are denied the economic
independence offered by employment on the open labour market, The
isolation of the petit bourgeois niche acts as a self-perpetuating trap to
the people caught up within it, with lasting effects for the second
generation. A childhood spent in meeting the unrelenting demands of the
family shop over individual needs has left many British-born Chinese with
little option but to continue to use their particular skills working in the
same trade, either as petit bourgeois entrepreneurs themselves (if they are
lucky) or as waged workers in the ethnic economy.
Net wages for waitering in city centre restaurants, both in Birmingham and
London ranged from an average of £120 to £200 per week, £150 being quoted
as about average. Working hours, however, were long and divided into
split shifts, the weekly total for most waiters averaging between sixty
and seventy five. Invariably, employers declared only a small percentage
of wages (approximately £30 to £70 per week) in order to make savings on
national insurance and tax contributions paid on behalf of their workers.
One waiter told how
"A lot of Chinese bosses don't give you a pay packet. They just give you
cash, so after you finish, you've got no proof you've worked there if you
want unemployment benefit. This boss here, we've asked him for our P60
more than five times and he keeps telling us excuses why we can't get it.
He won't show us any papers. He just sweet-talks us. Me and the cook, we
went down to the tax office about three months ago to see if we were
registered and they said they'd look into it but we haven't heard anything
from them yet."
Tied accommodation is still used widely, due to the long and late hours
demanded by restaurant work in city centres. These were the housing
conditions of one waiter in Birmingham.
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'There's five of us in this three-bedroom house. Four of us share
bedrooms, I share with another guy with a curtain across the room to
separate of f our parts. It's basic, very basic, but it's free so yo.0 can't
complain. There's no heating or anything like that so it's pretty cold in
the winter. And if you want hot water you have to put 5Op in the meter
and wait half an hour before it warms up. Anyway, we all get up about
half an hour before we have to start work, so we just wash in cold water.
It doesn't sound too good, does it? But for us it's just a place to sleep.
I'm just biding time until one day when I can get out of this business. I
don't want to live like that all my life,"
The relatively recent arrival of Chinese refugees from Vietnam has
provided some restauranteurs with an alternative source of cheap labour,
"They push the dim su trolleys around at lunch time for 1.5O an hour.
That's if the boss will hire them, Normally, they don't want to know
Vietnamese", it was told by a community worker in London's Soho,
Vietnamese Chinese as a rule are casually employed on a part-time but
permanent basis, Informal earnings by such means entails low pay and
minimal employment rights. Xost Chinese from Vietnam, however, remain
unemployed or consigned to other areas of low paid work (see Baxter 1986).
Racialism continues to be a feature of restaurant work. Unpid customers'
bills are still deducted from employees' pay and the police at best still
treat racist attacks and harassment as a 'civil' matter, showing what is
perceived by Chinese workers as obvious favour to racist offenders. Less
than one third of serious racist attacks an waiters were calculated to be
taken to court, whilst lesser Incidents generally went unreported (Chinese
Information and Advice Centre 1987). The following case, reported in 1tL
Limits (Hughes 1987 pp.6-7), is just one example,
"A group of customers decided to pay their bill In coins, stacking them up
in towers on the table. When they got up to leave, one knocked the piles
over, sending the money flying. When a waiter tried to stop them leaving
until it had been counted, a woman in the group hit him over the head.
The waiter - who had his hands full of dishes - pushed back, She
produced police ID, and said she was going to charge him with assault.
Another customer objected, and offered to be a witness for the waiter. He
was told to shut up, it was none of his business. When he announced he
was a journalist, the group apologised and left.
Bow St police station defends its record of dealing with incidents, and
describes its relationship with the community as good. 'They don't
understand the limited powers we have..."
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The widely publicised case of "The Diamond Four" (1987) is another recent
example in which four Chinese waiters each were sentenced to two years
imprisonment for affray following a violent fight started by a group of
drunken customers refusing to pay their bill. Whilst it was one of the
waiters who originally called for police assistance, it was the customers
whom the police escorted to hospital whilst the waiters were taken
straight to Bow Street police station, denied access to an interpreter or
solicitor and offered no medical attention until after they had been
charged. No statements were taken from Chinese witnesses (either workers
or customers) despite names being offered and none of the waiters
sentenced had any previous police record.
Local community workers told of informal "walk-outs" by restaurant staff
in London's Chinatown at an average rate of three per year. The
competitiveness of the Chinatown labour market combined with the absence
of uniorilsation and formal recognition, however, militate against more
sustained and effective collective action. There are numerous examples of
failed attempts by Chinese workers to assert their rights against Chinese
employers. During 1986, for instance, one waiter wished to persue action
through an industrial tribunal against his new employer who had flatly
dismissed all employees upon acquiring ownership of the restaurant. A
local Chinese community employment worker who offered him support was
vicously beaten by two henchmen in front of both the employer and the
acieved waiter, who subsequently dropped the case. The most successful
incident to date has been an official (Transport and Geneneral Workers'
Union) strike by four Chinese workers employed at the Brighton branch of
Wheeler's Restaurants (1986 -1987), Mobilising considerable support both
amongst Chinese workers in London and from the local labour movement, the
strikers were offered an 'out-of-court' compensatory settlement of 2O,OOO
between them in respect of unfair dismissal. li[any other Chinese workers,
however, feel such action was only possible against a non-Chinese
employer.
In addition to restaurants there are a range of food-related companies -
manufacturers, wholesalers, distributers and retailers - where wages and
conditions are rarely better than for waitering and cooking. One example
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was a trip le faceted operation which manufactured beansprouts and
supplied Chinese businesses with frozen foods and mushrooms. .Employees
numbered approximately twenty five, only half of whom were Chinese, The
others were Irish, Afro Caribbean, Asian and English. 	 These were the
experiences of one former worker:
"The workers between themselves were very nice. We all got on. But the
boss, he was miserable and nasty. Whenever he liked, he would order you
down to his office and moan and groan about you to your face, like "you're
ripping off the company." Sometimes he would tell the drivers they had
stolen a bag of beansprouts or some mushrooms when they made deliveries.
Then he would tell them they were too lazy and should do more to get more
cutomers and spend less money, like on petrol or something on deliveries.
He would moan and groan and. say "I'll sack you if you don't get better"
but with no real reason.
There was this old man who was like a night watchman for the company.
In the daytime he helped to pack the beansprouts but he was working there
twenty four hours a day, seven days a week, because upstairs in the
warehouse they provided him with a bedroom. It was quite a nice bedroom
compared to average. But he had to sleep in the place and make sure it
was okay during the night and for that they only gave him £30 to £40 a
week, something like that. I would imagine he was around sixty. Mary, my
friend, she used to get his shopping and I asked her one day, "Why do you
do it?" And she told me, "Do you know, they won't let him out", Not at
all. Not in the daytime, not at nightime, rio holiday, nothing. At
nightime, they just locked him in. There was about two or three locks on
the outside main door. And as far as I know, that was the only way out,
so if there was a fire or anything, he would just stay locked in there. Or
if he had a heart attack or anything, no-one would know. Because he was
illegal, he couldn't get a job anywhere else, so he had to take anything so
he could support his son, who was at college in London. The boss said he
didn't want him to get together with his friends or anything and steal
some beansprouts or mushrooms or something else. Then when he opened
that wine bar, he told him he didn't have enough money so he just sacked
him. But he was always spending money on himself. Just after he sacked
that man, he bought his son a Rolls Royce electric toy car, like a peddle
car but electric. So I didn't believe he was broke. I think he just
sacked that old man just to warn the other workers. That man got nothing
at all, just the sack.
Mary, the other day she was telling me, she works overtime six days a
week, She only has one hour or half an hour off around five o'clock every
day. And she has to start at .30 until 12, when the wine bar closes, six
days a week, no holiday. And they pay her £160 a week. When she added
it all up, she worked out she was getting under £2 an hour, just like the
bar maid who only worked half the time she did. So she said it wasn't
worth it.
He promised to raise my salary but he didn't and he never gave me any
responsibility because he didn't trust me. He didn't trust anybody. It
was really depressing to go in eveay and hear him talk to the workers
like that. So I had a row with him and left."
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The English foreman of the company confirmed the general situation. When
asked about his wages, he replied
"They're airight I suppose. They didn't used to be, not when I first came.
In fact, this job is the lowest paid job I've had. Mind you, the last job I
had I was taking home over £70 a week, so I couldn't really expect to get
that kind of money again, could I? Not for someone like me. It was all
on commission you see. The reason why I left that job was because I
wanted to work regular hours - nine to five, Monday to Friday. But here
sometimes I work six to ten. Must be mad."
The Chinese owner of the company had a different view of matters.
"The one thing I really want to do is set up a better controlled business
- like a football team. I don't agree with some things about the English
way of life. That's why I need Chinese workers: the English won't work
Sundays. Another thing is the English are under contract to themselves -
not the company. In England they've got unions, where people gather
together to make trouble. I feel, the more people I employ, the more they
can gather together and organise against me. There's not much problem of
that here now because they're not very well organised. This ring leader
at the moment - he doesn't really care. I always sack them before they
have a chance to do anything if they look like trouble-makers. My
ambition is to get the capital back as soon as possible so I can invest it
in other things, like property or another business, not necessarily
Chinese ,"
Another growing business, a bakery and cake shop employing an ethnically
mixed workforce of ten, thrived on the flexibility of labour, as explained
by the owner.
"The workers don't have a specific pattern. They don't have a specified
time to work. They all do a little of everything. As long as it gets
done at the end of the day, that's all I care about, It has to be like
that, or else you go down the drain."
This man, who had himself experienced considerable superexploitation and
racism as a boy, also worked long hours for the business. Moreover, he
lived in the staff house (which he owned) "to be like one of the staff".
But unlike one of the staff, his immediate goal was "to get the business
running itself" so he could retire early and live on the profits. To this
end, the owner was seeking to employ labour as cheaply as possible.
"I'm actually trying to get two employees from back home to help run my
business, And I can tell you, it's a tough procedure. There's probably
people here who can do it but I want someone who is fresh ,.. - I mean,
someone who will bring fresh ideas to the business and improve the image
of the Chinese race in this country."
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Many companies which service the Chinese take-away shops and restaurants
do not employ an exclusively Chinese staff. Indeed, one large importer
and wholesaler remarked how such a practice was "bad for business". He
employed people of particular ethnic origin corresponding to particular
tiers within his organisation as an obstacle to collective organisation.
Chinese workers merely "fronted" his company in direct deals with the
public. Another owner of two supermarkets expressed the advantages of a
similar arrangement: "When you're running a restaurant, it's difficult to
get a good chef from Hong Kong. Nowadays you have to pay a high price
for It. But running a supermarket, I can get local workers."
CONCLUSION
The economic and social profile of the Chinese community in Britain has
changed dramatically over the last thirty years. During the 1960s most of
the Chinese arriving from Hong Kong and China were men who entered the
'chop suey house' trade as cheap labour, a situation created by the
development of colonial Hong Kong tied to the interests of the domestic
British economy. Vithin ten years, however, the fragile market position
maintained by the small scale Chinese capitalists was usurped by
multinational fast food conglomerations, following the inevitable logic of
capitalist accumulation in the food catering industry. In response, many
Chinese resorted to self employment, opening family shops selling similar
food to the 'chop suey houses' which preceded them except with lower
overheads and fewer outgoings. Necessarily dependent upon the
supersweating of family labour, however, these take-away food shops are a
microcosm of exploitation and oppression for women and children in
particular, often storing dire consequences for those concerned.
As the pace of technological development and competition heightens within
fast food catering, the relatively static market position of the small
Chinese family shops reflects the diminishing significance of the ethnic
petite bourgeoisie in the industry and the increasing marginality of
ethnic Chinese capital aainst the international grip of companies like
XcDonalds. Conversely, but again in line with the laws of capitalist
development, there has also emerged a small but nonetheless distinct
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bourgeoisie within the Chinese catering community in Britain. As they
consolidate their operations, the polaried interests of capital and labour
within the Chinatown economies become crystallised such that class
divisions cut deeper than ethnic solidarity. In the light of this
contemporary situation, the final chapter returns to the original dichotomy
posed between culturalist and historical materialist analyses for
understanding Britain's Chinese 'business' community, ending with a
consideration of the political initiatives which flow from them.
.
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CHAPTER 5
GONCLIJS IONS AID PROSPECTS
INTRODUCTION
This last chapter draws together the central themes and findings of the
study, arguing conclusively for an alternative way of understanding the
apparent 'business' orientation of the Chinese community to that most
commonly adopted. Since the main points of contention are in terms of
analytical perspective, the fundamental argument o this thesis is not
limited to an understanding of the Chinese exclusively. Therefore,
following a review of the implications of political economy analysis for
the main subject of this study, the discussion is finally broadened to
address some of the wider political issues which project from it.
THE STUDY
Fundamental considerations of methodological approach are seldom taken up
in the plethora of studies which address themselves to the entrepreneurial
endowments of ethnic communities. All too often, cultural myths and
popular stereotypes are preferred to any serious analysis of the historical
material conditions which have structured the situations which it is
attempted to explain. In the case of the Chinese, this has led to the
reinforcing of the Idea that the economic and social existence of many
Chinese communities throughout the world somehow continues to be defined
by the enduring customs of traditional China. The work of Light (1972 &
1980 op cits); Wong (1979 op cit) and Bonacich (1973), to name but a few,
are cases in point.
This study has sought to penetrate beyond simple description of the
phenomenal world and the rhetoric of culturalism. Guided by the analytical
methodology of 1'arxist political economy, it has rejected implicitly the
explanatory value of ideal typical constructions and culturalist, idealist or
biological generalisations. As Engels [1] wrote,
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"Men make their history themselves, only they do so in a given environment
which conditions it, and on the basis of actual relations already existing,
among which the economic relations, however much they may be influenced by
the other - the political and Ideological relations, are still ultimately the
decisive ones, forming the keynote which runs through them and alone leads
to understanding."
The essential and definitive relations which characterise a society are
those of Its economic organisation of production. Under capitalism, society
is polarised primarily along the axis of capital and labour. Such a
starting point is not inherently crude and deterministic (a criticism often
levelled at Marxist studies) but one which seeks to recognise the totality
of dialectical tension between the economic base and the political,
juridical and ideological relations of the superstructure of a society at a
specific period in history. Indeed, it is only through a recognition of the
process of international capitalist development that a comprehensive
understanding of the economically distinct Chinese community in Britain can
be achieved. The mere fact of the ethnic niche in itself, however, affords
little analytical mileage. Therefore, it has been to the historical
dynamics of class conflict that this study has looked in order to
understand how the position of Chinese in the ethnic catering industry has
been structured and sustained.
This is what has been understood by Marx's premi, "It Is not the
consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary,
their social being that determines their consciousness" (Marx & Engels 1973
p.504 op cit). In order to interpret the specific, it is necessary first to
grasp the whole. To make sense of the subjective daily experiences of
Chinese people working in Britain's fast food catering industry requires
taking cognisance of the objective economic and political forces that have
shaped the nature of their migration. These have their roots dating back
as far as China's subordination to the expanding British capitalist empire
over a century ago.
The systematic incorporation of societies throughout the world into an
unequal global capitalist system has displaced countles populations. Prior
to sustained contact with the West, China had remained a relatively self-
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contained and static society for centuries. The asiatic mode of production
which characterised pre-colonial China mitigated against large scale
migration or trade and entrepreneurship. Subsistence agriculture for direct
domestic consumption supplemented by animal husbandry and handicraft
production had formed the basis of the traditional Chinese economy. Rigid
sexual divisions of labour were defined according to the convoluted
relations of family, lineage, village and clan hierarchies. Such
institutions were sanctioned and presided over by an autocratic bureaucracy
governed by an imperial despot. The advent of the capitalist colonisers
from the West brought this society to an abrupt end, destroying its
economic base and scattering millions of people throughout the world.
Chinese in the southeastern provinces (the area most accessible to Western
sea trade) suffered the worst effects of this penetration.
Men, women and children were scattered under indenture to the factories,
plantations and mines throughout the British empire and the New World.
Sometimes they worked alongside Black African slaves, such as in Cuba.
Mostly they filled the labour shortages left in the aftermath of the
abolition of slavery. It was this "coolie" diaspora that stamped a common
economic, social and political distinctiveness upon the establishment of
many overseas Chinese settlements throughout the world.
This process did not develop in a uniform way. In societies like Peru and
Guyana, Chinese freed finally from indenture largely became integrated with
the local economy and society. In other situations, such as that of South
Africa, a tightly regulated flow of Chinese labour ensured that "coolies"
were deported as soon as demand ceased. Where more favourable rights were
offered to longer established ethnic populations as formal colonial
domination receded, (sharecropping rights to freed slaves in Jamaica and
socio-economic priveleges to native Malays in Malaysia being two examples),
many local Chinese were relegated to economically marginal lines of
subsistence, such as self-employment and small scale trading. Throughout
southeast Asia, the association of the Chinese presence with the era of
Western colonial rule has rendered Chinese communities particularly
vulnerable to being scapegoated for the devastation caused by Western
imperialism.	 In such situations, Indonesia and Vietnam being extreme
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examples, the economic and social isolation of local Chinese has become
acutely pronounced.
In countries of the Old Commonwealth, (America, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand and not least, Britain), official and unofficial 'white' population
policies have systematically subordinated Chinese labour, legally,
economically and socially. Disseminated thpw'ugh the press of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, horror stories of the "yellow
peril" popularised anti-Chinese feeling.	 They peddled ideas of inherent
animosity between Chinese and indigenous workers, justifying racist laws
and contributing to a climate ripe for anti-Chinese agitation. Such
strategies successfully weakened organised workers during periods of labour
unrest. Britain's particular course of Chinese exclusion from the domestic
labour market is charted in the Merchant Shipping Acts of 1894 and 1906,
the Aliens Act of 1905, the 1914 Aliens Restriction Act and its Amendment
of 1919 (the same year of anti-Chinese 'race riots' at Cardiff, Newport,
Barry, South Shields, Liverpool, London, Manchester and Glasgow). It was
under conditions such as these that the ethnically exclusive Chinese
laundry shops became established.
Today, the ethnic Chinese economy is grounded quite firmly within the
catering industry in Britain. However, as some might believe, this is not
tie product of deep-rooted cultural mores re-emerging under a more liberal
environment. Once again, the historical material factors conditioning this
cituation provide the answer as to how and why it has arisen. These start
with the development of British Hong Kong in the economy, geography and
polity of South East Asia. Its unique political and geographic
circumstances gave rise to the colony's rapid industrialisation immediately
following the end of the Second World War and Mao's rise to power in China.
The swift transformation of agricultural production from rice cultivation to
vegetable cash cropping that this entailed during the 1950s and 1960s
dispossessed many former rice farmers of their livelihood. To obviate the
social effects of this process, emigration to Britain was encouraged by the
colonial administration.
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The migrants came at a time when the general demand for workers in the
declining manufacturing and emergent service industries was coming to an
end.	 The conditions under which Chinese entered Britain was therefore
structured by the demands of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, of
which the underlying aim was to syphon workers more specifically into
sectors of labour shortage by means of the work permit and voucher system.
The work permits under which the vast majority of Chinese migrated
required that a job be procured before departure and that the Department of
Employment be satisfied that no other suitable workers already in Britain
were available to do the work, Moreover, permits and vouchers were issued
for an increasingly narrow range of occupations, namely in hospitals, hotels
and catering (for which there was an exclusive quota system until 1979
(Phizacklea 1983)). Bound by these strictures, the largely unskilled New
Territories Chinese were left with little option but to exploit their
ethnicity as a specific qualification for entry to Britain, As such, they
swelled a specialised niche in the burgeoning catering industry which
relied specifically upon Chinese labour to serve Chinese food. Once the
informal channels had become established to facilitate migration in this
way, they quickly became viewed in Hong Kong as the standard route for
entry to Britain. However, to understand how the Chinese community was
subsequently affected by further developments in catering necessitates a
more specific examination of the historical course of the industry.
Consuming food outside the home (whatever its ethnic character) was
something that had become launched on a massive scale during the Second
World War. Maximum productivity demanded by the exigencies of war at a
time when millions of younger men (many of the most productive workers)
were conscripted into armed service meant that women filled their places in
the labour force, drafted into the 'War Effort'. To ensure most efficient
use of their productive labour, subsidised meals were introduced to the
general public on an unprecedented scale, socialising a particularly
laborious reproductive task prec-iously performed by women in the home.
This provided the initial stimulus for the development of catering
production. Yet as the War drew to a close, state control of public meal
provision (with the exception of institutional provision in schools and
hospitals) had already begun to give way to private interests. By the end
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of the War, meal prices rose as a result of the rapid deceleration of
investment into catering production and the withdrawal of state subsidy.
However, as increasing numbers of women re-entered the labour force during
general conditions of post War economic expansion, so too grew the
potential market for 'eating out', precarious though it was. This market
was met largely from low investment, low profit small scale enterprise.
The key to success in post War popular food catering was cheap and flexible
labour. The colonial status of Hong Kong rendered Chinese workers from the
:New Territories a ready source. Channelled into 'ethnic' catering jobs as a
result of the imposition of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act and the
special quotas set aside for workers in hotels and catering, Chinese
migrants made use of informal networks between Britain and Hong Kong to
facilitate immigration sponsorship, employment recruitment and housing.
Whilst such a system allowed many Chinese to gain their first foothold in
Britain, it was nevertheless predatory and highly exploitative of catering
workers, The lifestle demanded by working in the ethnic Chinese catering
niche was unsuitable for family settlement such that the majority of women
and children remained in Hong Kong supported economically by husbands and
fathers in Britain. Eventually, however, they too emigrated under the
threat of increasingly stringent immigration controls, often after years of
separation. In the ethnic economy in Britain many Chinese women and
children suffered acutely from the double burden of being economically and
socially dependent upon husbands and fathers as well as employers. This
compounded the disorientation caused by uprooting and moving to an
unfamiliar and hostile society.
The 1970s marked a watershed in the fortunes of Chinese catering, for it
was beginning in this period that the American-led onslaught of fast food
catering outlets brought about a relative decline in the market share of
Chinese 'chop suey houses'. This change represented more than just a simple
shift in market positions. The growth of large, fast food capital was
predicated upon a concerted effort both to raise the productivity of
catering labour and to transform the mass consumer catering trade from the
narrow confines of craft based production to factory production. This was
achieved by massive investment in the technological assets (or 'fixed
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capital') of catering production leading to a rise in the organic
composition of catering capital. The economies of scale achieved by the
fast food chains immediately undermined the competitive position of smaller
scale craft based capital units such as 'chop suey houses'. Thus, the
expansion of the popular market for 'eating-out' continued apace with the
capital costs of production, the rate of competition and the squeeze on
profits, In short, the fast food boom induced a rationalisation within
popular food catering - part of the endless 'shake-out' of capitalist
competition. Seen within this context, it was clearly the economics of
necessity rather than individual preference that forced large numbers of
Chinese into operating smaller, cost-cutting family take-away shops. The
transformation of the Chinese catering industry was not, however, an
automatic or mechanical process but one which rested upon the conscious
decisions of those concerned. This discussion has sought merely to
identify the factors which informed those decisions. These included not
only the competitive pressures of the fast food expansion but also by the
rise of organised racism, shrinking job opportunities in the general labour
market and the availability of family labour, making the option of running
a small business appear the most accessible,
Hand-in-hand with the economic shift within Chinese catering towards
smaller, family-run take-away businesses went a transformation of the
social class composition of the Chinese community. From being
predominantly waged workers, a large number of Chinese joined the ranks of
the petite bourgeoisie. Contrary to popular belief, however, there is no
evidence to suggest that turning to self-employment in order to retain a
foothold in the trade represented any material social or economic
advancement. Indeed, running a family take-away shop has been commonly
viewed by those concerned as a socio-economic trap in which the conditions
of self-exploitation and oppression within the family are invariably
intensified. women and children have borne the brunt of this, such that
their limited opportunities for economic and social integration have
remained virtually static over a generation. At the same time, the
conflicting interests between capital and labour within the Chinese
community remain as fraught as ever, despite common illusions in the bonds
of Chinese ethnicity.
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CO}91UITY AID CLASS
In so far as the abundant cultural stereotypes about the Chinese often find
support from Chinese people themselves who purport to speak on behalf of
the community, the structure of 'community' politics deserves careful
consideration. There are two perceivable strands to Chinese community
politics; that which tends to be represented by community workers (almost
invariably maintained by the state) and that which represents the more
self-organised sections of the Chinese population. The former are widely
recognised as voicing more 'grassroots' concerns since they are cast
necessarily into the professional role of 'service deliverers'. However, the
extent to which community workers champion 'grassroots' causes varies
considerably. A prodigious example is the Chinese Information and Advice
Centre in London, which is noted for its high profile campaigning role in
exposing and combatting oppression and exploitation within the ethnic
community. However, it is an exception to the rule.
The other, more self-organised aspect of Chinese community politics is
heavily dominated by business interests, It is the 'community politicans'
thrown up by this arena who are the most vociferous in promulgating
cultural stereotypes and ethnic insularity. An example of this was a
statement made emphatically by a noted businessman and. Secretary of a
regional Chinese association:
"Chinese people love the family - not the individual person. They've got a
very different attitude to work,	 If they don't get any time off for a
month, they will know it's for the good of the family. It's the family
that's the basic unit, not the individual. This is very-rooted in Chinese
culture. English people don't understand it."
Another example was the very wealthy Chair of a Reataurarteur 'a Association
in London, who told an officer of the London Borough of Westminster, "We
are a proud, self-help community. We neither need nor want grants from the
government like some other ethnic minorities." Similarly, Robert Ng in an
article entitled "My People" <1986 p.32) asserted that "accepting state-help
is seen by some to have brought some degree of dishonour or 'lost-face' to
one's family, since traditionally, our teaching has been 'self-help' and
'self-reliance' in order to keep our heads high."
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Whilst virtually all Chinese community organisations are beaded by the rich
and powerful, they nevertheless draw significant tacit support from the
petite bourgeoisie and even some Chinese workers. This is due to reasons
which relate to the specific conditions of Chinese settlement in Britain.
Firstly, the general history of the Chinese community within the last
twenty years has been characterised in large part by self-employment and
small business ownership which mitigate against class collectivity. Hence
the politics of the ethnic community strike a large degree of resonance
with the Chinese experience. At the root of this, however, is the level of
racism in society which has created a situation in which racial
subordination and ethnic divisions are part and parcel of living and
working in Britain for most Chinese. In this sense, the 'ethnic platform'
of the community politicians accommodates the experiences of racism and
economic ghettoisation that many (especially working class) Chinese have
confronted in migration, The other side to the coin is that the economic
and social marginalisation of the ethnic catering industry has actually
made sustained unionisation or labour organisation extremely difficult.
Chinese employers are in general vehemently anti-union and in the larger
cities where there is a large Chinese presence, some have consolidated their
economic power through informal syndicates which act as a strong economic
and physical deterrent to those who may wish to organise in opposition.
For the successful ethnic capitalist there is a distinct material benefit to
be gained from the continued oppression of the majority of Chinese in
Britain, for this ensures that they remain a cheap and captive source of
labour. The politics of cultural determinism, political sectionalism and
ethnic insularity therefore reflect and strengthen their specific ethnic
class interests. The ethnic bourgeoisie may still be oppressed on one
level; they still may suffer a degree o± economic and social confinement
and in this sense they may be drawn towards anti-racist posturing.
However, the benefits they derive from an unequally structured capitalist
system place their interests in a qualitatively different position from
those they employ, whether Chinese or non-Chinese. It is their ideas which
.dominate a large section of community politics at the present time,
reflecting in microcosm Marx's maxim that "the class which is the
prevailing material force of society is at the same time its ruling
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intellectual force" (Karx & Engels 1975 op cit in Callinicos 1987 op cit
p.99). Because the very nature of Chinese 'community politics' Is rooted In
ethnic difference and cultural distinction, it is an arena ripe for ethnic
entrepreneurs with a stake in the status quo.
Castles et al (1984 pp.215-220) discussed the role of ethnic bourgeois and
petit bourgeois community leaders In relation to the containment of
potential social disruption to the system: "State strategies of crisis
management are designed to offer privileges to the minority petite
bourgeoisie, in order to secure their c000peration as agents of social
control" (p.216). Indeed, the hegemony of 'community politics' amongst
Britain's Chinese is both underpinned and strengthened by the local and
national state. A good example of this was the case of an owner of a
thriving restaurant chain (and notable 'community politician') who was only
narrowly unsuccessful in obtaining substantial grants from his local
Economic Development Unit and Xanpower Services Commission to train young
Chinese waiters and cooks for his restaurants through the Youth Training
Scheme. This project, although unsuccessful, was only one of a myriad of
ethnic business initiatives which do recve sponsorship by the state in
part recognition of the economic opportunities denied to black and ethnic
minorities. The apparent contraditions and complexities which immediately
present themselves in such situations, however, merit careful consideration
if their full implications for those concerned can be understood clearly
and in context. This is attempted in the final section of this thesis.
MANAGING THE CRISIS: ETHNIC MINORITIES AND SKALL BUSINESS PROXOTION
By dealing with some of the more wider reaching issues of the day which
relate to the position of the Chinese in Britain, the practical significance
of the study is brought to the fore. As a strategy which has been adopted
by both the Parliamentary Left and Right over the last few years, the
encouragement of Black and ethnic small businesses has caused considerable
confusion amongst its practitioners, such as in the case described above.
Often, the-confusion remains unresolved, mainly through a lack of clarity-of
understanding. This study of the Chinese, however, hopefully contributes
168
towards clearing the way for the essential nature of the problem to be
grasped.
The positive encouragement of ethnic minority interests (of whatever
nature) is commonly perceived to be a recognition of the disadvantage these
groups face and a desire to rectify the situation, For this reason,
promoting their business opportunities appears to be an act of anti-racism,
a principle espoused traditionally by the political Left. The argument runs
as follows: Black and ethnic minorities tend to be under-represented in the
business sector. This is because of racist practices by the banks
(especially in granting loans; see for example, Home Affairs Committee
1980-81 para 220) and other business institutions, compounding the general
context of racism which systematically has structured the inferior chances
of black and ethnic minorities for economic choice. In other words, "Small
firms owned by Britain's ethnic minorities suffer even worse disadvantage
than the small business population at large and are seriously under-
represented in the business life of Britain" (GLEB p.6). If disadvantaged
groups wish to set up business for themselves, then attempts must be made
to remove the potential barriers so as to facilitate their proportional
representation in the entrepreneurial sector and redress the imbalance. It
is on this basis that the popular appeal of the promotion of ethnic
enterprise has grown considerably over the last few years.
The practices adopted to promote ethnic minority businesses have assumed a
variety of forms. These have ranged from publicity (conferences, printed
literature, etc) extolling the economic and social benefits of Black
entrepreneurship to practical assistance in capitalising and developing
emergent initiatives. Local authorities, particularly in the larger cities
in which they are mostly Labour-led, have developed ethnic enterprise
schemes. The London Borough of Brent, for example, has established a Brent
Enterprise Centre and Hammersmith & Fulham Council has set up the Black
Business Development Association. Xany others provide Economic Development
Units with a specific brief to judge sympathetically projects proposed by
Black and ethnic minori..ties, a directive which recëves considerable public
exposure. Likewise, education authorities are offering an increasing number
of courses for the 'community entrepreneur', such as those run by the Ethnic
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Minority Business Development Units at the Polytechnics of Middlesex and
the City of London or South West London College's Community Enterprise
Section.
The translation of principles into policy practice has followed in the wake
of the Home Affairs Committee Report on "Racial Disadvantage" (1980-81) and
Scarman's Report (1981). Focussing upon the situation of Afro-Caribbean
businesses in particular, the Home Affairs Committee assumed without
question the 'regenerative powers' of the small entrepreneurial firm:
"Not only does self-employment provide an alternative source of income
particularly important for those who are disadvantaged or discriminated
against in their search for employment 1 but it also contributes to the
regeneration of the urban areas in which the majority of ethnic minorities
live. The previous Government stated in their 1977 White Paper that "the
minority groups living in inner urban areas need to be given a full
opportunity to play their part in the task of regeneration" and the present
Government have strongly emphasised the role of small firms in
regeneration in the inner city." (para 216)
The Report advocated correcting the racial imbalance of economic
opportunity through the proliferation of more Afro-Caribbean and Asian
businesses: "It is thus in the interests of the whole community that
obstacles to the full participation by members of any minority group in the
creation and running of small business should be removed" (ibid). The aim
was to create a situa;ion, described by Wilson (1983 p.63), in which
entrepreneurship could be seen "as one option in a range of economic
possiblities facing individual members of the non-white ethnic minorities."
Scarman's Report (1981 op cit), commissioned to investigate the "Brixton
Disorders" earlier that year was not centrally concerned with Black and
ethnic business. However, he did note (pp.167-168) that
"The encouragement of black people to secure a real stake in their own
community through business and the professions, is in my view of great
importance if future stability is to be secured... A weakness in British
society is that there are too few people of West Indian origin in the
business, entrepreneurial and professional class."
The conception of the regenerative role of small business voiced by the
Home Affairs Committee and Scarman has been expressed also by the
Commission for Racial Equality:
"We believe that a genuine and equal partnership between the black business
community and government and private sector agencies could be a powerful
force for revitalising economic development in areas which so desperately
170
need a substantial and speedy injection of entrepreneurial spirit and
activity."
("Black Business Report: A Strategy Paper", March 1986 p.9)
THE IDEOLOGY OF THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY
The economic reasoning in favour of promoting ethnic enterprise articulated
by the CRE and accepted implicitly by Scarman and the Home Affairs
Committee stems from the contemporary popular faith in small businesses
for wealth creation, urban regeneration and a solution to the present crisis
of capitalism. It is the ethos of 'the moral economy' (Bechhofer & Elliot
1976 op cit).
Pressure to ratlonalise production by squeezing out least efficient capitals
and encouraging investment in the most profitable sectors, triggered by
international recession following the oil crisis of 1974, has posed
problems of management for many world governments. Not least of these has
been the British state, which has presided over a declining economy and
falling competitiveness for over a decade. Keynesian policies of
expansion, through which it was hoped to resolve the crisis by massive
state 'spending', soon were dropped in favour of a strategy wedded to the
ideals of the traditional, liberal 'free market' upon the election of
Thatcher's Conservative government in 1979, This change of strategy made
small business ownership a central plank of government attempts to revive
the flagging fortunes of British capitalism. As Bechofer and Elliot (1976
op cit p.197) put it,
"With the economies of the West in some disarray, with the fear of deep and
lasting economic recession, the orchestrated protest of small business has
helped carry into power a number of right wing governments which will try
(in more or less good faith) to protect and even to restore the moral
economy of the petite bourgeoisie."
In what Andrew Gamble (1974) has termed 'the politics of support', the
ideologues of the 'laissez-faire free market' argue that Britain's economic
decline is attributable to the decline in the moral fibre of the population.
More specifically, they believe that the traditional values of property
ownership and enterprise have been obscured and thwarted by an overly
bureaucratic state which has created since the War a nation (or rather, a
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working class) paralysed by its dependence on social welfarism. To restore
economic vitality thus demands breaking the dependence upon the state and
dismantling monpolistic trade, whilst encouraging entrepreneurship. Their
conclusions drew justification from The Brookings Report on the British
Economy (1969), which stated (p.375), "Business is a second choice (for the
best people) •.. they tend to retain the Civil Service as their model and
settle into a trustee role of gentlemanly responsibility that is hardly
conducive to rapid innovation," The ideals of 'the moral economy' have been
clearly articulated by Thatcher herself (15/03/76 Conservative Party
Council, Harrowgate), as Bechoffer & Elliot (1981 op cit p.94) pointed out:
"Hope is being strangled and as a result those indispensable qualities of
imagination, enterprise and drive are being stifled... Self reliance has
been sneered at as if it were an absurd suburban pretension. Thrift has
been denigrated as if it were greed ... decent, honourable ambition ... and
to save and to acquire a modest capital or property is savagely penalised
by taxation."
Despite the growth of state and monopoly capital, the small business sector
as a whole remains bioyant because of its flexibility to respond to and
capitalise upon new and potential areas of production. In this way, the
competitive environment of the small business world is seen to engender
innovation and efficiency (see for example, Schumacher 1974). This stands
against what Jacobs (1969) described as the "sterile division of labour of
big business", which was said actually to discourage innovation so as to
preserve existing trading hierarchies. Because of this contrast the
relationship between small and large businesses is seen to be symbiotic, if
not essential to an advanced capitalist economy. Smaller firms could enjoy
the patronage of larger firms, which in turn had at their disposal a range
of cheap and flexible subcontractors, Thus, small businesses represent
what Bechhofer & Elliot (1974 op cit p.l23) described as "the custodians of
certain 'core' capitalist values": they embody society's greatest
entrepreneurial virtues, In line with this, small business owners are seen
as "the pioneers of economic progress ... 'generous' people; witness their
much publicised acts of benevolence and charity" (ibid p.17; see also C.
Wright Xills 1951).
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THE POLITICS OF THE SMALL BUSIIESS ECONDKY
The rhetoric of virtuous independent enterprise has been accompanied,
rather inevitably, by an array of political initiatives to encourage the
creation of small businesses:
"The aim must be to change the atmosphere and environment for the business
community, to create anew conditions in which men and women of independent
spirit will see it worth their while to use their skill and enthusiasm to
start or expand profitable enterprises. This must be the goal for all
business of whatever size, and the whole of Conservative economic strategy
should have that purpose." 	 (Conservative Central Office, "Small Business,
Big Future" cited in Scase & Goffee 1982 op cit p.12)
Since small businesses are believed to be not only a source of wealth but
also jobs, the deprived 'inner cities' have been targetted as areas for
particular attention in the attempt to curb rising unemployment and
industrial decline through small business generation. In this way, they are
seen to be a means to reverse the long-term pauperisation of urban areas.
In this vein, the prognosis of GLEB <op cit p.8), that "The creative
dynamism of London's ethnic minorities can be a major contribution to the
provision of jobs and the reversal of London's de-industrialisation" was
virtually identical to that of the Home Affairs Committee (1980-81),
Scarman and the CRE (1986 op cit p.2>: "The encouragement of ethnic
minority small business is a means of creating jobs and is part of the
process of regenerating the whole economy" [2].
Repeated civil disorder during the last decade, which brought Black people
very much under the spotlight, has forced central government to focus upon
the promotion of ethnic minority small businesses. 'Business in the
Community' set up in 1981 was one of the first central government
programmes of this nature. During its first five years of existence it was
involved in the creation of three hundred and fifty enterprise agencies, the
provision of venture capital resources for high risk small businesses, the
conversion of redundant buildings and the encouragement of company support
and training schemes (Rigby 1987). More recently, Employment Minister
Kenneth Clarke has announced plans to establish a nationwide network of
'black enterprise agencies' intended to create jobs in inner cities,
beginning with the opening of an experimental agency in North Kensington
funded by central government to the tune of £50,000 (London Standard
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11/2/87 p.5). Other initiatives include the Inner City Partnership
Programmes funded under the Urban Programme, which have adopted as a
principle the role of co-ordinating public and private sector investment
initiatives, in which the encouragement of small firms in the local
community became a major feature. The ethos of Partnership and similar
schemes have culminated in the creation of Enterprise Zones, another
concept which upholds the traditional petty bourgeois demand of removing
the 'over-regulation' of the state to provide a climate for 'freer trade',
The assets to capital and the capitalist state of the small business sector
were formally recognised in the Bolton Report (1971), the first official
government inquiry on the subject. In subsequent studies, the essential
reasoning of the Bolton Report has been unquestioningly upheld (for
example, the Wilson Report 1979; Kazuka 1980). The most important premis
disseminated by Bolton was that small firms were the seedbed of large
firms: in other words, 'great oaks from little acorns grow'.
"The private sector of our economy as we know it today originated almost
entirely through the establishment and growth of small firms. Almost all
the present large firms started off as small firms and grew, in one way or
another, to their present size." (1971 op cit para 3.7 p.29)
In this sense, whether amongst ethnic minorities or the majorit population,
the promotion of small businesses is a strategy which has made bedfellows
of both Conservative and Labour administrations, being rooted in the
economics of the 'moral economy'. The consensus, however, is grounded in a
right-wing solution to a right-wing analysis of the crisis, albeit daubed to
varying degrees with the veneer of anti-racism. Table 18 below summarises
some of the most important attempts by the state to put into practice its
ideological faith in the capabilities of small businesses.
Such intiatives have not been confined to the state machinery. Large
companies have to a limited extent also shown an interest in the promotion
of ethnic minority small firms. One example is the UHURU project in Tower
Hamlets, which received help from Business in the Community to set up new
businesses (Gibben 1987 p.29). The voluntary sector also has sought to
carve out a role in enterpreneurial development. Schemes such as the Paul
Bogle Enterprise Trust provide exclusive funding for black enterprise. The
Community Business Conference, to take another example, recommended that
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attempts be made to set up a London Wide Community Business Unit (Watling
1986),
TABLE 18: GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES TO ASSIST SMALL FIRMS IN BRITAIN 1979-81
1. Business Start Up Scheme
Outside investors buying shares in new small trading companies
obtain tax relief at rates up to 75% on investments of up to
10, 000 per year.
2. Loan Garantee Scheme
Government will garantee 80% of new loans for between two and seven
years, on values of up to ,75,000. The remaining 20% is carried by
the financial institution carrying the loan.
3. Other Financial Benefits
Coporation tax liability has been reduced. The VAT threshold has
been raised. Trading losses can be offset against tax more
generously. Redundancy payments of up to 25, 000 are free from tax
if the money is used to start a business.
4. Premises and Planning
An extension programme of' the building of small factory premises
has been undertaken. Eleven Enterprise Zones have been created
within which planning restrictions are much less onerous and where
rates relief is given over a ten year period.
5. Information and Statistics
The number of forms which government issues has been substantially
reduced. On the other hand, the businessman can obtain advice on a
variety of topics from Small Firms information Centres.
6. Employment Legislation
This has been relaxed for small firms employing less than twenty
people who are not liable for claims for unfair dismissal by
workers employed by the firm for less than 2 years,
7. Enterprise Allowance Scheme
Source: Storey 1982 p.211
What appears to be lacking in this affront of business development
initiatives is any challenge to the underlying logic of the 'small business,
moral economy'. It is not disupted that any programmes for entrepreneurial
promotion should encourage equitable Black and ethnic participation. Black
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and ethnic minorities have as much right as whites to be business owners.
What is challenged is the underlying assumption that black capitalism can
solve the economic crisis and put an end to racial inequality and
oppression any better than can white capitalism.
THE REALITIES OF BLACK AND WHITE S}ALL BUSINESS
Overall, the small business sector employs up to 4.4 mullion people and
produces approximately twenty per cent of Britain's total Gross Domestic
Product (Beclihofer & Elliot 1981 op cit p.93). Thus, whilst significant, it
clearly exercises only a minor share of control over the economy. In 1900
the top one hundred British companies accounted for only fifteen per cent
of total national output: by the mid-1970s they accounted for over half
(Hannah & Kay 1977 p.1). The numerical quantity of small firms does not
reflect their economic size, Indeed, even in terms of numbers, historical
evidence points to a long term decline in small businesses. Between 1911
and 1975 the amount of small business owners fell by fifty per cent (Scase
& Goffee 1982 op cit), a direct result of the accelerating pace of
industrial concentration. The reality of the small business sector is that
whilst it may be subject to short periods of revival and even growth, in
the long term it is subordinate to the economic power and interests of the
state and monopoly capital.
Such is the context which dictates life for Chinese in the ethnic catering
industry. The superexploitation necessarily demanded by the typical
Chinese family business intensifies the subordination of Chinese women and
children in a racist society. Jobs are certainly 'created' for members of
the family but often at the expense of personal social and material
development. Few jobs are generated outside the family. Those that are
tend to demand very long hours, a high degree of flexibility and offer
relatively low pay. Formally established terms and conditions of
employment are scant and the usual channels for negotiating improvement
are kept firmly under control by organised employers. As a result, most
Chinese ethnic catering workers hold an attitude of transience. to their
jobs, hoping one day ± or better opportunities. They remain in their jobs
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because they are aware of their limited chances on the open and racist
labour market,
History has shown that the Chinese have entered self-employment and Email
business employment because they have been left with little alternative, a
reflection of their economic subordination to the interests of large scale
capital and the state rather than of their entrepreneurial vigour. Under
these conditions, the 'upward mobility' of a small minority of Chinese has
rested upon the continued oppression and superexploitation of the majority,
as Chinese firms are forced into ever sharper competition with the capital
intensive, international companies in the catering industry. Factors such
as these are often ignored in the politics of ethnic small businesses
stimulation. Xore specifically, such politics fail to recognise how racial
oppression is rooted in the unceasing drive to accumulate profit, the
central principle of the capitalist mode of production. In this sense, the
social inequalities created under capitalism can never simply be 'reformed'
away by attempts to tamper with its symptoms. Attempts by a capitalist
state to encourage the establishment of a tier of people with a stake in
the system from the ranks of an oppressed minority is at best naive and at
worst reflects a cynical attempt to co-opt sections of the black and ethnic
population into managing the terms of racial oppression and class
exploitation. This was crystal clear to Bobby Seale (1968 pp.71-72), an
active leader of the Black Panther movement:
"Those who want to obscure the struggle with ethnic difference are the ones
who are aiding and maintaining the exploitation of the masses of the
people: poor whites, poor blacks, browns, Red Indians, poor Chinese and
Japanese and the workers at large .,, We fight racism with solidarity. We
do not fight exploitative capitalism with black capitalism. We fight
capitalism with basic socialism, And we do not fight imperialism with more
imperialism. We fight imperialism with proletarian internationalism."
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NOTES
CHAPTER 1
[1] There are abundant sociological definitions of culture. However 1 a
suggested complement the definition contained in the text would be Firth's:
"If society is taken to be an aggregate of social relations, then culture is
the content of those relations.., Culture emphasizes the component of
accumulated resources, immaterial as well as material.. ." (Firth, R: Elements
of Social Organization, Watts, 1952, p.27)
[2] The term 'Asian Americans' refers to people living in America who are
of Far Eastern descent. This contrasts with British terminology, in which
the word 'Asians' signifies people from the Indian sub-continent and their
descendants.
[3]For a fuller disCussion of Park's concept, see
Stonequist, E.V: The Marginal I'Ian: A Study in Personality and Cuiture
Conflict, Russell and Russell, 1961, New York
[4] Although the social relations which characterised traditional Chinese
society were not identical to those of European feudal society, they were
essentially feudal in nature (see Chapter 2 for fuller discussion).
[5) Some writers who claim adherence to Marxism adopt an alternative
perspective on the role of ideology to the one proposed here, Following in
the tradition of Althusser, for instance, Hall (1980) and CCCS (1982)
discuss the reproduction of racist ideas in terms of their relative
autonomy from the material relations of production. However, since these
differences do not have a direct bearing on the main discussion, they are
not addressed in this thesis. See
a) Hall, S: "Racism and Reaction" in Commission for Racial Equality:
Five Views of Multi-Racial Britain, CRE, 1980, London
b) Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies: The Empire Strikes Back,
Hutchinson, 1982, London
[6] For a fuller discussion of sociobiology, see
a) Baxter, 5: "Sociobiology: A Racist Synthesis"
Doctoral Research Working Paper presented at
the Centre for Research on Ethnic Relations
University of Warwick, July 1985
b) Barker, K: The New Racism: ConservativeE and the Ideoioy of the
Tribe, Junction Books, 1981, London
c) Gordon, P. & F. Klug: New Right, NesRacism, Runnymede Trust, 1986,
London
i rJI
[7) The 'dual economy' was a characterisation developed to describe the
contemporary configuration of American capitalism. A distinctfon was drawn
between centre and periphery firms in terms of the capital composition
which structured each sector. 'Centre' firms were the mainstay of the
American economy. Capitalised on a grand scale, they served "national and
international markets", used "technologically progressive systems of
production and distribution", were organisationally "corporate and
bureaucratic" and were "vertically integrated through ownership and control
of critical raw material suppliers and product distributors" (Averitt 1968:
p.7).	 'Periphery' firms, by contrast, were "relatively small" and often
"dominated by a single individual or family" (ibid). Markets and profits
for 'periphery' firms were restricted and borrowing difficult.
Technologically less advanced than 'centre' firms, those in the 'periphery'
were highly subject to fluctuations in the economy. See
a) Averitt, R.T: The Dual Economy, W.V.Norton, 1968, New York
b) Galbraitb, J,K: The New Industrial State, Hamish Hamilton, 1967,
London
CHAPTER 2
[1] See for example,
Baran, F: The Political Economy of Growth, Monthly Review Press,
New York 1957;
Emmanuel, A: Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Free
Trade, Monthly Review Press, 1972, New York
Amin, S: Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of
Peripheral Capitalism, The Harvester Press, 1976, Hassocks
Frank, G: Dependent Accumulation and UnderdeveloDment, Monthly Review
Press, 1979, New York
Cardoso, F.M. & L,Faletto: Dependency and Development in Latin America,
University of California Press, 1979
[2] Prior to China's unification and the Ch'in dynasty, land tenure had
been controlled by an aristocratic elite, despite being nominally under the
tutelege of the emperor. This pattern of ownership was formally recognised
during the Shang Yang reform (C. mid fourth century BC) under Ch'in and its
regulation fell increasingly under governmental control. The period between
the Ch'in to Early Ch'ing dynasties thus witnessed the consolidation of
trade, cottage industries and farming under a single governmental apparatus.
One of the reforms introduced by Shang Yang (a minister for agriculture)
was the 'equal field system' according to which the state granted limited
land tenures to peasants who in turn accepted various fiscal
responsibilities. The latter part of the eighth century, however, saw the
surrender of state powers in this arena to private control. Fixed taxes
were replaced by levies proportional to the amount of land owned and
cultivated, This system entailed the burgeoning of huge, privately owned
estates (the owners of which were enmeshed in the ruling bureaucracy) and a
corresponding growth in tenant farmers.
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[3] The 'asiatic' mode of prodution was a pre-capitalist mode of
production with the following characteristics: (.) The major division in
society was between the state apparatus and agricultural villages. (b) The
state taxed and absorbed the economic surplus of the villages for two main
reasons - to finance infrastructural investments for the whole society eg.
irrigation projects, flood control and roads, arid for its own luxury
consumption needs.
	 (a) Each village possessed the land in common and
communally shared the produce.
[4] North China Herald April 30th 1864, quoted in Chan 1982 p.517
[5] Alcock's report quoted in MacNair, H.F: Modern Chinese History.
Selected Readings, Shanghai, 1927, pp.409-410
[6] Cole, F-R: The Peruvians at Home, London, 1877, p.199; quoted in
Stewart 1970 p.97
[7] D.J. Williamson to Secretary of State, Callao, Sept.20 1870 (No.11),
Consular Despatches, Callao 6; quoted in Stewart 1970 op cit p.97-98
[8)	 "Memorial of Nine English Shipmasters to the Lords of the Privy
Council of Trade", June 27, 1854, London; quoted in Stewart 1970 op cit p.97
[9] D.J.Williamson, op cit. in Stewart 1970 op cit
[10] Gibb, American Despatch To Secretary of State, Lima, November 13, 1874,
No.107 (Peru 28); quoted in Stewart 1970 op cit p.225
[ii] Figures for Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia are added together
[12] All references in this paragraph are from sources held at the
Runnymede Trust library. More detailed references than those given in the
text were not obtainable.
[13] Denby, C. in Forum September 1899, taken from Review of Reviews 1
December 1899, quoted in May 1973 (Introduction)
[14] Whilst the Act did not specifically mention the exclusion of East
European Jews, it is widely renowned to have been instituted for this
purpose: see forexample Gordon and Klug 1985 pp.1-2; Rees 1982 pp.77-79
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[15] "Report on Miss Robinson's allegation re Chinamen" (undated) in file
dated 1 February 1911, 11045 11843/139147/18, quoted in May 1978 pp.113-114
[16] Figures from the 1911 Census reveal that the ratio of Chinese seamen
working f or British ships (including those temporarily resting) totalled
roughly five thousand, out of a total of seventy three thousand for foreign
seamen (May 1978 p.115).
CHAPTER 3
[1] McBride, TJ'l: The Domestic Revolution, Croon Helm, 1976, London
quoted in WiggIns 1985
[2] Waton defined the Hans lineaEe as "direct lineal (male) descendants
of a common founding ancestor who settled in the Hong Kong region nearly
600 years ago... Since surname exogamy is strictly enforced in this part
of China, all wives must be brought in from other villages" (Watson 1975
pp.1B-19)
CHAPTER 4
[1] Ownership of the growing pub trade is dominated by the major brewery
companies and operated through franchises. A similar situation pertains to
the hotel and travel industry. Trust Houses Forte, the largest British
catering company, for example, owns two hundred hotels in the UK and the
Post House chain. The firm has pioneered motorway service stations and
airport catering in Britain and now supplies over one hundred and twenty
international airlines with cabin food (London Food Commission 1986 op
cit),
CHAPTER 5
[1)	 Letter to W. Burgius Jan 25 1894, p.694 in Marx, K. & F.Engels:
Selected works, Progress Publishers, 1973, Moscow
[2 Employment in small firms is believed to possess further advantages in
that it is geographically tied to the locality and less vulnerable to the
national and international mobility of' large companies. Taylor (1981), for
instance, discussed the political importance of co-operatives in tackling
problems in the local community, how localised firms could be instrumental
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to local authorities in establishing control over local economy and the
benefits of locally spent profits for alleviating local unemployment. Falk
(1983) to take another example, argued that small businesses often were
more resilient and less prone to disruptions (for example, through
industrial action) than large firms. This was said to be achieved through
more personalised management styles derived from closer working between
management and employees. As it was put by a Conservative Party Pamphlet
(p.1, cited in Scase & Goffee 1982 op cit p.12), uKore than one job in three
outside the public sector is in small businesses. If they were encouraged
to do so they could become the main source for new jobs."
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